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                                     Online as it is in Heaven 
     An Exploration of the Phenomenon of Digital Presence, Techno-                  
         Soteriology, and the Secularisation of Transcendent Being 
 
                                        By David Eaton 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the phenomenon of ‘Digital Presence’: the sense that Social 
Network Sites (namely Facebook) constitute the sole means of communicating with 
the deceased. Previous investigations of Digital Presence have largely been 
quantitative surveys seeking to document the extent of the phenomenon; qualitative 
inquiries have not attempted to determine why certain survivors experience Digital 
Presence whilst others do not. 
 
This thesis is a qualitative inquiry featuring interviews with eight survivors who 
interact with the profiles of the deceased. It seeks to determine the conditions in 
which the phenomenon occurs, and to explain Digital Presence with reference to 
theories and concepts from the field of cognitive neuroscience. 
 
It also argues that the phenomenon is contingent upon notions of ‘The Digital’ as a 
vista which is ontologically distinct from the ‘Physical World’; it concludes that 
Digital Presence is ultimately the ‘deathstyle’ of a particular, secular worldview, i.e. 
this worldview’s response to the existential challenge posed by death. 
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This thesis is a result of my own work. Material from the work of others 
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                                                 Introduction 
 
That the internet has fundamentally and irrevocably changed the way we live is the 
clichéd salutation of virtually every article that has ever been written about it. But 
that’s because it’s true. 
 
Based on data collated by the World Bank, the UN and the CIA, an estimated 3.19 
billion people have access to the internet, c.40% of the global population.1 We use it 
to shop, explore digitally mapped cities, and share information from our desks, our 
baths and our beds. It has also provided us with new ways of interacting with each 
other, as Social Network Sites (herein SNS) have become ‘central to contemporary 
processes of… relationship maintenance, [and] self-expression’.2   
 
The first dedicated SNS, Sixdegrees was launched in 1997 and was quickly followed 
by Friendster and Ryze. The first SNS to achieve ‘mass popularity’ however was 
Myspace, founded in 2003.3 At its peak, Myspace boasted 300 million users, 110 
million of which logged into to the site at least once a month.  
 
Since 2008 the world’s most popular SNS has been Facebook. On the 27th August 
2015, the company announced that more than 1 billion people had logged in and were 
online at that very moment. As of 30th June 2015, Facebook had 1.49 billion users 
who logged in at least once a month. It had 986 million users who logged in at least 
once a day. These users create Profiles, add their friends and family to their networks, 
and interact and share multimedia content with them. Most of these friends are alive. 
But some of them are dead. 
 
Companies which manage the digital estates of the deceased such as their email and 
SNS accounts have estimated that 10,273 Facebook users die per day, and that more 
                                                 
1 http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/, accessed 07/09/15. 
2 T. Hutchings, ‘Wiring Death: Dying, Grieving and Remembering on the Internet’, in D. Davies and C. 
Park (Eds) ‘Emotion, Identity and Death’, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), p43. 
3 D. boyd and N. Ellison, ‘Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship’, Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication, 13 (1), 2007, [boyd opts not to capitalise her surname, as a 
political statement]. 
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than 30 million have died since 2008.4 Current projections, based on ‘the total number 
of Facebook users, their ages and geographic distribution, and international death 
rates’5 predict that at the earliest, the dead will outnumber the living on Facebook 
around 2065. Many of these Profiles of the deceased (herein PDs) persist long after 
the death of their progenitors, and survivors continue to interact with them. 
 
Memorialising the deceased online however is nothing new. Roberts,6 de Vries and 
Rutherford7 and Roberts and Vidal8 have documented how websites such as ‘World 
Wide Cemetery’ and the ‘Virtual Memorial Garden’ allowed survivors to create 
digital memorials including eulogies and photo montages as early as 1995. What is 
different about Facebook is the sense in which for some survivors, ‘it feels like the 
dead are listening.9 
 
For these survivors, Facebook is not simply one of a number of avenues used to 
continue a bond and communicate with the deceased, equitable to talking at the 
graveside or communing in their heads. Instead, Facebook is uniquely efficacious. It 
is ‘the only place to leave a message’,10 the only way to ‘get hold of’11 the deceased. 
If the deceased’s Profile were to be deleted, it would ‘feel like I wouldn’t be able to 
talk to them properly’12 as ‘it’s strange but part of me just feels like they see it 
somehow’.13  
 
Carroll and Landry’s 2010 quantitative study of SNS mourning practices established 
                                                 
4 http://www.nathanlustig.com/tag/facebook-death-rate/, accessed 07/09/15. 
5 Ibid. 
6 P. Roberts, ‘From My Space to Our Space: The Functions of Web Memorials in Bereavement’, The 
Forum 32 (4), 2006. 
7 J. Rutherford and B. de Vries, ‘Memorialising Loved Ones on the World Wide Web’, Omega, Vol. 49 
(1), 2004. 
8 P. Roberts and L. Vidal, ‘Perpetual care in cyberspace: A portrait of Web memorials’, Omega, 40, 
2000. 
9 E. Kasket, ‘The Face(Book) of Death: Posthumous Identity and Interaction on a Social Networking 
Site’, 9th International Conference on Death, Dying and Disposal, Durham, 2009, cited in T. Walter, R. 
Hourizi, W. Moncur and S. Pitsillides, ‘Does the Internet Change How We Die and Mourn? An 
Overview’, Omega, 64 (4), 2011, p16. 
10 J. Hieftje, ‘The Role of Social Networking as a Medium for Memorialization in Emerging Adults’, 
(Doctoral Thesis, Indiana University, 2009), p139. 
11 Sam, respondent in my undergraduate dissertation study, Durham, 2013. 
12 E. Kasket, ‘Being-Towards-Death in the Digital Age’, 2011, 
https://www.academia.edu/1705544/Being-towards-death_in_the_digital_age, accessed 03/09/15. 
13 E Kasket, ‘Continuing Bonds in the Age of Social Networking’, Bereavement Care, 31, 2010, cited in 
E. Kasket, ‘Access to the Digital Self in Life and Death: Privacy in the Context of Posthumously 
Persistent Facebook Profiles’, Scripted, Vol. 10 (1), 2013, p15. 
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that some survivors were utilising Facebook PDs as sites of continued contact and 
communication with their decedents. In conclusion to their 2012 study of survivor 
interactions with PDs on Myspace, Brubaker et. al acknowledged that popular SNS 
practice had already shifted, and urged that ‘analysis of similar, but more recent 
content from additional sites, such as Facebook, is necessary’.14 
 
Since then, a variety of qualitative inquiries into survivor interactions with the 
deceased on Facebook have been conducted by Kasket, Brubaker and Hayes, 
Marwick and Ellison, deGroot, and Church amongst others. All of these studies 
however have suffered from at least one of three shortcomings, and I include my 
earlier investigations amongst this number. 
 
Firstly, several studies, including those conducted by Church15 and Carroll and 
Landry,16 have failed to note whether PDs were considered to be a uniquely 
efficacious means of communicating with the deceased. They did not inquire if the 
PD constituted the sole means by which survivors felt that they could communicate 
with their decedents, or whether it was only one of a number of channels (no more or 
less effective than speaking to a photograph or continuing a conversation in the mind). 
 
Secondly, those studies which did note whether survivors considered PDs to be the 
sole means of contacting the deceased, wherein they experienced an ineffable 
‘feeling’ that the deceased were present on Facebook (a phenomenon we shall refer to 
as ‘Digital Presence’) did not attempt to distinguish why some survivors experienced 
Digital Presence, whilst others felt that PDs no longer had any connection with the 
deceased. 
 
Kasket17 and Hieftje18 have yet to suggest what might differentiate those who 
                                                 
14 J. Brubaker, F. Kivran-Swaine, L. Taber and G. Hayes, ‘Grief-Stricken in a Crowd: The Language of 
Bereavement and Distress in Social Media’, 2012 AAAI Conference, p49. 
15 H. Church, ‘Digital Gravescapes: Digital Memorializing on Facebook’, The Information Society, 29 
(3), 2013. 
16 B. Carroll and K. Landry, ‘Logging On and Letting Out: Using Online Social Networks to Grieve 
and to Mourn’, Bulletin of Science, Technology  and Society 30 (5), 2010. 
17 Kasket, op. cit., 2009; 2010; 2011; 2013. 
18 Hieftje, op. cit. 
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experience Digital Presence from their peers, and Brubaker et. al’s19 2013 study only 
examined attitudes towards Digital Presence expressed by those who knew people 
whom had experienced the phenomenon, not those who had experienced it themselves. 
 
My own research, undertaken for my undergraduate dissertation, noted basic 
demographic information about my respondents, e.g. age and gender, and recorded 
the nature of their relationship with their decedents and the time elapsed since their 
deaths. It did not, however, note the personal beliefs of respondents, and it did not 
give adequate attention to the emotional states respondents associated with Digital 
Presence.  
 
Finally, the majority of these surveys have examined survivor interactions with 
memorialised Profiles. In 2009, Facebook introduced the ‘Memorialisation’ function 
to allow survivors to remove certain features from a PD.20 If requested, memorialised 
Profiles firstly inform visitors that the user has died, the Profile no longer appears in 
public searches or public groups and spaces, and it can only be viewed by members of 
the deceased’s network. Studies conducted by Marwick and Ellison,21 Kern,22 Forman, 
Kern and Gil-Egui,23 and DeGroot24 amongst others have all focused on survivor 
interactions with memorialised Profiles. 
 
But this function has not been universally well received by survivors. A number of 
surveys have found that ‘most users choose to interact with a person’s regular 
Facebook presence’,25 and that survivors would ‘never ask for a slimmed down 
                                                 
19 J. Brubaker, G. Hayes and P. Dourish, ‘Beyond the Grave: Facebook as a Site for the Expansion of 
Death and Mourning’, The Information Society, 29 (3), 2013. 
20 See https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/1605213279719667, accessed 12/09/15. 
21 A. Marwick and N. Ellison, ‘There Isn’t Wifi in Heaven!’: Negotiating Visibility on Facebook 
Memorial Pages’, Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 56, (3), 2012. 
22 R. Kern, ‘R.I.P: Remain in Perpetuity. Facebook Memorial Pages’, Telematics and Informatics, 30, 
2013. 
23 A. Forman, R. Kern and G. Gil-Egui, ‘Death and Mourning as Sources of Community Participation 
in Online Networks: R.I.P Pages in Facebook’, First Monday, 17, (9), 2012. 
24 See J. DeGroot, ‘For Whom the Bell Tolls’: Emotional Rubbernecking in Facebook Memorial 
Groups’, Death Studies, 37 (10), 2013, and ‘Maintaining Relational Continuity with the Deceased on 
Facebook’, Omega, 65, (3), 2012. 
25 S. Buck, ‘How 1 Billion People Are Coping with Death and Facebook’, Mashable, 13/02/13, 
http://mashable.com/2013/02/13/facebook-after-death/, accessed 03/11/14. 
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version’ of the deceased’s Profile.26 And, following an involuntary memorialisation in 
2012, around 1500 British parents established a campaign group to reinstate the 
Profile of a woman’s deceased daughter back to full functionality.27  
 
Nonetheless, this inquiry and my undergraduate study both issued invitations intended 
to attract as broad a range of experiences as possible. In both studies however, 
respondents had only interacted with functionally consistent, non-memorialised PDs, 
and some respondents were vehemently opposed to the notion of memorialisation. 
Their testimonies and the above-mentioned surveys have confirmed the need for 
inquiries into Digital Presence to primarily focus on survivor interactions with 
functionally consistent PDs. 
 
This study shall seek to address these shortcomings to discover why memorialisation 
is met with such hostility, and why some survivors experience Digital Presence whilst 
their peers do not. To do so, we shall also examine attitudes toward what Graham, 
Gibbs and Aceti,28 and Donath29 have described as ‘The Digital’, i.e. a purposively 
ambiguous term intended to express the fluidity with which digital hardware, software 
and the internet are collectively understood. Because as Ohnuki-Tierney has noted, 
there is ‘a functional advantage in defining phenomena vaguely’30 when ‘the 
intellectual and emotional content of a phenomenon is only dimly perceived’.31 
 
Of course, this is not without its difficulties: Digital Presence belongs to that category 
of experience described by Merleau-Ponty as ‘Tacit cogito’, and by James as 
‘Acquaintance knowledge’ i.e. as a ‘feeling’ derived from experience, encompassing 
‘sensations, emotions, and vague ‘feelings of relations.32 As such, respondents are 
                                                 
26 J. Kaleem, ‘Death on Facebook Now Common As ‘Dead Profiles’ Create Vast Virtual Cemetery’, 
Huffington-Post, 12/07/12, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/07/death-facebook-dead-
profiles_n_2245397.html, accessed 26/10/14. 
27 A. Smith-Squire, ‘Facebook ‘Heartless’ Says Grieving Mum’, The Magazine, 
http://sellyourstoryuk.com/2012/03/04/facebook-heartless-memorialised/, accessed 24/10/14. 
28 See C. Graham, M. Gibbs and L. Aceti, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue on the Death, Afterlife, and 
Immortality of Bodies and Data’, The Information Society, 29 (3), 2013. 
29 See J. Donath, ‘Pamphlets, Paintings, and Programs: Faithful Reproduction and Untidy 
Generativity in the Physical, and Digital Domains’, in ‘Switching Codes: Thinking Though Digital 
Technology in the Humanities and the Arts’, (Eds) T. Bartscherer and R. Coover, (London: University 
of Chicago Press, herein UCP, 2011). 
30 E. Ohnuki-Tierney, ‘Illness and Healing Among the Sakhalin Ainu’, (Cambridge: CUP, 1981), p157. 
31 Ibid, p149. 
32 Ibid. 
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characteristically incognisant of its causes and uncertain how to articulate their 
experiences, e.g. some have simply stated ‘It’s weird’33 and that they ‘don’t know 
what I believe’.34 
 
Therefore, we must consider which qualitative methods we could employ to attempt 
to understand the ineffable; but firstly, given the nature of our subject matter, we must 
also determine whether we can conduct an investigation into Digital Presence without 
committing trespass and inflicting trauma.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 J. Kaleem, op. cit. 
34 Kasket, 2010, op. cit., cited in Kasket, 2013, op. cit., p15. 
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                                                             1 
              Trespass, Trauma and Understanding the Ineffable 
                           Ethical Considerations and Methodology 
 
‘Next to Impossible’ - Ethical Guidelines and Internet Research 
 
Before employing qualitative methods to examine social media, we may wish to 
consult the research guidelines of one or more social scientific associations to 
familiarise ourselves with the ethical issues pertinent to digital technologies. 
 
If we consulted the RCSI’s ‘Reflections on Cybermethodology’ we would discover 
that ‘it is next to impossible to produce formal methodological guidelines for research 
in cyberspace at present’.35 The British Sociological Association would inform us that 
‘sociologists have a responsibility to ensure that the physical, social and psychological 
well-being of research participants is not adversely affected by their research’,36 
before qualifying that ‘ethical standards for internet research are not well developed 
as yet’.37 
 
If we scoured the ESRC’s ‘Framework for Research Ethics’ for guidelines on internet 
research we would note that ‘researchers… will often encounter new or unfamiliar 
ethics questions and dilemmas’,38 and that ‘a good starting point is the Association of 
Internet Researchers Guidelines’.39 Upon locating these professional conduct 
guidelines, we may well conclude that ‘multiple judgements are possible, and 
ambiguity and uncertainty are part of the process’.40 
 
Of course, such tentative and qualified forewarnings are unsurprising, given that the 
environment under consideration is ‘bound to evolve significantly in the time between 
                                                 
35M. Aiken and C. McMahon, ‘A Primer on Research in Mediated Environments’, RCSI, 
CyberPsychology Research Unit, Working Paper Series #14.2.m, July 2014, p7. 
36 ‘Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association’, British Sociological 
Association, March 2002, p2. 
37 Ibid, p5. 
38 ‘ESRC Framework for Research Ethics’ ESRC, 2012, p33. 
39 Ibid. 
40 AOIR Ethics Committee, ‘Ethical Decision-Making and Internet Research’, 2012, p5. 
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conceptualization and publication’.41 For instance, any research which involved user 
engagement with the Android smartphone Facebook App would require continued 
reassessment, as there are currently 35 different versions of this application.  
 
Over the course of a relatively brief period, even the focus of popular SNS practice 
can shift; Brubaker et al.42 have noted how a research inquiry into Myspace activity 
begun in 2007 would not reflect contemporary SNS practice by 2008, the year 
Facebook established itself as the dominant platform. Again, the particular 
methodological difficulties associated not with distinct media, but the distinct 
functional features of different SNS, warrants entirely different approaches. 
 
However, as even the relatively inexperienced social-scientific researcher is aware, 
personal judgement is a sine qua non of ethical consideration. As reaffirmed in the 
BPS’s Code of Human Research Ethics: ‘thinking is not optional’.43 Indeed, as the 
AoIR states, ‘phronesis is a crucial factor in determining the ethical applicability of 
any given methodology of internet research’.44 
 
Therefore research guidelines, echoing Moor’s observation that due to the scale of 
technological development, there will forever be ‘policy vacuums about how 
computer technology should be used’,45 emphasise the necessity of ‘applying existing 
ethics principles in an IMR (Internet Mediated Research) context’.46 They also stress 
the need to reflect on ‘traditional and current’47 research practices, and ‘make choices 
on the basis of principles and values’.48 
 
One example of a codification of established research principles is the BPS ‘Code of 
Ethics and Conduct’. These guidelines warn that as they were not drafted with 
consideration to internet research, we ‘might wish to consider erring on the side of 
                                                 
41 E. Kasket, ‘Review: Dying, Death and Grief in an Online Universe’, Journal of Religion, Media and 
Digital Culture, 2 (2), 2013, p62. 
42 See Brubaker et. al., 2012. 
43 ‘Code of Human Research Ethics’, British Psychological Society, 2011, p4. 
44 AOIR, op. cit., p4. 
45 J. Moor, ‘Ethics and the Information Revolution’, in ‘Readings in Cyberethics’, (2nd Ed), ed. R. 
Spinello and H. Tavani (London: Jones and Bartlett Publishers Int, 2004), p266. 
46 ‘Ethics Guidelines for Internet-Mediated Research’, BPS, 2013, p1. 
47 Aiken and Mc Mahon, op. cit., p7. 
48 BPS, 2002, op. cit., p1. 
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caution’ in one’s judgements’49 when conducting such research. 
 
The code recommends that we consider four basic principles before embarking upon 
any qualitative enquiry: ‘respect for the autonomy and dignity of persons, scientific 
value, social responsibility, and maximising benefits and minimising harm’.50 
Examples of conventional applications include assessing the degree to which those 
studied may ‘perceive apparent intrusions into their private and personal worlds’,51 
and the related extent to which ‘research procedures might disrupt/harm social 
groups’,52 both contingent upon determining whether research contexts constitute 
‘public situations’. 
 
With regards to applying these principles to internet research, the code acknowledges 
that ‘it is not always easy to determine which online spaces people perceive as 
‘private’, or ‘public’.53 This assessment is deemed crucial to ensure respect for 
autonomy and dignity of persons, social responsibility (whether inquiries may be 
deemed ‘invasive’), and to determine whether harm may result from not seeking 
informed consent in ‘spaces where people believe that they are not likely to be 
observed’.54 
 
However, even when internet researchers have sought to uphold the harm principle 
through adhering to the reasonable expectation of online subjects, conflicting 
approaches have been formulated: whilst Elgesem and Walther have both maintained 
that ‘the expectations of the actors/agents involved are paramount’, Elgesem prohibits 
recording inter/actions in ‘the public spaces on the net’, while Walther concludes that 
such observations are ethically permissible.55 
 
Indeed, Walther appears able to justify his approach with reference to the ‘Ethical 
Guidelines for Internet-Mediated Research’, as these guidelines state that a researcher 
                                                 
49 BPS, 2002, op. cit., p6. 
50 BPS, 2013, op. cit., p2. 
51 BPS, 2002, op. cit., p4. 
52 BPS 2013, op. cit., p5. 
53 Ibid, p6. 
54 Ibid. 
55 D. Elgesem, ‘What is Special about the Ethical Issues in Online Research?’, Ethics and Information 
Technology, 4 (3), 2002, and J. Walther, ‘Research Ethics in Internet-Enabled Research’, same 
publication, both cited in AOIR op. cit., p30. 
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may utilise ‘non-reactive’ techniques, wherein ‘data about individuals are collected 
unobtrusively, e.g. ‘in found text in online spaces’.56 Getty et al. claim that such 
‘unobtrusive’ methods are ‘sensitive to users’ in studies of digital post-mortem 
communication (herein DPMC), as ‘analysing extant posts on profiles is non-invasive, 
as users are not questioned or otherwise contacted by researchers’.57 Likewise, 
Brubaker and Hayes ensured that of the 1369 deceased Myspace profiles they 
examined, the sample was limited to ‘Profile pages and comments [that] are publicly 
visible’,58 so as not to be obtrusive, and thus insensitive to survivors. 
 
Walther, Getty, Brubaker and Hayes can, with reference to the principles outlined 
above, claim they don’t require informed consent, as the scope of their inquiries was 
limited to ‘public’ spaces. Sinha and Back maintain SNS constitute ‘public’ spaces as 
through SNS interactions users ‘broadcast themselves’,59 whilst Langer and Beckman 
have claimed that examining online spaces is ‘analogous to viewing readers’ letters to 
newspapers’.60 
 
Indeed, in relation to DPMC, to elicit consent may be contrary to the researcher’s 
obligation to minimise harm, as ‘requesting such consent in the immediate aftermath 
of a traumatic death could be enormously insensitive’.61 
 
However, Beneito-Montagut has claimed that those using public websites ‘do not 
expect researchers to be gathering their exchanges of personal information as data’.62 
Therefore, if online subjects reasonably expect publicly accessible websites to be 
afforded a degree of privacy, the harm principle would stipulate that we should 
attempt to gain consent to avoid a violation of privacy. Nonetheless, the extent to 
which informed consent is necessary to conduct any manner of SNS research, and 
                                                 
56 BPS, 2013, op. cit., p2. 
57 E. Getty, J. Cobb, M. Gabeler, C. Nelson, E. Weng and J. Hancock, ‘I Said Your Name in an Empty 
Room: Grieving and Continuing Bonds on Facebook’, 2011 SIGCHI Conference, p997. 
58 J. Brubaker and G. Hayes, ‘We Will Never Forget You- An Empirical Investigation of Post-mortem 
Myspace Comments’, ACM 2011 Conference, p126. 
59 S. Sinha and L. Back, ‘Making Methods Sociable: Dialogue, Ethics, and Authorship in Qualitative 
Research’, Qualitative Research (herein ‘QR’), 14 (4), 2014, p484. 
60 R. Langer and S. Beckman, ‘Sensitive Research Topics: Netnography Revisited’, Qualitative Market 
Research, 8, (2), 2005, p189-203, cited in C. Paechter, ‘Researching Sensitive Issues Online’, QR, 13 
(1), 2012, p80. 
61 Hutchings, op. cit., p51-52. 
62 R. Beneito-Montagut, ‘Ethnography Goes Online: Towards a User-Centred Methodology to 
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indeed, the legality of any such ‘non-invasive’ methods is the subject of renewed 
scrutiny. 
 
When the studies cited above were published, discussions concerning the ethicality of 
different SNS research methods were largely confined to research communities and 
their journals. This changed in June 2014 when the findings of a study into SNS and 
emotional contagion were published, and SNS research became the subject of intense 
media and legal scrutiny. 
 
‘I Am Not a Lab Rat’- Research Ethics and Media Scrutiny 
 
In January 2012 a member of Facebook’s Data Science department (Kramer), and 
research psychologists from the Universities of Cornell (Hancock) and California 
(Guillory), conducted an investigation entitled ‘Experimental Evidence of Massive-
Scale Emotional Contagion through Social Networks’, designed to gauge if ‘exposure 
to emotions led people to change their own posting behaviours on Facebook’.63 The 
inquiry involved the manipulation of Facebook’s ‘Newsfeed’, a perpetually dynamic 
visual representation of all the inter/actions of the members of a social network.  
 
The experiment involved a group of 689,000 users, divided into two sample groups: 
one exposed to a 10% increase in positive posts, the other to an equal adjustment of 
negative posts over a period of one week. Whilst the findings suggest a minor 
increase in relative posts, i.e. ‘when positive posts were reduced in the News Feed, the 
percentage of positive words in people’s status updates decreased by B =−0.1%’,64 
social media surveys record a massive increase in user vitriol following publication of 
the research paper. The BBC claimed the social media response ‘I am not a lab rat’ 
was typical of the adverse responses to the study.65 
 
The 2014 TRUSTe (a leading digital privacy certifier) consumer confidence index 
found that 84% of Facebook users had lost trust in the service, with 66% considering 
                                                 
63 A. Kramer, J. Guillory and J. Hancock, ‘Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional 
Contagion Through Social Networks’, PNAS, 111 (24), 2014, p8788. 
64 Ibid. 
65 ‘Facebook Emotion Experiment Sparks Criticism’, BBC, 30/06/14, 
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-28051930, accessed 31/10/14. 
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deleting their profiles because of the experiment.66 Hancock claimed he had received 
a number of physical threats following the publication of his findings;67 a statement 
from Cornell University sought to distance the institution from the experiment by 
claiming ‘the research was conducted independently by Facebook’.68 Kramer 
published on the SNS ‘I can understand why some people have concerns about it, and 
my co-authors and I are very sorry’.69 
 
The project was widely criticised by a variety of academics and research associations: 
Schroeder of the Oxford Internet Institute stated ‘if this had been a study conducted 
within academia, I doubt very much it would have got ethical approval’;70 the BPS 
claimed that the experiment ‘appears to contravene all four principles of research 
ethics as set out in the Society’s Code of Human Research Ethics’;71 and a member of 
the Commons Media Select Committee commented ‘if there is not already legislation 
on this, then there should be, to protect people’.72 
 
The study was not just criticised on the basis that exposure to abnormal levels of 
negative content risked harm. It was also criticised because it ‘failed to gain valid, 
informed consent from the participants’.73 The 2014 TRUSTe index claimed that ‘the 
outcry in response to the experiments indicates that users have two unique 
expectations of social media: a heightened expectation of privacy, and higher levels of 
trust’.74 
 
                                                 
66 D. Deasy, ‘Why Are Social Media Experiments Considered an Invasion of Privacy?’, TRUSTe, 
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how-facebook-works/378812/, accessed 31/10/14. 
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73 The Guardian, op. cit. 
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Facebook claimed that informed consent was constituted by ‘agreement with our data 
use policy, to which all users agree prior to creating an account’;75 however, Forbes 
has noted that the pertinent article in the data use policy was an addition made ‘four 
months after the study happened’.76 And whilst Facebook claimed it took measures to 
ensure the privacy of affected users, as ‘none of the data used was associated with a 
specific person’s Facebook account’77 (a precaution taken by Walther, Getty and 
Brubaker et. al) the degree of perceived violation suggests that ‘social media is a sort 
of online ‘home’.78 
 
Western legal systems have long recognised the home as a sacred place, and 
experiments that manipulate our ‘‘online homes’ may feel like the most serious 
transgression’.79 Furthermore, Fiske, the study’s editor, has claimed ’people are 
supposed to be told they are going to be participants in research and then agree to it 
and have the option not to agree to it without penalty’.80 
 
Thus, Crawford, an MIT Professor and Microsoft researcher, has claimed that ‘opt-in’, 
as opposed to ‘opt-out’ provisions are necessary to minimise the incidental risk of 
harm caused by a perceived violation of privacy, and to provide ‘more agency for 
users’.81 And whilst manipulating data is not pertinent to examining survivor 
interactions with PDs, the related issues of privacy and consent are. If SNS can be 
deemed equitable to ‘online homes’ and thus afforded a degree of privacy, then 
violating a point of continued contact and communication with the deceased, deemed 
a secure locale of such activity, could also be perceived as a severe violation of 
privacy.  
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Thus, we must consider the degree to which SNS can be described as ‘public’ or 
‘private’ to determine whether eliciting consent best serves the harm principle.  
However, before such judgements are made, we must acknowledge that ‘there are 
national laws and administrative regulations, (for example, Data Protection Acts, the 
Human Rights Act, Copyright and Libel laws), which may affect the conduct of 
research’.82 
 
As the RCSI recognises, it is difficult to determine whether a methodology is 
permissible ‘in the face of vacillating legal frameworks’.83 Nonetheless, research 
subjects are ‘likely to have rights under the Data Protection Act’,84 informed by the 
EU Data Protective Directive if subjects are under EU jurisdiction. As ‘very often 
research participants will be located in one or more different counties, so a project 
may span multiple nations, cultures and legal jurisdictions’,85 and given that 
Facebook’s Terms of Service state that a breach of contract will be litigated under US 
jurisprudence, it is also necessary to examine US legal frameworks. 
 
This is particularly the case as Grimmelmann, a law Professor at Maryland University, 
has claimed that failure to obtain informed consent in SNS research may breach the 
US Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects.86 
 
Therefore, researchers need to examine emerging legal frameworks (or lack thereof) 
to determine if they are required to elicit informed consent from their SNS research 
subjects. For even if the technologically literate researcher recognises that ‘like 
Heraclitus’ river, we can never enter the same internet twice’,87 they may still be 
swept away by the rising tide of case law and legal precedent. 
 
‘All applicable laws’ – Information, Content, and Data Protection 
 
Foremost scrutiny must be applied to Facebook’s Terms of Service, as this agreement 
constitutes a contract between the service provider and the user. It includes details of 
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the procedures and regulations researchers must abide by to avoid breach of contract, 
and the possible legal repercussions of any ensuing damage to Facebook’s reputation. 
 
We shall examine the latest version of the agreement, last revised 1st January, 2015.88 
In relation to publishing content and information, Facebook’s ‘Statement of Rights 
and Responsibilities’ notes: ‘when you publish content or information using the 
Public setting, it means that you are allowing everyone, including people not on 
Facebook, to access and use that information, and to associate it with you’.89  
 
However, this does not stipulate that researchers have unhindered access, and the right 
to disseminate user content or information. A qualifying article in the section entitled 
‘Protecting other People’s Rights’ states ‘if you collect information from users, you 
will: obtain their consent, make it clear that you (and not Facebook) are the one 
collecting their information and post a privacy policy explaining what information 
you collect and how you will use it’.90 Nonetheless, depending on our interpretation of 
the term ‘information’, a researcher could still observe, analyse, and publish details of 
DPMC on Facebook without requiring informed consent.  
 
‘Information’, as defined by the Terms of Service, refers to ‘Facts and other 
information about you’,91 and a sub-section concerning ‘Community Standards, 
Identity and Privacy’ states that ‘on Facebook, people connect using their real names 
and identities. We ask that you refrain from publishing the personal information of 
others without their consent’.92 
 
Given that ‘Personal information’ is related here to ‘Identities’, we could interpret 
‘Facts and Other Information’ as pertaining to demographic details, such as age, 
ethnicity, political affiliation and religious belief. But, ‘Information’ is also described 
as encompassing ‘actions taken by users and non-users who interact with 
                                                 
88 Initial reference was made to the November 2013 Terms of Service, however these were updated 
during the course of this study. No significant changes to any relevant subsections were made. 
89 Facebook Statement of Rights, Article 4, https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-site-
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90 Ibid, Article 7. 
91 Ibid, Definitions. 
92 Facebook Principles, op. cit. 
 21
Facebook’.93 This may suggest that a researcher would be prohibited from recording 
user interactions such as one person commenting on another’s Profile, as that act 
could be classified as an ‘action’.  
 
Discerning the scope of protected ‘Information’ is further complicated as another 
discrete category, ‘Content’, is defined as ‘anything you, or other users post on 
Facebook that would not be included in the definition of information’.94 The fact that 
‘posts’ are explicitly distinguished from protected ‘Information’, could well be 
interpreted to stipulate that a researcher could record and anonymise ‘content’ so as 
not to identify the action with the individual, and in doing so circumvent the informed 
consent article. Thus, providing the author could not be identified by their comment, 
we could maintain that there had been no breach of contract. 
 
Whilst the ambiguity of these terms may technically allow for a violation of the spirit 
of the policy, a researcher could defensibly, with reference to the Terms of Service, 
collect, analyse and publish anonymised comments made on PDs without seeking 
informed consent. However, these terms further appeal to the authority of ‘all 
applicable laws’95 relevant in the user’s jurisdiction. Therefore, researchers operating 
within the EU are required to abide by the dictates of the EU Directive on Data 
Protection. 
 
Article 6 of the Directive states that ‘personal data must be collected for specified, 
explicit and legitimate purposes’;96 therefore, any party involved in gathering 
‘Personal Data’ must issue a disclaimer alerting data subjects to their operations. 
However, in this instance ‘Personal Data’ are defined as ‘any information relating to 
an identified, or identifiable natural person’.97 
 
In relation to data harvesting PDs, providing that contributions are not published 
verbatim, as these ‘may be traced to... where they originated, where they are likely to 
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95 Facebook, Statement of Rights, Article 9, op. cit. 
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be linked to an individual’s identity’,98 then it appears these comments cannot be 
classified, and thus protected, as ‘Personal Data’. 
 
However, there are also provisions for the protection of ‘Sensitive Data’; a researcher 
requires explicit consent from the ‘data subject’ to process such information. This 
data includes information ‘revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, or 
religious beliefs… sensitive in the sense that the dissemination of such data can be 
particularly harmful to the data subject’s interests’.99  
 
If applied to comments left on PDs, then some comments could express cosmological 
concepts regarded as religious, e.g. references to Heaven. However, the fact that this 
is but one possible interpretation demonstrates the difficulty of applying the Directive 
to studies of DPMC. 
 
Furthermore, even a researcher based in the EU could be subject to legal challenge 
under US jurisprudence, if Facebook were to enact legal proceedings for breach of 
contract and damage to reputation caused by the publication of a scandalous study. 
Article 1 of the ‘Disputes’ section of Facebook’s Terms of Service states that ‘the 
laws of the State of California will govern this statement, as well as many claims that 
might arise between you and us’.100  
 
It is common practice for US Courts to cite other States’ judicial rulings when a case 
pertains to a legal framework still in its infancy, in order to discern and apply any 
relevant legal principles. Therefore, we must note which established legal principles 
US courts’ rulings on SNS privacy are based on to consider how these might be 
applied to SNS research by a Californian court. 
 
Uninitiated or Foolish - Reasonable Expectation 
 
US Judicial decisions concerning SNS privacy have been informed by the landmark 
Katz v. US (1967) case which established the principle of a reasonable expectation to 
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privacy. This principle is only applicable however when a concerted effort to protect 
privacy has been made. This is why a number of courts have claimed that examining 
and disseminating information found on SNS does not constitute an ‘invasion of 
privacy, because the facts are not actually private’.101 
 
Courts across the US have claimed: ‘information posted on a public medium, and 
available to anyone with access to the internet, is not private information’;102 ‘the 
concept of internet privacy is a fallacy upon which no one should rely’;103 and ‘only 
the uninitiated or foolish could believe that Facebook is an online lockbox of 
secrets’.104 
 
As noted however, the legal framework governing SNS privacy is still developing, 
and Katz v. US has also been cited to support rulings that ‘an individual’s right in 
controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not 
dissolve simply because that information may be available to the public in some 
form’.105 
 
Instead, the Californian Supreme Court has ruled that ‘mere visibility in a public 
space should not vitiate privacy rights… customs and usages of a space, and not the 
‘objective’ facts of a space, should define the territory in which one could legally 
claim a right to privacy ‘.106 Therefore, even in instances where privacy is not 
guaranteed by virtue of public accessibility, privacy may nevertheless be afforded, e.g. 
to publicly accessible Facebook profiles. 
 
The parties present in a particular setting have also been considered by US courts 
when applying the reasonable expectation test. In the case of Multimedia WMAZ v. 
Kubach, the Georgia Court of Appeal ruled that we do not ‘waive [our] expectation of 
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privacy in information by disclosing it to a limited number of people who care about 
[us], or share [our] experience’.107 Instead, in this case of a TV recording of an HIV 
support group, the court found that ‘the bonds of intimacy between the plaintiff and 
his audience were key components in determining whether information was 
protected’.108 
 
In relation to researching DPMC, we could argue that whilst the data is publicly 
accessible, there are contextual expectations of privacy informed by the intention of 
sharing data with ‘a limited number of people of shared experience’, i.e. fellow 
survivors, and those authorised by the deceased to interact with their Profile. And as 
‘intended audience should be a factor in deciding whether the aggrieved voluntarily 
made information public’,109 we could claim that a PD constitutes a place of 
normative privacy. 
 
However, contextual expectations of privacy protected by reasonable expectation 
must also be ‘established by general social norms and must be objectively 
reasonable’.110 Therefore, we must determine whether there are any norms governing 
SNS behaviour, and whether any such norms could be described as ‘objectively 
reasonable’; one means of assessing this is through judging whether a proposed norm 
is consistent with any coherent theory of privacy. 
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                                             Privacy 
 
To Share, or Not to Share - Control theory 
 
The control theory of privacy has gained broad support from legal practioners and 
academic theorists alike, with its central tenet summarised by Fried: ‘one has privacy 
if and only if one has control over information about oneself’.111 DeMarco has added 
that this account of privacy is one of the ‘ability of an individual to control the 
collection and dissemination of personally identifiable information by others’.112 
 
Thus, Westin explains that this account of privacy ‘distinguishes between situations 
where a person’s privacy is violated, and situations where the person reveals personal 
information about himself. The difference is, on the control account, that there is a 
loss of control in the first case, while in the second case the person exercises his 
control’.113  
 
By this account, it would be possible to deem a Facebook Profile private if an 
individual has the ability to control the extent to which their inter/actions are publicly 
accessible, and Facebook does indeed provide mechanisms to adjust privacy settings 
to reflect the extent to which a user wishes to share information and content.  
 
‘Ownership and control of information’, one of Facebook’s codified ‘Principles’, 
states that ‘people should have the freedom to decide with whom they will share their 
information, and to set privacy controls to protect those choices’.114 The fact that a 
user has the ability to control the accessibility of information about themselves 
coheres with the US ruling that a claim to privacy on SNS is only available to those 
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who ‘take measures to protect information’.115 
 
Indeed, another court ruled that the plaintiff in an SNS privacy dispute ‘may have had 
a reasonable expectation that her Facebook posting would remain private, considering 
that she actively took steps to protect her Facebook page from public viewing’.116 
Therefore, by the control account of privacy, an SNS profile can be described as 
private, and thus protected, if and only if users have adjusted their privacy settings 
accordingly. 
 
However, the ability to alter privacy settings is the user’s alone. We might imagine 
that unless the deceased had forewarning of their demise and were particularly 
conscious that their Profile may be utilised as a site of continued contact, they are 
unlikely to have anticipated this contextual shift. Thus, even if privacy settings were 
adjusted to ‘public’, survivors may contend that this new context warrants an 
adjustment of the deceased’s privacy settings. 
 
Furthermore, the ability to choose the privacy setting of another user’s inter/action 
with a Profile resides with the recipient user, i.e. ‘when you comment on, or ‘like’ 
someone else’s story, or write on their timeline, that person gets to select the 
audience’.117 Again, this control mechanism is redundant following the death of 
Profile’s user, as there is no agent to choose an appropriate privacy setting. 
 
However, following such concerns, in October 2009 Facebook introduced the 
‘Memorialisation’ function. If a request is made to memorialise a Profile, ‘we keep the 
timeline on Facebook, but limit access and some features’,118 specifically altering 
privacy settings to prevent users outside the deceased’s network from accessing the 
Profile, and viewing survivor inter/actions. 
 
Therefore, a claim to privacy in accordance with control theory may still be valid, 
providing survivors have submitted a request to memorialise a PD. If this request has 
not been made, and privacy levels are set to ‘public’, then the means to control access 
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are not being utilised and privacy cannot be ensured. However, as noted in our 
introduction, this function has not been universally well received and many survivors 
choose not to memorialise their loved ones’ PDs. 
 
Nonetheless, the dictates of control theory stipulate that if survivors are not willing to 
submit a PD to the memorialisation process, then that Profile can not be meaningfully 
described as ‘private’; there can be no control over accessibility.  
 
Control theory is not without criticism however. As Spinello notes, ‘on a practical 
level, one is never able to have complete control over every piece of information 
about oneself’.119 In relation to researching DPMC, an equitable ‘real world’ situation 
would be observing mourners by the graveside. Graveyards are designated ‘public’ 
places, as there are no restrictions on public access, and therefore no means by which 
mourners can control who can observe them. Nonetheless, few would maintain that 
close observation and scrutiny of the bereaved was acceptable behaviour, simply on 
the grounds that such actions are not restricted by the parameters of architecture.  
 
Similarly, Reiman claims that as ‘privacy is a social practice, it involves a complex of 
behaviours, e.g. refraining from looking into open windows one passes on the 
street’.120 Simply because we may not have the means to control who can observe us, 
does not imply that we forfeit any sense of privacy. The sociologist Goffman 
described the act of ‘giving someone space’, i.e. not scrutinising their inter/actions 
simply because we can, as ‘Civil inattention’121 (a ‘social norm, driven by an ideal of 
respect’). 
 
For example, if we are speaking to a friend in a café, there is an expectation that 
fellow patrons will not actively attempt to listen to our conversation, despite their 
ability to do so. Examples such as these demonstrate that beyond the onus of the 
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individual to prevent the dissemination of information they wish to keep private, there 
are also social expectations informed by popular practice, or lack thereof, viz. norms. 
 
Even in contexts where we lack the means of ensuring that our inter/actions are free 
from scrutiny, there remains an expectation that peers will not attempt to observe, or 
disseminate, that which we have not made a concerted effort to publicise. Therefore, it 
is necessary to acknowledge that ‘architecture’, i.e. the constraints of environment, is 
not the sole means of regulating behaviour, and thus privacy. 
 
Indeed, as provisions in the US test of reasonable expectation allow, ‘social norms 
also regulate… understandings or expectations about how I ought to behave, enforced 
not through some centralised norm enforcer, but rather through the understandings 
and expectations of just about everyone within a particular community - direct and 
constrain my behaviour in a far wider array of contexts than any law’.122  
 
Lessig has identified four means of social regulation: law, social norms, market, and 
architecture, although when discussing digital contexts, Lessig substitutes architecture 
for ‘code’, i.e. the strictures of digital environments, such as the accessibility of an 
SNS Profile. 
 
However, in digital environments, code does not appear to be an effective regulator of 
privacy, as ‘entrenched constructs [of privacy] are all related in one form or another to 
a pervasive consciousness of physical space, a concept that is no longer relevant in 
analysing many modern online privacy harms’.123 Indeed, given how contentious SNS 
privacy is, it is evident that ‘without the ability to easily conceptualise location [and] 
boundaries… the traditional legal boundary between ‘public’, and ‘private’, have 
become blurred. As a result, expectations of privacy are unstable, and harder than ever 
to ascertain’.124 
 
Given the inherent ambiguity of digital structures in relation to conventional, spatial 
understandings of privacy, control theory appears applicable to ‘architecture’, but not 
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‘code’, as ‘the idea of private and public spheres or activity assumes a community in 
which not only does such a division make sense, but the institutional and structural 
arrangements that facilitate an organic representation of this kind are present’.125 
Digital structures do not allow for ‘organic representations’ of this kind, as 
demonstrated by the increasing body of case law concerning SNS privacy. 
 
However, when architecture/code is insufficient to regulate privacy, greater reliance is 
placed in the resource of social norms, as demonstrated through the popular practice 
of civil inattention in environments in which it is possible to observe and scrutinise 
behaviour, e.g. not staring at mourners in a public graveyard. This recourse to 
alternative forms of regulation is also enacted on SNS, as boyd and Marwick’s study 
of adolescent privacy strategies on Facebook found that ‘teenagers are especially 
wedded to social norms as the only regulatory force they feel empowered to shape’.126 
 
Indeed, boyd and Marwick encountered the popularly held conviction that 
‘information that is publicly accessible is not necessarily intended to be consumed by 
just anyone. While teens may be negotiating privacy in a public-by-default 
environment, social norms also serve a critical role in how teens do boundary 
work’;127 there was an expectation that ‘people ignore what’s not meant for them’.128 
 
Given the importance of social norms as a means of ensuring privacy (as noted in US 
case law), we must also examine the ‘Restricted Access’ theory, an approach charged 
with the criticism that it fails to ‘draw the distinction between private and public 
situations’,129 i.e. situations classified as such by the control theory account of privacy. 
However, as we will see, this is the virtue of the restricted access theory.  
 
In the Zone - Restricted Access 
 
Restricted access theory acknowledges the limitations of ‘architecture/code’, 
dispenses with the inapplicable public/private dichotomy stipulated by control theory, 
                                                 
125 R. Waks, ‘Personal Information: Privacy and the Law’, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), cited in 
Nissenbaum, op. cit., p7. 
126 boyd and Marwick, 2011, op. cit., p5. 
127 Ibid, p15. 
128 Ibid, p24. 
129 Elgesem, in Spinello and Tavani, op. cit., p427. 
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and accounts for the dictates of social norms as products of contexts. 
 
One proponent of restricted access theory, Allen, has defined privacy as ‘a degree of 
inaccessibility of persons, of their mental states, and of information about them to the 
sense and surveillance of others’.130 However, ‘access’ is not contingent on the mere 
possibility of accessibility; instead, this account of privacy crucially recognises ‘the 
importance of contexts, or ‘zones’ for protecting privacy’.131 
 
Nissenbaum has described how the concept of privacy is relevant to ‘a situation or 
zone, and not to the information itself’.132 The idea of assessing privacy claims in 
terms of ‘Zones’, or contexts is also expressed by Elgesem, in terms of ‘Channels’ of 
information,133 and by Hoven134 and Schoeman135 in terms of ‘Spheres’. In each of 
these articulations of restricted access theory, the norms of each ‘zone’, ‘channel’, or 
‘sphere’ define what constitutes legitimate access to a particular context. Shoeman has 
identified the legitimate access criterion as ‘an associational tie’,136 and Brown has 
elaborated that associational ties are understood ‘by virtue of their places in role 
structures’.137  
 
For example, a tax official is authorised to access an individual’s financial details in 
the conduct of their inquiries. However, if the same official were to access the same 
information to satisfy their own curiosity, with the search bearing no relevance to 
their role as a tax official, then we could claim an invasion of privacy had occurred 
despite no new information being gained. As Moor notes, ‘the employee has 
legitimate access in the first situation, but not the second’.138 
 
Similarly, a doctor or a lawyer is privy to information concerning their patients/clients 
in their role as service provider, but to attempt to gain this same information in a 
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personal capacity would constitute an invasion of privacy; information can only be 
legitimately accessed if authority to do so is conferred by virtue of our role, relative to 
the data subject. 
 
Therefore, the legitimacy of accessing a PD is contingent upon whether there is an 
associational tie between the individual and the deceased, with survivors occupying 
the roles of bereaved/consoled within a mutual support network of bereavement. 
Survivors would not anticipate extra-contextual dissemination of their inter/actions as 
this would ‘violate… the trust assumed in a relationship… if our interlocutor wants to 
publicise every detail, it is assumed that this intention will be announced’.139  
 
Indeed, an ‘invasion of privacy can be said to have occurred wherever the flow of 
information becomes divorced from the social role structure’,140 a phenomenon 
termed the ‘Short Circuit effect’141 by Brown. 
 
Therefore, even if we could claim the authority to legitimately access a PD by virtue 
of an associational tie to the deceased (and thus their network of survivors), to ‘short 
circuit’ this information would violate the norm of ‘contextual integrity’,142 as 
information would not be confined to the role structure in which it was shared.  
 
Nissenbaum has described the dissemination of information beyond the confines of an 
established role structure as a ‘violation of contextual integrity’,143 and she has noted 
that an ‘important function of privacy is to help maintain the integrity of intimate 
spheres as against more public spheres’.144  
 
Given the reasonable expectation of contextual integrity, based on the role structures 
of those who share an associational tie to the deceased, restricted access theory 
appears to afford PDs a degree of normative privacy. However, whilst civil inattention 
demands that we ‘refrain from looking into open windows we pass on the street’,145 
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Reiman has clarified that normative privacy does not entail ‘the right never to be seen 
on a crowded street’.146  
 
As Facebook’s Newsfeed is a perpetually dynamic, visual representation of a 
network’s inter/actions, we must assess whether individuals have the ability to avoid 
inadvertently viewing survivor inter/actions with PDs. If commenting on a PD is akin 
to demanding that we never be seen on a crowded street, then it may be unreasonable 
to claim that only those with legitimate access may view PD inter/actions, if we 
cannot avoid observing them. 
 
Therefore, a key determinant in deciding whether we can reasonably expect privacy 
on SNS is whether ‘information is in clear view to the casual observer, or whether the 
observer has to put forth significant effort to gain access’.147 
 
None of Your Business – Being Private in Public 
 
It is important to note that SNS practices are not static. Instead, ‘people’s practices, 
expectations, and social norms have also co-evolved alongside the technical 
features’148 of SNS platforms, and a crucial development has been that ‘traversing the 
connections between people to view profiles is no longer the sole - or, even primary - 
way of participation. Content is surfaced through streams’.149  
 
Users previously had to actively search for the Profile they wished to view, and then 
transgress the boundaries of that Profile to access it. Now, information is primarily 
accessed in the ‘Stream’ of the Newsfeed. The ‘salience of these features has 
shifted… media streams [the Newsfeed] have increasingly taken a more prominent 
role…the act of traversing did not change from a technical perspective, but became 
less central over time’.150 As such, the ‘basic profile [is] increasingly irrelevant as a 
destination’.151 
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Given the functional shift from traversing Profiles to examining the Newsfeed, a third 
party would have to make a concerted effort to search for, find and violate the 
contextual integrity of a PD by transgressing the boundaries of the Profile. For if we 
were not conferred the authority to access and contribute to the Profile by the 
deceased, then none of its activity would feature in our Newsfeed. 
 
Therefore we could well claim that it is possible and reasonable to practise civil 
inattention toward PDs. Indeed, this functional shift may also facilitate ‘boundary 
work’, whereby individuals attempt to ‘create symbolic distinctions between objects, 
people, practices, and architectures, e.g. a teen’s car is ‘private’, yet their parent’s is 
‘public’’.152 
 
For whilst ‘code’ cannot regulate privacy in the sense of limiting access through 
structure, in relation to social norms it may delineate the ‘public’ context of the 
Newsfeed, as the epicentre of activity and functional focal point, from the ‘private’ 
context of a PD. Thus, the boundaries of the Profile symbolically demarcate this 
distinction, much as St. Cuthbert’s line in Durham cathedral symbolically demarcated 
the spaces forbidden to women without physically restricting access to them.  
 
It is also important to note that the sense of violation which accompanies the 
transgression of these symbolic boundaries and of ‘short circuiting’ information is not 
necessarily dependent upon subject matter, as boyd and Marwick have found. 
 
When a local school authority presented images garnered from Facebook in a school 
assembly to demonstrate the need for privacy concern, there was a sense amongst 
students that ‘by taking the images out of context, the educators had violated students’ 
social norms, and thus, their sense of dignity, fairness, and respect’.153 It was not the 
content of the images that offended the students, but the fact that their symbolic 
boundaries had been transgressed, and their information ‘short circuited’. 
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However, besides the inherent sense of violation accompanying ‘short circuiting’, 
there are a variety of potential harms associated with violating the integrity of a PD. 
Firstly, given the recognition that ‘most people behave differently when they are 
being watched or monitored’,154 Zuboff has claimed it is not uncommon to find 
instances of what she has described as ‘anticipatory conformity’155 among those  
being observed. 
 
Whilst the Freudian ‘attachment’ theory of grief has been largely discredited by 
evidence supporting the ‘continuing bonds’ theory propounded by Silverman, Klass 
and Nickman156 and Walter157, it persists nonetheless. Therefore, it is still possible for 
a survivor who interacts with a PD to find their comments labelled indicative of 
‘emotional stress’,158 or as ‘symptomatic of pathology’.159 
 
Survivors may seek to avoid judgements of psychological irregularity by conforming 
to linear, staged-based attachment/loss accounts of grief, thus depriving them of a 
resource of unique efficacy. For privacy ‘enables us to form intimate bonds with 
people that might be difficult to form and maintain in public’,160 particularly so if our 
inter/actions might be assessed in relation to attachment/loss theories of grief. 
 
Furthermore, compromising a PD in this manner could constitute a denial of resource 
i.e. the resource of a secure locale of unique efficacy to communicate with the 
deceased, as interactions would no longer be confined to the context of bereaved 
mutual support.  
 
Transgressing a PD could also violate what DeCew has described as ‘expressive 
privacy’, i.e. ‘expressing one’s self-identity or personhood through speech or 
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activity… when the activity in question helps define oneself as a person’.161 This form 
of privacy is particularly relevant if we appreciate inter-relational models of 
reflexivity, such as that of Walter: ‘we create our selves through interacting with 
others’,162 or Searle’s which claims that maintaining a dialogue with the deceased 
‘serves as a micro-ritual for the sustenance and renewal of a secure narrative of self-
identity’.163 
 
Therefore, I believe that these potential harms are sufficient to class the violation of 
the normative privacy of a PD ‘offensive to a reasonable person’, as a researcher 
would violate those most vulnerable and intimate exchanges which occur within a 
community of mutual support for the bereaved. 
 
I also propose that the social norms which regulate the normative privacy of a PD can 
be described as ‘objective norms’, as the same principle which establishes the 
normative privacy of such protected institutions as patient/doctor confidentiality is 
applicable to PDs. Both are contexts protected by virtue of the associational ties and 
role structures in which information is exchanged in them. 
 
Whilst the debate on whether the emergent norms of SNS can be considered 
‘objectively reasonable’ may continue, the potential for such harms demonstrates that 
violating contextual integrity without permission contravenes a number of established 
principles in social-scientific research ethics. For example: ‘participant protection… 
and vulnerable populations’164 are not safeguarded by a violation of contextual 
integrity which ensures a denial of resource, both of a site of unique efficacy to 
contact the deceased, and of a potential social support network.  
 
’Respect for the autonomy and dignity of persons… social responsibility, and, 
maximising benefits, and minimising harm’ would be transgressed, as the autonomy 
of survivor groups would be infringed through the observation of a critical external 
agent. We could claim that ‘the extent to which proposed research study procedures 
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and dissemination practices might disrupt/harm social groups’ would be irrevocable, 
as a violation of contextual integrity renders a PD as anything but a secure locale of 
continued contact and communication. 
 
And through the act of trespassing on trauma, there may well be ‘deleterious 
consequences for [those] who come after them… [which] might undermine the 
reputation of… a discipline’,165 as survivors may perceive researchers to be 
underhand, and socially irresponsible. Therefore, any potential benefit derived from 
covertly observing and publishing DPMC, i.e. being ‘non-invasive’, is vastly 
disproportionate to the potential harm caused by violating contextual integrity, and 
compromising a resource of unique efficacy. 
 
For as the Facebook contagion experiment demonstrated, the inevitable publication of 
covert research will only further contribute to a sense of violation.166 However, whilst 
we have demonstrated the need to gain informed consent, it is possible that the very 
act of attempting to gain consent could in itself constitute a breach of privacy. 
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                                                Methodology                  
 
Gatekeepers and Legacies – Selecting Research Participants 
 
As Arksey and Knight have noted,167 one of the most significant barriers to 
conducting qualitative research can be identifying potential respondents. This process 
is simplified however if relevant parties are ‘regularly located at the same place or 
scene’.168 Those who experience Digital Presence are located on PDs (which can be 
readily discovered on directories such as ‘MyDeathSpace’).169 
 
As described, due to the dictates of normative privacy, any attempt to access a PD 
without consent could be deemed unethical. However, the act of requesting 
permission to avoid a violation of privacy is self-defeating, and paradoxical: it is akin 
to trespassing on another’s property in order to gain consent to enter said property. 
 
To gain consent, a researcher would need to access a PD to contact survivors, thus 
alerting survivors to the presence of an external agent lacking a relational tie to the 
deceased. The ramifications of an external observer making their presence known 
could be severe; given the absence of any detectable digital footprint, such a presence 
would otherwise remain unknown. By alerting survivors to a breach of normative 
privacy, they may become aware of the constant potential for scrutiny that digital 
anonymity affords, and the existence of a panoptic research community. This 
realisation could well compromise the integrity of the entire institution of the PD. 
 
I have previously written that as there is no coherent concept of ‘Ownership’, or 
‘Stewardship’ in relation to PDs, it is difficult if not impossible for any one survivor 
to assert the authority of ‘Gatekeeper’ and grant access to a Profile. Kasket has also 
dwelt on the conflict between ‘the right of next of kin… and potentially the rights of 
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other mourners, e.g. Facebook friends’170 when it comes to making decisions about a 
PD (decisions such as who has the right to engage with a Profile, and whether it 
should persist). For example, even if a decedent’s next of kin granted a researcher 
permission to examine a PD, other members of the deceased’s network may object, 
not least on the grounds that this could short-circuit their own privacy.  
 
This dilemma constituted an ethical and legal impasse when our study was conducted. 
However, in February 2015 Facebook introduced a function to resolve the issue of 
what constitutes authoritative stewardship of a PD. The ‘Legacy Contact’ feature 
allows users to nominate a contact to act as the official custodian of their Profile in the 
event of their demise. 
 
Kasket has noted that ‘while still living, the deceased made decisions about how to 
regulate their privacy, and admitted to the friends list only those who they wished to 
have access to information’.171 One of the features of the ‘Legacy Contact’ however is 
to allow the nominated custodian to ‘respond to new friend requests’,172 i.e. to 
effectively decide if a researcher can access the Profile. Therefore, researchers may 
now be in a position to seek, and gain the authority to access and examine a PD. 
 
However, I believe that difficulties will remain. Firstly, as this feature is a relatively 
new development, we do not currently have any data on how widely it has been 
utilised. It is questionable how many users will elect to nominate a ‘Legacy Contact’, 
particularly as more than half of Facebook’s users are aged under 35, and may not 
wish to spend time dwelling on their own demise.173 
 
Secondly, even if a ‘Legacy Contact’ is nominated, they will not be notified ‘until 
your account has been memorialised’.174 As noted, many users have expressed their 
opposition to the practice of Profile memorialisation, so it is questionable how many 
survivors would notify Facebook of a death, and so be in a position to enact ‘Legacy’ 
features. Therefore, whilst the introduction of the ‘Legacy Contact’ feature may allow 
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researchers to claim the authority to access PDs in some circumstances, it remains 
uncertain how often these conditions will be in place and does not negate the need to 
consider how we approach Profiles that for whatever reason lack a ‘Legacy Contact’. 
 
Another approach to selecting researching participants is to avoid PDs and contact 
survivors listed on online directories of PDs such as ‘MyDeathSpace’; this however is 
also problematic, as a number of survivors have publicly denounced such directories 
for inviting violations of privacy, and causing harm.175 
 
Researchers may also attempt to document their own experiences of participating as a 
member of a bereavement community on a PD. They might issue a general notice on a 
PD that they plan to observe interactions, or may petition for interview respondents. 
However, this approach risks threatening coercion via consensus. 
 
For even if fellow members are invited to object, or comment upon the proposal, if 
opposition is not forthcoming, more reserved members may conclude that the 
consensus is to allow scholarly scrutiny of the group. The imposition of such a request 
may itself discourage some members from engaging with the PD, and thus constitute 
a denial of resource (a problem which could also arise on Profiles with a ‘Legacy 
Contact’). 
 
Therefore, whilst it may be true that ‘in-depth interviews rarely constitute the sole 
source of data in research’,176 information elicited from respondent interviews in this 
study cannot be verified by participant-observation due to the related potential for 
harm. However, there are no difficulties in researchers identifying members of their 
own network who interact with PDs, if such interactions are publicly observable in 
their Newsfeed. A researcher could invite these members to share their experiences 
providing they emphasised that the PD would not be accessed, and could ask whether 
they would be happy to consolidate their own interactions for examination. 
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However, as there were no such cases in my own network at the commencement of 
this study, respondents were sought through advertisement. As a member of Durham 
University, I had access to a pool of 17,000 students and staff members, the majority 
of whom are members of the broad, dominant SNS demographic of 18-30 year olds 
(documented as being the demographic most likely to report sensations of ‘Digital 
Presence’).177 
  
The advertisement was disseminated via email by the Senior Tutors of Durham’s 
composite colleges. These figures were chosen to forward the advertisement, not 
simply due to the ease of this form of dissemination, but to provide the reassurance of 
a trusted gatekeeper to encourage responses.178  
 
Of course, the advertisement sought to attract those who had experienced what could 
be described as ‘Digital Presence’. However, the phrasing of the advertisement 
needed to satisfy seemingly contradictory requirements. It needed to effectively grant 
permission for respondents to adopt what Bennett described as a possibly stigmatised 
‘super-natural’179 semantic; however, I sought to avoid imposing a framework of 
interpretation, or utilising terms which could connote certain interpretations, to 
discourage acquiescence bias and prevent the creation of demand characteristics. 
 
We Need to Talk about Presence – Avoiding Acquiescence 
 
Whilst accounts of conventional presence experiences are well documented, some 
respondents are nevertheless anxious  their experiences in a super naturalist semantic, 
due to the belief they will be ‘ridiculed or viewed as mentally unwell’180 (particularly 
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in the case of male respondents).181 Indeed, it is unsurprising that a participant in one 
study wondered ‘if this is a mental condition that afflicts me’,182 as adherents of the 
Freudian attachment theory of grief have labelled such experiences indicative of 
psychological disorder. 
 
It has also been claimed that employing a non-materialist discourse may be ‘even 
more challenging in a society that is popularly regarded as secular’.183 This fear may 
even persist when survivors recount their experiences to healthcare professionals, due 
to the ‘perceived lack of support’184 some survivors have reported when the topic of 
the presence of the deceased has been broached. 
 
For these reasons, Bennett has claimed that many participants in studies of presence 
articulate their experience through a materialist discourse, as ‘respondents know it 
will be the safest, if for no other reason than that researchers often assume that 
respondents share this world view’.185  
 
Therefore, to allow respondents to express their experiences in a manner which 
reflects their own perceptions and understandings, we must allow them to adopt a 
semantic field which does not necessarily reduce Digital Presence to a materialist 
explanation. Bennett and Bennett have noted how allowing a super naturalist 
discourse ameliorated respondent anxiety, and indeed, some respondents have 
‘expressed relief at being able to share their experiences with others, who would not 
ridicule them’.186  
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However, as was infamously demonstrated by Mead’s Samoan ethnographies,187 if 
respondents believe a study to exhibit demand characteristics, the potential for 
acquiescence bias may result in respondents simply recounting what they believe the 
researcher wants to hear. For example, if respondents noted that I was a researcher 
from a Theology and Religious Studies department, employing super naturalist 
language, they may articulate their responses accordingly (regardless of whether this 
accurately conveys their own understandings). 
 
Therefore, I sought to eschew terms which implied particular convictions: e.g. whilst 
some of Hieftje’s respondents referred to decedents accessing Facebook from 
‘Heaven’,188 this concept may not be a feature of our own respondents’ experiences. 
Indeed, even terms such as grief/mourning may suggest a degree of anguish which 
subjects do not believe is applicable to their own experiences.  
 
Instead, I opted to provide extracts of accounts of Digital Presence cited in other 
studies. These were introduced through stating that:   
 
Some studies have found that people have noted that on the Facebook Profiles of the 
deceased, it ‘feels like they’re there’, and/or people can ‘get hold of’, and/or ‘get 
through to’ the deceased, or that the deceased ‘can read comments’.  
 
The intention was to effectively grant permission for respondents to describe their 
experiences in terms of ineffable ‘feelings’, and in language which does not 
necessitate materialist reduction. Whilst a super naturalist semantic was employed, it 
was done through citing accounts of Digital Presence; therefore, the terms were not 
directly used to describe the phenomenon, but were made available for respondents to 
employ if they believed that they were appropriate. 
 
Also, through providing our respondents with accounts of Digital Presence which may 
have resonated with their own experiences, these accounts acted as a form of 
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complementary reciprocity. Those who may have believed that their experiences were 
unique and perculiar may have found recognisable descriptions of Digital Presence to 
be comforting. Therefore, in the absence of ‘strict reciprocity’189 we could still 
establish a form of rapport building exchange. 
 
To also allow a more sceptical, materialist semantic to be employed, I omitted any 
mention of the Theology and Religion department in our invitation to interview, and 
instead referred to myself as a research postgraduate from the Arts and Humanities 
faculty. I also chose to cite the extract ‘deceased can read comments’ as opposed to 
the extract ‘deceased can access comments’, as I believed that ‘access’ could suggest 
a more active form of engagement and deceased agency. Instead, ‘read’ was chosen to 
allow for understandings of a more general notion of deceased omniscience as 
opposed to notions of a decedent directly accessing and engaging with the SNS. 
 
I also extended the invitation to interview to ‘anyone who’s had a similar experience, 
or anyone who would like to talk about their experiences of writing on a deceased 
person’s Profile’. In doing so, I sought to welcome those who may not have identified 
with the accounts cited, yet might still have had what could be described as ‘a similar 
experience’ to Digital Presence. By differentiating Digital Presence from other 
‘experiences of writing on a deceased person’s profile’, I sought to invite those who 
had not experienced Digital Presence so as to compare their accounts with those who 
had, to examine commonalities and differences between these groups. 
 
Furthermore, mindful that the advertisement was directed towards a university 
community, I substituted the term ‘interview’ with ‘conversation’, given the 
emotional potency of the former for a group inculcated in interview etiquette. This 
was also an attempt to reduce any possible anxiety of scrutiny and judgement, and any 
possible empirical, positivist demands the term may possess for potential respondents.  
 
Instead, ‘conversation’ was employed to imply a greater degree of symmetry than 
might be anticipated in an ‘interview’ by a university populace. Finally, to further 
encourage comfort, the invitation to interview concluded that all ‘conversations’ 
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could be conducted ‘In-person, or on skype (as a video-call, audio-only, or text-only 
conversation)’. 
 
Face-to-Face or Screen-to-Screen? – Mediums and Mediation 
 
The primacy of the in-person, or face-to-face mode of conducting interviews has been 
widely affirmed, and described by some commentators as the ‘gold standard in terms 
of validity and rigour’.190 For ‘bodily presence is crucial’191 in order to both discern 
the ‘nuances of speech’,192 and also to note non-verbal cues, e.g. ‘facial features and 
body language’.193 
 
Indeed, some qualitative researchers have questioned whether language is ‘too limited 
in its ability to truly interpret people’s feelings and meanings, never mind language in 
typed format’194 with regards to conducting interviews via text-based digital 
exchanges. As such, these purists regard any form of technological mediation, from 
text-based online messaging clients to telephone interviews as insufficient to discern 
the true nature of a respondent’s experiences. 
 
However, even proponents of the primacy of the in-person interview have recognised 
that ‘the vehicle for conducting interviews has always been less important than the 
provision to the respondent of the opportunity to tell their own story’.195 As such, 
there may be instances when the in-person mode can inhibit authentic disclosure, as 
vulnerability (particularly documented in male respondents) results in reticence. For 
example, Stroebe has claimed that male survivors are disproportionately absent from 
bereavement studies, for ‘fears of giving way to emotion at the interview’,196 and 
                                                 
190 J. McCoyd and T. Kerson, ‘Conducting Intensive Interviews Using Email’, Qualitative Social Work, 
5 (3), 2006, cited in H. Deakin and K. Wakefield, ‘Skype Interviewing’, QR, 14 (5), 2014, p604. 
191 J. Gubrium and J. Holstein, ‘Introduction to Technical Issues’, in Gubrium and Holstein, op. cit., 
p490. 
192 C. Riessman, ‘Analysis of Personal Narratives’, in Ibid, p706. 
193 R. Poynter, ‘Handbook of Online and Social Media Research’, (Oxford: Wiley, 2010), p128. 
194 Ibid, p127. 
195 Gubrium and Holstein, ‘Introduction to Technical Issues’, in Gubrium and Holstein, op. cit., p490. 
196 M. Stroebe, ‘Bereavement Research: Methodological Issues and Ethical Concerns’, Palliative 
Medicine, 17, 2003, cited in Adamson and Holloway, op. cit., p737. 
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Adamson and Holloway197 have added that men may feel they cannot discuss such 
issues with family and friends. 
 
This reticence however is not exclusively a gender norm. While conducting research 
for my undergraduate dissertation, I encountered a female respondent whose sense of 
vulnerability greatly restricted her ability to articulate her experiences. However, from 
the security of her room she could freely express herself in text-based exchanges over 
online messaging clients; that ‘safe locations’ can be disinhibiting has also been noted 
by Hanna198 and Golden.199  
 
It also appears that richer responses can be elicited by text-based exchanges not 
simply because respondents are in ‘rooms they already feel comfortable in’,200 but 
because such distance removes respondents from a researcher’s gaze. 
 
Commentators have noted that communicating through text-based digital clients can 
facilitate the recording of ‘false nonverbals’, i.e. ‘feelings and emotions that do not 
correspond to demeanour’,201 as researchers have no access to non-verbal cues to 
discern the respondent’s ‘physical and/or emotional state’.202 Instead, respondents 
could provide ‘vague or inaccurate responses’203 which could be discerned as such in 
an in-person interview, but not a text-based exchange. 
 
However, this deficiency is also a virtue. Instead of facilitating the documentation of 
‘false nonverbals’, several studies have concluded that ‘for some topics, people may 
be willing to be more honest online’,204 particularly in relation to ‘sensitive, or 
embarrassing questions’.205  
                                                 
197 Adamson and Holloway, op. cit., p747. 
198 P. Hanna, ‘Using Internet Technologies (Such as Skype) As a Research Medium: A Research Note’, 
QR, 12 (2), 2012, p241. 
199 T. Golden, ‘Healing and the Internet’, The Forum, 32 (4), 2006. 
200 Ibid. 
201 A. Fontana, ‘Postmodern Trends in Interviewing’, in Gubrium and Holstein, op. cit., p169. 
202 R. Shuy, ‘In-Person Versus Telephone Interviewing’, in Ibid, p548. 
203 Ibid. 
204 See M. Herbert, ‘Comparing Online and Face-to-Face Qualitative Research: From Teenagers to 
Third Agers’, AQR/QRCA, 2001, cited in Poynter, op. cit., p113. 
205 C. Madge and H. O’ Connor, ‘Online Methods in Geography Educational Research’, Journal of 
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For example, Poynter recorded that respondents felt ‘less subject to social 
pressures’206 when they were not physically co-present with a researcher, and 
Newman et al. found that respondents were more likely to report ‘stigmatised 
behaviour’207 through digital mediums than they were in-person. Whilst Barak et. 
al.208 have claimed that it is the anonymity the internet provides which encourages 
greater emotional disclosure, studies by Sweet209 and Rand210 concluded that a lack of 
‘personal interaction’ also elicited more candid responses. 
 
Bampton and Cowton have made similar claims, and concluded that the physical 
separation digitally mediated interviews allow reduces social desirability distortion 
and inhibition.211 Indeed, in the case of my above-mentioned respondent, her identity 
had already been disclosed; the distance provided by the online client was sufficient 
to allow her to express herself. 
 
These claims are substantiated by similar findings from studies on the efficacy of 
telephone interviews: studies by Groves and Kahn,212 and Sykes and Collins213 found 
that respondents were ‘less likely to cast their answers to threatening or sensitive 
questions in the most positive light’,214 suggesting that a lack of physical observation 
can facilitate more accurate accounts of sensitive experiences. 
 
Therefore, it is the fact that conducting qualitative interviews through digital mediums 
                                                 
206 Poynter, op. cit., p113. 
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‘remains distant’215 that means that some vulnerable respondents may better articulate 
their experiences this way; indeed, Bennett has claimed that the use of technological 
mediation can facilitate access to ‘men who might have avoided discussing emotions 
if interviewed face-to-face’.216 
 
Mann and Stewart however have questioned whether it is ‘possible for an interviewer 
to develop rapport with participants whom he or she may never have seen or 
heard’.217 Critics of digitally mediated interviews have noted how rapport is 
developed and discerned via ‘eye contact, facial expression, and bodily idiom’,218 and 
how the in-person mode prompts self-generated responses through ‘visual signs to 
encourage respondents to elaborate, clarify, or amend’219 their responses. Respondents 
are also eased into candid expression owing to the ‘contextual naturalness’220 of the 
in-person interview, i.e. this mode best accords with the natural expression of 
thoughts and feelings.  
 
However, Major has advanced the retort familiar to any parent who has attempted to 
sustain conversation with an adolescent: ‘the technical has become the natural’.221 The 
twenty first century has undoubtedly, in part, been defined by the frequency and 
familiarity of communication via digital mediums; for ‘Generation Y’, the politics and 
nuances of text-based digital exchanges have been ingrained in them through near 
perpetual engagement with digital chat clients and text messaging.  
 
Thus, Smith-Stoner has responded that ‘rapport is absolutely possible online’,222 and 
that through responding in a manner consistent with informal online conversation, 
‘virtual relationships can become very personal, very quickly’.223 Indeed, whilst non-
verbal signifiers may be absent, a number of scholars have attested to the ability to 
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detect changes in tone through the language employed in online exchanges, and to 
determine the significance of qualifying phrases, e.g. ‘you may want to’, or ‘if you 
like’.224 
 
Also, the relative ellipsis of a text-based online interview can be used as an indicator 
of a respondent’s emotional/psychological state: in Cabaroglu et. al’s comparative 
study of pauses, repetitions and recasts, they found ‘no significant difference’ 
between in-person and online interviews.225 Admittedly, a respondent could falsely 
attribute a pause to being absent from their computer, as opposed to struggling with a 
question; however, relative pauses and delays, coupled with a discernment of tone as 
conveyed by language, can indicate emotional state to the initiated researcher. 
 
Indeed, Denscombe’s comparative study of rapport concluded that carefully 
conducted online interviews produced ‘much the same quality of responses as 
produced by more traditional methods’,226 whilst Poynter has concluded that 
interviewees can contribute more online than they would in-person.227 Again, this is 
perhaps due to the technical being organic for a generation attuned to digital nuance. 
 
It is for these reasons that Deakin and Wakefield have claimed that the online 
interview should be ‘treated as a viable option, rather than an alternative when face-
to-face interviews cannot be achieved’.228 The security of distance, the fluency of 
text-based digital communication, and the amelioration of social desirability distortion 
combine to render text-based modes of interview particularly apt for interviews 
concerning Digital Presence (as demonstrated by my anxious respondent). Therefore, 
this study allowed participants to select between a variety of interview modes: Skype 
with video, Skype audio-only, Skype text-only, or Facebook chat text-only. 
 
                                                 
224 See Ibid, and J. Galegher, L. Sproull and S. Kiesler, ‘Legitimacy, Authority and Community in 
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If the disinhibiting effects of a familiar environment and the distance afforded by 
digital mediation are sufficient, than Skype with video could still allow for the 
discernment of physical non-verbal cues, e.g. facial expressions and body language. 
However, if respondents opt for text-only interviews, paralinguistic features can still 
be discerned, whilst respondents may more fully and accurately articulate their 
accounts and feelings of presence phenomenon (also achievable through audio-only 
means, as demonstrated by the aforementioned telephone studies).  
 
Regardless of the mode, each interview has constituted an individual case study, and 
no attempts have been made to classify respondents as a ‘sample’. Instead, each case 
study was examined individually before attempts were made to identify 
commonalities and differences between cases, and each case was also examined to 
assess the applicability of what some scholars have described as ‘grief conventions’ in 
respondents’ accounts. 
 
A Stiff Upper Lip – Case Studies and Grief ‘Conventions’ 
 
Each interview constitutes a case study as there are currently no theories to account 
for the emergence of Digital Presence. Therefore, to attempt to categorise accounts 
based on respondents’ demographic characteristics is arbitrary at best; as Hollway and 
Jefferson have stated, unless cases are examined individually at this stage of analysis, 
commonalities may well ‘produce spurious, misleading generalisations’.229  
 
Respondents are characteristically not aware of which factors may cause Digital 
Presence, e.g. ‘It’s weird, I don’t even know what my own motives are’.230 Therefore, 
attempts to identify any demographic feature, and/or confessed beliefs as necessary 
characteristics or conditions of the phenomenon are speculative at best. 
 
To attempt to synthesise data would also require a uniformity of understanding 
amongst respondents that could not be guaranteed: even if the terms employed by 
                                                 
229 W. Hollway and T. Jefferson, ‘Doing Qualitative Research Differently: Free Association, Narrative, 
and the Interview Method’, (London: Sage, 2009), p127-128. 
230 Kaleem, op. cit. 
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researcher and respondent are the same, there is nothing to suggest that the 
understandings of those terms are similar.231  
 
Each interview was also examined as a separate case study to identify the presence of 
so-called ‘grief conventions’, particularly in relation to gender; for the charge has 
been made that social scientific researchers have been insensitive to gendered 
responses.232 Therefore, examining each account as a case study can allow us to 
determine: if the male reticence characteristic of grief studies persists in accounts of 
DPMC;233 if the ameliorating effects of technological mediation apply to accounts of 
Digital Presence; and through comparing cases, whether other factors can influence a 
respondent’s degree of disclosure. 
 
Viewing respondent accounts as case studies also allows us to identify commonalities 
and differences in later analysis, as opposed to allowing concepts discussed by one 
respondent to dictate the direction of inquiry in subsequent interviews.  
 
As noted however, characteristic of accounts of Digital Presence are respondents’ 
incomprehension of the phenomenon, and their reluctance to suggest possible 
contributing factors. Therefore, it is pertinent to question by what means a researcher 
could elicit a narrative fruitful for analysis, and by what means such a narrative could 
be analysed. 
  
How Did That Make You Feel? – Our Methodological Approach 
 
As conscious motives are absent and the phenomenon is inexplicable even to those 
who experience it, we must analyse that which is accessible, i.e. descriptions of 
experience, and accounts of the conditions under which they occur, e.g. our 
                                                 
231 Indeed, J. Johnson and S. Weller note that to synthesise interview material, ‘each and every 
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respondents’ emotional states. Of these two central concerns, phenomenological 
analysis is best suited.234 
 
For as well as seeking to elicit descriptions of phenomenon and their emergent 
conditions, interpretive phenomenological analysis appreciates ‘an individual’s 
personal perception or account of an object or event, as opposed to attempting to 
produce an objective statement of the object or event itself’.235 This is particularly apt, 
as there are no grounds to assume any common conceptual understandings of digital 
artefacts or processes.236 
 
Whilst proponents of this approach do not claim that ‘the thoughts of an individual are 
transparent within verbal reports’,237 the method does appreciate that the ‘lived 
experience’ of any one object or event may vary depending on any number of 
circumstances. Therefore, instead of attempting to provide an ‘objective’ description 
of an object, a comparative study of each respondent’s account with a 
phenomenological focus on the qualities of their experiences may well illuminate the 
factors necessary for the phenomenon to occur. 
 
Also, a comparative phenomenological analysis of varying presence phenomena as 
experienced by respondents, e.g. as felt at potent places such as graves, or whilst 
interacting with conventional media, such as photos, can offer insight. If the 
embodied sensations of such phenomena differ, or their emergent conditions vary, it 
may be possible to identify the peculiar influences of Digital Presence. 
 
However, ‘free imaginative variation’,238 i.e. the process of altering aspects of 
phenomenon to determine their essential features (as pioneered by Husserl) is not 
practicable in this instance. Given the privacy we have afforded PDs, it is uncertain 
how they could be manipulated. Whilst the conditions of interaction could be varied, 
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e.g. varying the time and place interactions with PDs occured, the fact that such 
interactions would be under scrutiny could render them subject to the Hawthorne 
effect (i.e. the effect by which observing an agent can alter their experiences and 
behaviour). 
 
Instead, phenomenological analysis of DPMC, coupled with a comparative 
phenomenological analysis of different presence phenomena may elucidate the 
essential features of Digital Presence. 
 
None of the terminology or concepts utilised by one respondent were introduced to 
any other respondent. In contrast to the identification and verification of ‘categories’ 
popularised by grounded theory,239 interviews focused on respondents’ descriptions of 
events; descriptions of their emotional states; and descriptions of their individual 
convictions. As noted, understandings of common terms may have varied, and as our 
respondents’ motives were unconscious I did not wish to provide resources which 
they could have appropriated to organise, justify or explain their experiences.  
 
Similarly, respondents were not prompted to provide an explanation of their 
experiences. I concur with Geertz’s claim that ‘the best informants are those who can 
describe… not necessarily those who analyse or theorise’.240 As Sacks discovered, ‘a 
‘why’ question elicited an intellectualisation… interviewees offered sociological 
responses’, which were ‘disconnected from their actual lives’.241 
 
Instead of attempting to organise and explain the incoherent and inexplicable, 
interviews simply sought to elicit that which was available to respondents: their 
experiences, as lived. However, as Dingwall has observed, the act of interviewing 
prompts organisation, as respondents attempt to ‘turn the helter-skelter, fragmented 
process of everyday life into coherent explanations’.242  
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Despite our best efforts to deter respondents from inadvertently providing an 
‘intellectualisation’ of their experiences, (thus potentially inviting distorted accounts 
and hastily seized upon interpretations), the act of narrating experience necessarily 
involves the employment of ‘cohesive devices’,243 as it attempts to ‘organise human 
experiences into temporally meaningful episodes’.244 
 
Thus, a researcher must respond to the question (particularly apt in this instance): if 
one of the ‘defining features of the narrative form is coherence, how does this affect 
our knowledge of the potential incoherence of life as it is lived?’245. 
 
We can answer that the narrative features utilised by respondents, as resources 
appropriated to validate experience, can be of interest in themselves. Conceptions of 
time, the language used to describe the relationship between the living and the 
deceased, and if that language varies can all offer insight and were all considered in 
analysis. The description of emotional states, both in relation to physical and digital 
stimuli may also have exhibited something of a respondent’s understanding of digital 
ontology, and so these were also considered in our analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
243 A phrase employed by M. Bamberg and A. McCabe, ‘Editorial’, Narrative Inquiry, 8 (1), 1998, 
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                                                    2  
                         Feeling, Looking, Thinking, Being 
Contact Comfort, ‘Biological’ Motion, the Extended Mind and the Digital 
Body  
 
                                        Data summary 
 
After contacting the Senior Tutors of Durham University’s 16 constituent Colleges: 
11 Senior Tutors failed to reply to the invitation to interview; 2 objected on the 
grounds of sensitivity, as their colleges had recently suffered the death of a student, 
and 3 agreed to disseminate the invitation. Of those 3, 2 disseminated the invitation in 
a dedicated email, and 1 included it toward the conclusion of a weekly email bulletin. 
As it is questionable how many students read such emails, more so in their entirety, 
this form of dissemination potentially limited the number of unique impressions the 
invitation made.  
 
Of those 3 Colleges which received the invitation to interview, their combined 
membership allowed for a potential reach of 2688 undergraduate and postgraduate 
students. The same invitation was also advertised on the Facebook profile of a friend, 
who acted as a gatekeeper for her network; the potential reach of her advertisement 
was equivalent to the number of contacts in her network, i.e. 407. Of the potential 
pool of 3095 respondents, 8 responded to the invitation (7 in response to emails 
circulated by Senior Tutors, 1 in response to the Facebook advertisement).  
 
In relation to comparable inquiries (those which specifically examined interactions 
with PDs), 8 cases represents the largest qualitative investigation to date. Kasket’s246 
investigation featured 3 case studies, Hieftje’s247 6, and whilst Brubaker, Hayes and 
Dourish248 interviewed 16 respondents, none had personally engaged in DPMC. 
 
Instead, the insights of Brubaker et. al’s respondents are speculative, e.g. ‘Kevin 
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speculated that’,249 or ‘Catherine characterised post-mortem Wall posts as’.250 They 
are based on their observations of interactions between members of their own social 
networks. Whilst their speculations may provide some insight into their own beliefs, 
they do not contribute to a greater understanding of the affective quality of Digital 
Presence, or the operant motives and beliefs of those who experience the phenomenon. 
 
7 of this study’s respondents belonged to the broad ‘emerging adult’251 demographic 
(18-25 year olds) examined in the work of Kasket252 and Hieftje;253 5 undergraduates 
aged 18, and 2 postgraduates aged 25. These include David, George, Catherine, Lucy 
and Julia,254 all 18 year old first year undergraduates; Thomas, a 25 year old first year 
PhD student, and Sarah, a 25 year old final year PhD student. 
 
The remaining respondent, Joan, is in her early 40s, however the degree to which she 
engaged with Facebook was equitable to other respondents. She reported heavy usage, 
and described herself as ‘addicted’ to the platform. Similarly, the respondents from 
Durham University described the frequency of their interactions with Facebook as 
being ‘quite often’;255 some utilised the platform ‘up to 15 times a day’;256 all 
accessed it ‘everyday’;257 and some described themselves as being ‘always on’.258 
Kasket and Hieftje do not note the usage patterns of their respondents, so comparison 
is not possible. 
 
As for gender ratios, a study composition of 5 female, 3 male respondents appears 
consistent with previous response rates in online grief studies. Male participants form 
a third of Hieftje’s respondents, and a quarter in Carroll and Landry’s259 survey of 
online grieving practices amongst ‘emerging adults’; Kasket’s study is entirely female, 
although the small sample size of 3 cases may account for this. 
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That men constitute between one-quarter and one-third of respondents in such studies 
is unsurprising: Daggett’s meta-study of bereavement research concluded that men are 
‘more reluctant to discuss such experiences’.260 Stroebe,261 Adamson and Holloway262 
and Bennett263 have claimed that the absence of men from such studies may be due to 
‘fears of giving way to emotion at the interview’.264 Whilst Brubaker, Hayes and 
Dourish’s study included a greater proportion of male respondents with 7 male and 9 
female participants, none of the male respondents were questioned about their 
personal experiences of interacting with PDs; this may account for a greater 
willingness amongst male respondents to participate.  
 
Despite Bennett’s claim that technological mediation could facilitate greater access to 
male experiences of grief, the option to participate via online text or video messaging 
failed to increase the proportion of male respondents beyond the average. However, of 
the 3 male respondents, none opted for any form of technological mediation; all 3 
respondents participated in face-to-face interviews, and comfortably described their 
emotional responses to bereavement. For example, David describing how he felt 
‘upset’, and ‘hollow’, and Thomas described how he ‘broke down’ upon discovering 
the death of a friend.  
 
Only 2 respondents, Joan and Sarah, opted for an online text-based interview. Both 
chose to utilise Facebook’s ‘Chat’ feature as they found it more convenient than 
travelling for a face-to-face interview. As per Cabaroglu et. al’s265 findings, I found 
‘no significant difference’ between the in-person and online interviews. The duration 
and frequency of pauses were comparable to the face-to-face interviews, although 
Joan and Sarah both navigated to PDs during the course of their interviews to verify 
the information they had given. Otherwise, the duration of these interviews and their 
degree of candour were equitable. 
 
Our respondents all comfortably communicated their experiences despite their close 
relationships with the deceased. In David’s case, a school friend of 6 years had been 
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treated for a critical illness and showed signs of recovery before a sudden death; 
George’s Aunt had also received treatment for a critical illness, exhibited signs of 
recovery, then deteriorated rapidly; Thomas’ ‘really close friend’ had committed 
suicide, and all three male respondents described the deaths as a sudden ‘shock’. 
 
3 of the female respondents shared a strong bond with the deceased: Catherine 
described the sudden death of her father as a ‘major shock’; the death of Joan’s close 
friend ‘who was like family’ was ‘devastating’, and Lucy’s close friend who appeared 
to be recovering from a critical illness before a sudden death was also a ‘shock’. One 
female respondent, Sarah, said of her friend ‘we didn’t stay very close… but [his death] 
affected me a lot’, while Julia experienced an adverse reaction when she noticed that a 
school friend’s PD was active, claiming ‘it’s just a bit disturbing’. 
 
The time elapsed since the death of each of the respondents’ decedent and their 
interviews ranged from 2 months to just under 3 years; a greater range than the 2-to-
20 months of Hieftje’s respondents. However, the respondent with the greatest time 
elapsed (Catherine) demonstrated one of the most acute experiences of Digital 
Presence, as she continued to utilise a PD as the sole site of continued contact and 
communication with her father. 
 
6 respondents were British citizens, including George, although he had ‘always lived 
abroad’, and his parents originated from India. Thomas is a Canadian citizen, 
studying in the UK, and Sarah is a French citizen studying in the UK. The only 
respondent exhibiting evidence of non-western cultural influences was George, who 
‘celebrates Dewali, and Christmas’, and was raised learning ‘hymns or prayers from 
Christianity, Islam and Hinduism’. 
 
Respondents’ beliefs are absent in Kasket and Hieftje’s studies: there is no mention of 
the beliefs of Kasket’s respondents, whilst the only possible indicator of belief in 
Hieftje’s study is one respondent’s allusion to ‘Heaven’, which remains ambiguous.  
 
Besides celebrating Dewali and Christmas and learning about Christianity, Islam and 
Hinduism as a child, George also ‘prays to multiple gods’, and ‘distinguishes between 
the body and the soul’; Joan describes herself as ‘spiritual’, and ‘believes in a god’; 
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Thomas also describes himself as ‘spiritual’, and questions ‘how much do we know 
about life after death?’; David describes himself as ‘relatively agnostic’; Sarah is ‘not 
religious at all, I don’t believe in anything’; Lucy identifies as an ‘atheist’, and 
Catherine stated that she is ‘not religious’ and therefore rejects the concepts of 
‘prayer, and communication’ with the deceased. 
 
However, despite rejecting the notion of post-mortem communication, Catherine 
utilises the Profile as the sole site of continued contact and communication with her 
father, wherein ‘it feels like messages get through’. Similarly, whilst Lucy describes 
herself as an ‘atheist’ and rejects the notion of an afterlife, (she claimed ‘Heaven 
doesn’t exist and all of this’), she also regards the Profile as uniquely efficacious; she 
claimed that ‘it doesn’t really feel like she’s actually gone’ on Facebook, and she 
sends private messages directed to the deceased via their PD. Joan too communicates 
with her deceased friend through their PD, although she also talks to photos of them, 
and claims she ‘talks to her in my mind’. 
 
George however described how he ‘didn’t feel [the PD] had any attachment to her’; 
he did not experience any form of Digital Presence, and so did not attempt to 
communicate with his aunt via Facebook; David experienced an ‘empty feeling’ when 
he visited his PD, and so does not utilise it as a means of continuing a bond. 
 
Sarah only viewed ‘what other people have posted’, and did not attempt to 
communicate with the deceased in any manner; Julia left a tribute on her decedent’s 
PD, as she ‘felt like I maybe ought to write something’, but she does not attempt to 
communicate with her friend and finds her active PD ‘uncomfortable’; and Thomas 
has left tributes, but claimed that he ‘didn’t really have anything to confess, I feel like 
I said everything to him that I wanted’. 
 
Thus, 3 of our 8 respondents utilise PDs to communicate with the dead. For 2 of these, 
PDs are the sole means by which they ‘feel’ that they can do so. The remaining 5 do 
not attempt to communicate with the deceased via Facebook; nonetheless, their beliefs, 
and experiences of PDs offer as much insight into the mechanics of Digital Presence 
as those who are familiar with the phenomenon. 
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But before we explore the possible causes of Digital Presence, perhaps we should 
consider how an intangible digital artefact can serve as a referent for the deceased 
when ‘physically tangible memorials’266 are necessary to sustain a bond beyond death. 
 
For Baptist claims that the referents employed must be physical in order to subdue the 
‘corporeal withdrawal’267 survivors experience in the absence of the deceased; only 
tangible objects can become ‘dwelling places for the deceased’.268 Similarly, Massimi 
and Baecker claim that physical objects ‘represent the corporeality of the deceased in 
almost all cultures’,269 and Lambert has agreed that ‘immanence benefits from a 
relic’s materiality’.270 Why then do respondents feel that the deceased are present on 
their Profiles? 
 
Perhaps because they can ‘actually look back on the life of a person, and their posts, 
the fact it’s their writing’;271 ‘you can actually go through the whole history and see 
all the comments and everything’,272 and with that sense of ‘character still there’,273 
‘it felt like it was still there, it was still back there… coz you’re looking at things she 
was doing when she was alive’.274 
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                                           Contact Comfort 
 
Wire-mesh and Terrycloth – Multimedia and Contact Comfort 
 
As well as visiting PDs to direct publicly observable or private messages to the 
deceased, our respondents also focused their attention on ‘going through all the 
picture’s,275 ‘looking at photos’,276 and viewing their decedent’s ‘videos’.277 Lucy 
claimed that upon discovering their friend’s death, ‘the moment we [her school class] 
got home from school… we went through all the profile pictures’.278 Hieftje’s study 
also found that one of the activities survivors engage in on PDs is ‘looking at 
pictures’.279 This is unsurprising, given that a study conducted by Massimi and 
Baecker found that 92% of respondents valued photos of the deceased, which have 
enjoyed pride of place in homes long before the advent of the digital age.280  
 
However, a PD is not just an assembly of multimedia representations of the deceased. 
It ‘means a lot more than looking back at a photo album [as the deceased has] written 
the status, or the comments, and you kind of, often can see a person’s humour or 
something like that on Facebook’.281 
 
Thomas also observed that survivors can ‘see all the comments’282 written by the 
deceased, and Catherine claims the PD is ‘not even just photos and videos, it’s his wit 
and views there, they still remain and can be visited’, which allow her to experience 
‘an aspect of his character’.283 Lucy even described how she utilises Facebook’s ‘See 
Friendship’ function, whereby users can ‘see friendship between us, like things that 
we’d ever posted between [each other]’,284 i.e. she could view every interaction she 
had ever had with her friend on Facebook. 
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Thus, we may be able to begin to understand why it ‘feels like’ the deceased are 
present on their Profiles. Objects that have been manipulated by the deceased, such as 
items of clothing may ‘invoke a greater sense of immediacy’285 than other referents as 
they bear a physical imprint of the deceased ‘marked by use through wear and tear’.286 
However, users also impart an imprint on digital constructs by imbuing them with 
multimedia representations and written status updates. 
 
This may account for why PDs are, in some cases, favoured over traditional 
monuments or symbolic objects such as heirlooms which belonged to the deceased. 
For the distinction between static memorials, such as plaques or benches, and PDs 
which retain the multimedia and written status updates imbued by their users is 
reminiscent of the distinction between the two substitutes employed in Harlow’s 
maternal deprivation experiments. 
 
In 1958, Harlow, a researcher in early cognitive development, conducted a series of 
controversial experiments involving a number of rhesus macaques deprived of 
maternal contact from birth. This cohort of macaques was later introduced to two 
different maternal surrogates: a wire-mesh mother macaque, and a comparable model 
with terrycloth ‘fur’. 
 
Harlow discovered that the macaques unequivocally favoured the terrycloth models, 
even when the wire-mesh surrogates were fixed with feeding bottles, their sole form 
of nutrition. Harlow termed this preference for the affectively familiar (in this 
instance, the resemblance between the tactile quality of terrycloth and rhesus 
macaques), ‘contact comfort’.287 
 
We can draw parallels between the cold, unresponsive substitute of the wire-mesh 
mother and the static memorial which does not speak, and the terrycloth mother and 
the PD: the written contributions, photos and videos of the deceased providing some 
small comforting familiarity. Like the terrycloth, these personal contributions exhibit 
recognisable affective qualities, which grant the PD a closer phenomenological 
                                                 
285 M. Gibson, ‘Melancholy Objects’, Mortality, 9:4, 2004, p290. 
286 Ibid. 
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resemblance to the deceased, i.e. a greater sense of ‘contact comfort’. The PD thus 
functions as a simulacrum; not as a surrogate, but as a referent for the absent deceased. 
 
It is unsurprising then that survivors may also continue to write on PDs through 
comments and private messages. Of all the available means of externalising inner 
thoughts, feelings and desires about/to the deceased, such as by vocalising feelings at 
a graveside, or in a domestic setting,288 Lattanzi notes how writing has a ’cathartic 
benefit… enabling bereaved individuals to explore, and express, their hopes, fears, 
fantasies, and realities’;289 indeed, Catherine described how she experiences feelings 
of ‘relief’290 whenever she writes a message to her father on his PD.  
 
However, whilst writing may be inherently cathartic as it allows survivors to organise 
their thoughts and cogently express their feelings, that the object of this action is a 
closer phenomenological approximation of the deceased than a static memorial may 
account for the greater sense of ‘presence’ located on PDs. Or, expressed in 
neurological terms, the variety of sensory stimuli evident on PDs can be imaginatively 
engaged with to evoke an internal multimodal representation of the deceased. 
 
Imagine Seeing you Here – Multimodal Representations and Person-File Types 
 
Schroeder and Matheson, and Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell have documented the 
process whereby ‘stimulation of the sense organs produces neural signals, which in 
turn create patterns of activity in the brain’.291 They have described how whilst ‘these 
patterns of activity are initially segregated by sense modality’, the brain can 
synthesise input from multiple sensory channels to compose ‘multimodal 
representations’, i.e. composite images formed by a variety of sensory stimuli. For 
example, an internal mental image of a person is a multimodal representation 
composed of their tone of voice, appearance, odour, etc. 
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Boyer has claimed that when these multimodal representations are of people, they act 
as sensory signatures to allow internal ‘Person-file’ types to be retrieved. For instance, 
when we ‘hear people’s voices’, or identify ‘other such cues’, this induces ‘memories 
of past interaction episodes, people’s general dispositions, facts about their histories, 
etc’.292 
 
When these multimodal representations are induced, corresponding neural impulses 
are automatically sent to ‘emotional centres like the orbitofrontal cortex, affective 
striatum, and amygdala. When stimulated, these ‘emotional centres’ are responsible 
for the feelings and physical responses we associate with emotions’.293 
 
But perhaps more interestingly, multimodal representations can also be induced by 
‘fictional’ stimuli, i.e. sensory stimuli known to be simulacra, such as the howl of a 
wolf in a horror film. For it appears that ‘there is no distinct anatomical region of the 
brain, nor distinct set of nerve fibres… designated for receiving input’294 from 
‘fictional’ sensory stimuli. Emotional centres are also stimulated, as ‘it appears that 
fictional stimuli have their emotional effects via the same types of causal pathways as 
‘real’ stimuli’.295 
 
Indeed, ‘fictional stimuli are known to be so great in the brain's representational and 
emotional systems that scientists experiment upon human subjects using fictions to 
elicit feelings’.296 For example, Teasdale297 and O’ Dougherty298 have used 
representations of events and objects to produce responses equitable to those elicited 
by the events and objects themselves.  
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Perhaps then, the richness of the sensory stimuli found on PDs has invoked internal 
multimodal representations, (and thus ‘Person-file’ types) in our respondents. And as 
fictional stimuli activate the same causal pathways as ‘real’ stimuli, our respondents 
have experienced a sense of presence because the brain’s emotional centres have been 
stimulated accordingly.  
 
However, Catherine commented that ‘we’ve got photos albums and we’ve got writing 
and things that he’s done, and drawings, and that’299 in other, analogue formats, yet 
neither the sum nor whole of these parts invoked the same sense of presence as the PD, 
which constitutes Catherine’s sole site of contact with her father. So perhaps it is not 
simply that the sensory stimuli derived from multimedia representations of the 
deceased found on PDs act as invocations of the deceased, or even that these invoke 
‘memories’.300  
 
Perhaps it is the inherent ability to ‘go back anywhere in time’,301 and Lucy’s 
observation that by ‘scrolling back to before she was ill’, it ‘was still like, it was still 
back there’, i.e. ‘it’s more like she’s alive, coz you’re looking at things that she was 
doing when she was alive’302 that accounts for Digital Presence. 
 
For the induction of multimodal representations from fictional stimuli requires a 
degree of ‘imaginative engagement’;303 when watching a play, ‘in spite of the fact that 
simulated assaults and emotions are all known simulacra, they are represented much 
as real things would be, by the same multimodal representational structures’304 
providing we suspend our disbelief that what we are watching is fiction. And Profiles, 
by design, allow an individual to be experienced synchronically, via the atemporality 
afforded by Facebook’s ‘Timeline’ feature. 
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Like You’re Still Here – Atemporality and Imaginative Engagement 
 
By ‘going back’, or ‘scrolling back’, respondents are referring to the ability to 
navigate through a Profile’s history via its ‘Timeline’ feature. Whilst the perpetually 
dynamic ‘Newsfeed’ presents interactions between members of a social network 
linearly and in real time, the Timeline feature of a Profile allows users to navigate all 
prior comments, interactions and multimedia uploads made on a Profile. These are not 
presented in archival form; by ‘scrolling back’, users can regress to any point in time.  
 
By not only allowing us to move freely through every major (and minor) life event, 
expression, comment and interaction, but to view them simultaneously, an individual 
can be experienced synchronically. The effect of this feature will be examined in 
greater detail in Chapter 3, however for now it is sufficient to note that when 
Catherine has ‘a moment when I really miss him’, she utilises the Timeline feature to 
‘read some messages that he’d once sent’.305 Whilst visiting her friend’s grave, the 
gravestone is a ‘constant reminder, she is gone’ for Lucy, but through ‘scrolling’ back 
through the PD, there is ‘the tense, that she’s still there’, as Lucy can immerse herself 
in ‘the things that she was doing when she was alive’.306 
 
As there are no indicators to the contrary, and given Lucy’s desire to ‘think you’re 
still here’,307 shared by Catherine as she ‘really misses [her father]’,308 there is reason 
and motive to suspend disbelief that the deceased are absent. When utilising the 
Timeline function, the regressed PD removes evidence of mortality, and presents a 
multimedia image of the deceased in life. Thus, survivors can imaginatively engage 
with these stimuli to pretend that the deceased ‘haven’t gone yet’,309 through inducing 
a multimodal representation of the deceased complete with the attendant affective 
response of ‘presence’. 
 
This suggestion is substantiated by David’s account: he did not utilise the Timeline 
feature of his PD, and consequently claimed ‘all the stuff that’s posted is all, about 
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him, in, you know past tense’. David also reported an ‘empty feeling’ when he 
engaged with this PD, and felt no sense of Digital Presence. However, one striking 
feature of Catherine and Lucy’s accounts is that they both experienced a pervasive 
feeling of ‘sadness’,310 and were ‘quite emotional’311 when they engaged with their 
PDs.  
 
Despite their ability to use the Timeline to imaginatively engage with a multimedia 
image of their decedents alive, they experienced a pervasive feeling of sadness due to 
their ever conscious acknowledgement that their loved ones are deceased. 
Furthermore, Thomas also noted how he could ‘go back anywhere in time too, and get 
information from anywhere in time’,312 although Thomas did not experience any sense 
of Digital Presence on his PD.  
 
Instead, Digital Presence might be accounted for by evidence of the implicit 
classification of Profiles into distinct binary categories; these stipulate that whilst 
Catherine and Lucy recognise that their loved ones are dead, their Profiles may be 
alive and well. 
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                                         ‘Biological’ Motion 
 
A Normal Friend – Implicit Profile Categorisation 
 
Implicit in respondents’ accounts of their interactions with PDs is the binary 
classification of a Profile as either ‘normal/living’, or ‘abnormal/deceased’. These are 
not official classifications (in the sense that they are designated thus by Facebook), 
but emergent categories that are independent of the status of their users, e.g. a PD may 
still be deemed ‘normal/living’. 
 
Lucy described her deceased friend’s Profile as akin to that of a ‘normal friend’, and 
David differentiated the PD he interacted with from a ‘normal’ Profile (which he 
elaborated as that belonging to ‘someone who’s still alive’). George claimed that his 
Aunt ‘never used it in the same way, as normal’, i.e. hers was not a ‘normal’ Profile 
as its activity was ‘very sporadic’. Lucy distinguished her deceased friend’s Profile 
from a ‘deceased Profile’, as it demonstrated functionality not applicable to that 
category; she ‘assumed that if they were deceased, they’d take it off groups and 
friends lists’. 
 
The implicit classification of a Profile is, as evidenced by Lucy’s account, 
independent of the status of the individual: whilst the individual may be deceased, 
their Profile may well be ‘alive/normal’. Those Profiles which satisfied the criteria of 
a ‘normal/living’ Profile are those which invoke an ineffable sense of presence, or in 
Julia’s case, unsettle and ‘disturb’ (the reasons for the disparity between Julia’s 
affective response, and those of Catherine and Lucy will be considered later in this 
chapter).  
 
The classification of a Profile as ‘living/normal’ is based on a tripartite criterion 
(herein referred to as the LPC, or ‘Living Profile Criteria’), which consist of the 
inextricable interaction/activity dyadic, and integration, i.e. inclusion in groups, lists, 
and events. 
 
 68
The interaction/activity dyadic refers to the dynamic of Profile interaction, and the 
subsequent activity that interaction generates. For example, if we comment on a 
Profile, that interaction will feature in the Newsfeed for public consumption. Thus, 
any form of interaction will generate activity, although acknowledgement of this 
causal connection is not evident in our respondents’ accounts. The integration 
criterion refers to the continued participation of a Profile in Facebook groups, and lists; 
for example, if the Profile features in a list of people invited to a party, or continues to 
be present in a special interest group, e.g. a group for a particular rugby team. 
 
These criteria are demonstrated on Catherine’s father’s Profile: there is continued 
interaction with the Profile by members of its network, e.g. friends continue to 
‘update him on the football scores’; a product of such interaction is activity in the 
Newsfeed, as ‘the people that my dad is friends with on Facebook, and I’m friends 
with on Facebook, and my mum’s friend’s with on Facebook, all see these messages’. 
The Profile also remains integrated in standard groups featuring living people, e.g. 
special interest groups on Facebook, as ‘even things he liked, you can see’, and 
‘invitations to come to a party, and friend requests’ are present. 
 
The Profile David interacted with, which left him feeling ‘empty and hollow’ does not 
satisfy the LPC. It is not active: ‘it’s been quite a long time since I’d seen anything’, 
and does not participate in groups, or feature alongside other Profiles in event lists: ‘it 
doesn’t have any of the standard kind of, pages that people have liked that come up’. 
 
Lucy’s however, like Catherine’s, demonstrates interaction and subsequently activity, 
and integration. There is a ‘steady stream’ of ‘people talking to her’ (interaction), 
which is ‘keeping it going’ (i.e., active), and ‘all of the friends lists and everything, 
she’s still in like loads of the Facebook groups’… I see her in the little ‘going’ 
column [on an event]’ (integration).  
 
George’s Aunt’s Profile did not exhibit any indications of interaction, as ‘no-one had 
commented’ on it, and consequently it was not active and did not appear in his 
Newsfeed. Similarly, Joan’s friend’s Profile is ‘always silent’ as it is not interacted 
with or active, and Sarah claimed ‘there’s not often much new… it’s kind of sad’, as it 
never appears in her Newsfeed.  
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Julia’s friend’s Profile continues to function as a focal point for interaction as users 
continue to ‘write messages’ to the deceased, which ensures that the PD is ‘still 
active’ in her Newsfeed; it also remains integrated within the system, as ‘you get the 
birthdays, and they turn up, and you kind of, you click on it’, a feature memorialised 
Profiles lack. As noted however, the reasons why Julia might find these indicators of 
vitality ‘disturbing’ as opposed to comforting will be explored in greater detail later in 
this chapter. 
 
Why then does a ‘normal/living’ Profile invoke a sense of Digital Presence, even 
when respondents are conscious that its user is deceased? Perhaps because ‘an 
animal’s survival depends on its ability to identify the movements of prey, predators 
and mates, and to predict their future actions’.313 
 
Hunting Prey, Avoiding Predators – Biological Motion 
 
Santos et. al have noted how ‘humans like most other animals equipped with visual 
senses are very sensitive to detect biological motion in their environment’,314 and 
Saygin et. al have commented that this ability to detect biological motion is necessary 
for tasks of ‘ecological significance, such as hunting prey, avoiding predators, 
communication and social interaction’.315 Boyer has labelled this capacity the 
‘Animacy system’, i.e. a system ‘activated by the sight of any object that moves in a 
purposeful manner, it produces expectations and inferences about animals and 
persons’.316  
 
Particular neural regions have evolved to specialise in detecting biological motion. 
Representations of articulated biological motion have consistently been observed to 
evoke stimulation in one particular cerebral region, the Superior Temporal Sulcus 
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(STS). For example, Bonda et. al317 detected activity in the STS when subjects viewed 
grasping hand movements as opposed to random movement, and Grezes et. al318 have 
documented STS activation when subjects viewed meaningful hand gestures with 
tools and objects, amongst innumerable other studies. 
 
Even abstract representations can be identified as exhibiting biological motion and 
can stimulate the STS, as demonstrated by experiments featuring point-light 
representations of human figures walking (originally conducted by Johansson,319 and 
replicated by Blake and Shiffrar320 and Blakemore and Decety).321 Infants too can 
identify articulated biological motion exhibited by point-light figures, and can 
differentiate these from random point-light sequences, which suggests that ‘the 
detection of biological motion may become hard-wired in the human brain at an early 
age’.322 
 
Neural responses to point light displays that portrayed random, rigid motion were 
‘localised more posteriorly in the occipito-temporal junction’,323 as opposed to the 
STS. Also, the motion of tools and ‘other forms of mechanistic motion’324 have been 
found to stimulate the neighbouring MTG region, as opposed to the STS. Thus, 
neurologists such as Lange and Lappe have concluded, following an extensive review 
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of biological motion research employing PET scans and fMRI imagining that ‘studies 
almost uniformly report activation of the STS when subjects viewed biological 
motion displays’325 (a conclusion corroborated by Gobbini et. al’s. comprehensive 
review of biological motion research).326 
 
Lange and Lappe have also claimed that biological motion detection is contingent 
upon ‘analysis of the global form of the human body’,327 i.e. the identification of form 
as well as movement. They have cited Shiffrar et. al’s experiments, in which ‘they 
presented stick figures of walking humans seen through apertures. Despite the 
ambiguous motion signals through the apertures, subjects recognized the human 
figure easily’.328 They also alluded to Hirai and Hiraki’s findings that ‘the amplitude 
of event-related potentials elicited by point-light biological motion is mainly 
dependent on the spatial structure of the walker rather than on the temporal structure 
of the dot movement’.329  
 
The same position is advocated by Thompson et al., who derived their assertion from 
their study of mannequins; some were fully intact, others were presented in various 
states of dismemberment, yet all appeared to walk. They noted ‘greater activation [of 
the STS] to the intact relative to apart walker’,330 even when they occluded the figures 
with solid black bars in video presentations. When the mannequins’ form was 
disrupted through dismemberment, ‘there was significantly greater activation relative 
to intact walkers in bilateral superior parietal lobule (SPL), right parieto-occipital 
cortex, and left middle temporal gyrus (MTG)’.331 
 
As such, Thompson et al. concluded that ‘the STS does not process biological 
movement simply by monitoring the temporal correlation between independently 
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moving objects but instead requires these moving objects to be configured in a 
manner consistent with a body shape’.332 This relationship between form dependency 
and STS activation is undermined however by well documented cases of geometric 
shape animations that have elicited STS stimulation. 
 
In an experiment originally conducted by Heider and Simmel in 1944, subjects were 
presented with animations of numerous geometric shapes present in the same frame. 
More recently, neurological researchers have replicated this experiment, and through 
PET studies observed ‘activation of the STS’333 in subjects viewing these animations. 
Comparable findings have been documented by Gobbini et. al334 and Martin and 
Weisberg335 amongst others. 
 
As well as stimulating the STS, these animated presentations of dynamic geometric 
shapes also activated the Medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC), as subjects characterised 
the featureless shapes as scared, angry, and helpful. The mPFC is consistently 
identified as the locus of intention attribution, as ‘activity associated with making 
inferences about the mental states of characters in stories or nonverbal cartoons is 
observed in the mPFC’.336 Goel et. al,337 Fletcher et. al,338 and Gallagher et. al339 are 
just some of the many research teams to have corroborated this claim, as they have 
observed mPFC stimulation via fMRI studies of participants in intention attribution 
exercises. 
 
That stimulation of the mPFC was documented in subjects presented with animations 
of dynamic geometric shapes is unsurprising, given that 33 of Heider and Simmel’s 
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34 subjects ‘attributed intention and mental states to the shapes, including chasing, 
aggression, and helping’,340 and that ‘the sight of any object that moves in a 
purposeful manner produces expectations and inferences’.341 This phenomenon has 
also been documented cross-culturally in similar experiments conducted by the 
Japanese neurologist Hashimoto,342 and Danish neurologist Marek343. 
 
Some researchers, such as Arnoff, Barclay and Stevenson344 have suggested that form 
was a factor in the attribution of intention to these shapes: the triangle was deemed 
‘angry’, and their research has suggested that large, angular shapes are perceived as 
more ‘aggressive’, and ‘dominant’, than small, round objects’.345 However, even 
when videos of the shapes were quantised, i.e. disrupted and permutated to vary their 
structural features, ‘subjects continued to described the movements as the intentional 
actions of motivated beings’.346 
 
Shaw and Warren347 have claimed there are two invariants present in any event. 
Structural invariants, which include the size and shape of the objects participating in 
an event, and dynamic invariants, which include the styles of change such objects 
exhibit, e.g. alterations of speed, trajectory and placement. On the basis of these 
Heider and Simmel type experiments, a variety of neurological researchers have 
concluded that structural invariants are largely irrelevant. 
 
Instead, ‘research on the experience of animacy has put forward the notion that 
different variations of movement influence our ability to attribute mental states to 
moving objects’,348 a position propounded by Santos et. al, and supported by 
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equivalent findings from Barrett et. al,349 Abell et. al,350 and Tremoulet and 
Feldman351 amongst others. 
 
These ‘variations of movement’ more specifically ‘yield impressions of socially 
relevant qualities’.352 Examples include self-propelled motion, i.e. ‘initiation of 
movement without an external cause’,353 contingency between objects,354 and 
responsiveness to the motion by the environment.355 What though, renders the 
approach and responsiveness of one object to another as indicative of a ‘social cue’, 
and why attribute intentions motivated by fear and anger to simple geometric shapes? 
 
In the original Heider and Simmel experiment, extensively replicated in studies of 
biological motion detection and intention attribution, the shapes’ environment was a 
hollow rectangle, with a single hinged opening resembling a door; as such, the 
structure resembles a house. The presentation of this structure and the shapes’ 
interactions constitute a topographically consistent representation of physical 
interactions. 
 
Therefore, an object (in this case a triangle or a circle) approaching another object 
which ‘responds’ through altering its relative position, e.g. a sudden rapid approach 
eliciting a judder and a rapid retreat, is comparable to a ‘bird’s eye view’ 
representation of a confrontational physical exchange. Similarly, one object gradually 
approaching and making contact with another which reciprocates this contact is 
comparable to an aerial perspective of an amicable greeting, and so on. 
                                                 
349 H. Barrett, P. Todd, F. Miller and M. Blythe, ‘Accurate Judgments of Intention from Motion Cues 
Alone: A Cross-Cultural Study’, Evol. Hum. Behav., 26, 2005, in ibid. 
350 F. Abell, F. Happe and U. Frith, ‘Do Triangles Play Tricks? Attribution of Mental States to 
Animated Shapes in Normal and Abnormal Development’, Cognitive Dev., 15, 2000, cited in ibid. 
351 P. Tremoulet and J. Feldman, ‘The Influence of Spatial Context and the Role of Intentionality in the 
Interpretation of Animacy from Motion’, Percept. Psychophys., 68 (6), 2006, cited in ibid. 
352 Berry, op. cit., p238. 
353 See A. Leslie, ‘Spatiotemporal Continuity and the Perception of Causality in Infants’, Perception 13 
(3), 1984, and J. Stewart, ‘Object Motion and the Perception of Animacy’, Psychonomic Society 
Meeting, 1984, cited in Santos et al., op. cit., p292. 
354 S. Blakemore, P. Boyer, M. Pachot-Clouard, A. Meltzoff, C. Segebarth and J. Decety, ‘The 
Detection of Contingency and Animacy from Simple Animations in the Human Brain’, Cereb. Cortex, 
13 (8), 2003, cited in Santos et. al., op cit., p292. 
355 J. Schultz, K. Friston, J. O'Doherty, D. Wolpert and C. Frith, ‘Activation in Posterior Superior 
Temporal Sulcus Parallels Parameter Inducing the Percept of Animacy’, 
Neuron, 45 (4), 2005, in ibid. 
 
 
 75
In the digital age, intersubjectivity is not restricted to physical interaction (or in some 
instances, its prevalent mode). Instead, as near perpetual digital connectivity and 
engagement is now beginning during formative periods of acute neuroplastic 
malleability, a generation inculcated in a digital doxa356 may well be hardwired to 
identify the dynamic invariants of a ‘living’ Profile as socially intelligible movements 
indicative of ‘biological’ motion. 
 
Neurons that Fire Together, Wire Together – Neuroplasticity and ‘Biological’ Motion 
 
Until the 1950s, it was received knowledge that after an initial formative period of 
neurological development, the brain was effectively ‘fixed’. However, in 1951, the 
biologist Young conducted a series of experiments and announced ‘there is evidence 
that the cells of our brains literally develop and grow bigger with use, and atrophy or 
waste away with disuse’.357 
 
More than 50 years later, and following extensive research utilising PET scans and 
fMRI imagining, Hallett was confident enough to declare that ‘neuroplasticity is not 
only possible, it is constantly in action’;358 Pascual-Leone that ‘neuroplasticity is the 
normal ongoing state’359 of the brain, and Choudhury and McKinney that ‘because of 
neuroplasticity, we can say that the brain and nervous system are constantly changing 
in response to environmental stimuli as well as the brain’s own activity’.360 
 
As such, any ‘repeated experience influences our synapses’.361 For example, the 
repeated use of primitive technologies such as pliers and rakes by monkeys has been 
found to result in ‘significant growth in their visual and motor areas involved in 
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controlling the hands that held the tools’.362 Similarly, an fMRI investigation into the 
brains of violinists concluded that ‘playing a violin, a musical tool, results in 
substantial physical changes in the brain’, as the sensory cortex that processes signals 
from the left hand (used to finger the strings) was ‘significantly larger than those of 
non-musicians’;363 these findings were repeated for violinists who had only practised 
the instrument as adults. 
 
However, it is not just the repeated manipulation of physical objects that can provoke 
neuro-physiological development, but altering the focus of cognitive exertion too. In 
an imagining study on the brains of London taxi drivers, this cohorts’ posterior 
hippocampi, ‘a part of the brain that plays a key role in storing and manipulating 
spatial representations of a person’s surroundings, was much larger than normal’.364  
 
Whilst this manner of synaptic recalibration occurs throughout a lifetime, either 
through acquiring a new manual skill or altering our focus of mental exertion, there 
are acute periods of neuroplastic malleability, ‘such as adolescence, when the brain is 
especially susceptible and vulnerable to environmental input and to the formation of 
irreversible pathways and networks’.365 
 
Post-mortem histological and fMRI studies conducted by Blakemore and Frith366 
suggest that adolescence is a neurologically sensitive period, and Johnson has 
suggested on the basis of his fMRI scans that this period witnesses ‘increasing 
functional specialisation of brain areas involved in social cognition, executive 
function, and emotional processing’.367 
 
Whilst the manipulation of physical objects and concerted shifts in cognitive exertion 
can forge novel, or reinforce existing neural pathways, Carr claims that ‘if you were 
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to set out to invent a medium that would rewire our mental circuits as quickly and 
thoroughly as possible, you would probably end up designing something that looks 
and works a lot like the internet’.368 Small has concurred, and stated that ‘digital 
technology is rapidly and profoundly altering our brains, stimulating brain cell 
alteration, gradually strengthening new neural pathways in our brains, while 
weakening older ones’.369 
 
Small conducted fMRI scans on 12 regular internet users, and 12 individuals who 
rarely, if ever, used the internet in any capacity. The regular user cohort’s fMRI 
images exhibited ‘a much broader range of brain activity’ when exposed to digital 
technologies, while both cohorts demonstrated equitable neural activity when reading 
from books; thus, Small noted that ‘the experienced net users’ distinctive neural 
pathways had developed through their internet use’.370  
 
However, Small’s most remarkable findings were that ‘after just five days of practice, 
the exact same neural circuitry in the front part of the brain became active in the 
internet-naïve subjects. Five hours of the internet, and the naïve subjects had already 
rewired their brains’. Small subsequently posed the question, ‘if our brains are so 
sensitive to just an hour a day of computer exposure, what happens when we spend 
more time online?’.371 
 
Merzenich, one of the fathers of neuroplasticity, answered: ‘The heavy use of digital 
tools has neurological consequences. It creates DIFFERENT brains’.372 
 
Given the degree of engagement Catherine and Lucy have had with this medium, I 
propose that ‘socially relevant’ behaviour is as evident online as it is offline, and that 
indications that a Profile is ‘alive’ are interpreted as cues of animate motion which 
subsequently activate the animacy system. This occurs as near perpetual digital 
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connectivity has lead to the creation and reinforcement of synaptic pathways which 
identify these criteria as ‘socially relevant’, relative to the architecture and 
functionality of Facebook.  
  
For example, motion contingency is satisfied by the interaction/activity dyadic: 
‘living’ Profiles respond to interactions in a spatially and temporally consistent 
manner, i.e. according to the same ‘real-time’ dynamic that governs the Newsfeed; 
responsiveness to the environment is satisfied through the effects of the same dyadic, 
and spatial and temporal synchrony between objects is met by the integration criterion 
(these Profiles remain embedded in the wider architecture of Facebook, such as in 
groups and events and respond in the same manner as any other ‘living’ Profile). 
 
Such movements are ‘socially relevant’ within the context of Facebook, and may thus 
be classified as digital ‘behaviour’. In our case studies, respondents demonstrated 
prolonged exposure to digital interactivity, claiming they were ‘always on’,373 that 
they ‘scrolled through it a lot, everyday’,374 and even that they were ‘addicted’.375 
 
Of our two acute cases of Digital Presence, their exposure began prior to and persisted 
through the formative neuroplastic period of adolescence: both Catherine and Lucy 
began using SNS around the age of 10, and continued throughout adolescence when 
they were particularly prone to generating new synaptic connections. 
 
A further catalyst for the LPC impacting ‘biological’ motion detection is found in the 
‘chronic over-activity of those brain regions implicated in social thought’.376 When 
individuals lie and rest quietly, most of their brain activity decreases. However, the 
mPFC, the temporo-parietal junction and the medial parietal cortex, i.e. ‘the brain 
regions identified during mind-reading tasks continue to churn away’.377 Thus, 
Mitchell claims that ‘this chronic engagement of ‘social brain’ regions suggests that 
the human brain has a predilection for contemplating the minds of others’.378 
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I believe that this ‘predilection’; the unique neurological impact of digital 
technologies; and prolonged and persistent exposure to these technologies, 
particularly during periods of acute neuroplastic malleability, render the LPC of 
‘living’ Profiles as indicative of ‘biological’ motion. 
 
Of course, testing this hypothesis would not be without its difficulties. Whilst an 
fMRI compatible device could allow subjects to access Facebook whilst under 
observation, some important questions remain to be considered. Would respondents 
need to identify the LPC while under observation to activate their animacy system? 
Or would previous identification of these criteria designate their PD as ‘living’, i.e. is 
the potential for motion sufficient?  
 
Furthermore, the appearance of indicators of the LPC are independent invariables, 
which could not be elicited in controlled conditions. However, if any/all of these 
criteria did occur while respondents were under observation, then fMRI scans could 
determine: if ‘living’ Profiles of living users stimulate the STS/mPFC; if ‘living’ 
Profiles of deceased users do, and if there are any differences in activation levels 
between these two. We would also need to negotiate the difficulties posed by the 
Hawthorne effect, whereby in observing an agent, we alter their behaviour (although 
whether this effect extends to this manner of neural activity is questionable). 
 
Of course, it is necessary to acknowledge that neurology is not yet the panacea it may 
promise. The explanatory potential of neurology is currently limited by the inherent 
ambiguity of contemporary methods of mapping neural functions on cerebral regions. 
 
For example, whilst Gobbini et. al claimed in their study of intention attribution ‘the 
involvement of the pSTS/Temporal Parietal Junction in the systems for action 
understanding and Theory of Mind may reflect a common anatomical substrate for the 
representation of the intentions of others’, they later conceded that given the 
ambiguity of current mapping techniques, ‘the involvement of this region may reflect 
nearby but functionally dissociable regions’.379 Similarly, Lange and Lappe have 
qualified their hypotheses with comments such as ‘the contribution of form 
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processing areas to biological motion perception is less clear’.380  
 
This degree of qualification and ambiguity in certain quarters of neurological inquiry 
has prompted Satel and Lilienfeld to claim that ‘dozens of inconclusive studies have 
been spun into the oversimplification, interpretive license, and premature application 
of brain science’.381 In a similar vain, Choudhury and McKinney note that despite its 
limitations, ‘cerebral language and neuro-discourses increasingly assume a privileged 
explanatory status in explaining and intervening in human behaviour’.382 
 
They claim that ‘despite the absence of solid evidence, this limited brain data is used 
to support normative claims about adolescents and digital media’,383 such as those 
made by Greenfield that ‘young brains are being disturbingly reshaped, which could 
shorten attention-spans’.384 Indeed, Dumit has claimed that ‘in biomedicalized 
cultures, the ‘brain’ exists as a vital metaphor for what is most true, durable, universal, 
and uncontestable about who we are’.385 
 
I would add that a field deemed to represent the zenith of our cognitive endeavours 
(as for quantum physics, well, it’s not brain surgery), a field promising universal 
benefit, but mysterious and inaccessible to all but a small minority would see its 
practioners’ revelations as privileged as the words of the sages (a notion I will return 
to in chapter three in relation to the ‘god of technology’). However, despite these 
qualifications, even Choudhury and McKinney acknowledge that ‘certainly some 
prepositions are well founded’.386 
 
Indeed, the sheer quantity of data which consistently isolates the STS in explicit 
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identifications of biological motion, as documented by Peuskens et. al,387 Thompson 
et. al,388 and Vaina et. al389 amongst others, and the mPFC in the attribution of 
intention (see Goel et. al,390 Fletcher et. al,391 and Gallagher et. al392), presents a 
convincing case for the localisation of these functions.  
Therefore, providing we do not wholesale reject the field of neurology and its existing 
findings based on the limits of its utility in other areas, then the intention attributed to 
this form of ‘biological’ motion and its contribution to the phenomenon of Digital 
Presence can be discerned. As the Profile’s appearance and movements remain 
congruent, it can be attributed with the intention of ‘living’ Profiles: ‘being nosy’, and 
reading all the contributions made by the members of our networks. 
  
‘If she’s going to be anywhere, she’s going to be there’ - Intention Attribution 
 
For ‘Facebook is… being nosy isn’t it?’,393 a space where we ‘nose at friends and 
family’s Profiles’.394 Julia further acknowledged that ‘all the stuff I’m putting on 
Facebook you [a user] can see’. Lucy noted that activity centres on ‘scrolling through 
it a lot’, i.e. examining content, and Catherine recognised that the messages posted to 
her Father’s Profile are read by others. That users might not generate their own 
content appears irrelevant, as Lucy stated that her friend ‘might have gone a couple of 
days without posting something’, despite ‘always [being] on’ Facebook.  
 
Indeed, David claimed that the certainty that anything posted to a ‘living’ Profile will 
be seen by its intended recipient is so great (given the average degree of digital 
connectivity), that a response is not necessary to be confident that a message sent is a 
message received. He claimed ‘you know you’d post something, or send them a 
message, and you knew that they’d get back to you at some point about it’. 
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That the intention of reading messages is attributed to ‘living’ Profiles may account 
for why Catherine ‘feels’ that ‘messages get through’ to her deceased Father via his 
Profile, even though she has struggled to reconcile this ineffable ‘feeling’ with the 
reality that he is gone. For ‘If I, think for a second, erm, you know and, apply, logic, 
and, yeah, I mean, yeah, if I think about it for a second I go no, erm, but yeah, I 
suppose actually I kind of do’. Similarly, Lucy described how although her friend is 
dead, it ‘feels a lot more like she’s still reading it’, and so directs messages she wishes 
to communicate through her PD, e.g. ‘I just like to think that you’re still here’. 
  
In other reported cases of Digital Presence, the intention of reading messages has been 
attributed to the deceased ‘on Facebook up in Heaven’;395 I also encountered the 
notion that the deceased read Facebook messages in ‘Heaven’ in my dissertation study, 
as respondents requested that the deceased ‘Say hi to mum for me’.396 However, one 
of the limitations of my previous study was that respondents were not asked if their 
PDs constituted their sole means of interacting with the deceased. 
 
This is important to discern as it allows us to distinguish the differences between 
Catherine and Lucy’s experience of Digital Presence, wherein PDs are utilised as the 
sole means of contacting the deceased, and Joan’s experience. For whilst Joan 
continues to direct messages to her friend’s Profile, she describes herself as ‘spiritual, 
believing in a god’, and maintains that her friend is in ‘Heaven’. 
Thus, whilst the PD functions as a focal point for her continuing bond with her friend, 
as ‘there are memories there’, communicating via this medium is ‘the same as 
speaking to photos, or talking to her in my mind’. Through a general notion of 
deceased omniscience, ‘talking about those who have passed keeps them close’.  
 
However, in Catherine and Lucy’s cases, there is a wholesale rejection of the concept 
of an afterlife, or any form of ‘supernatural’ immaterial transcendence. When both 
individuals described their ineffable experience of presence in response to the 
question ‘how did you feel after you had left a comment?’, they claimed: ‘I’m not a 
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religious person’,397 and ‘I’m an atheist’.398 These were both unprompted remarks 
which they reiterated throughout their accounts to qualify our perception of their 
experiences. 
 
Of course, identifying as ‘not religious’, or as an ‘atheist’ does not in itself entail a 
rejection of post-mortem persistence. However, Catherine elaborated that one must be 
‘religious’ in order to believe that one can ‘communicate’ with the deceased, and 
claimed that ‘if I was religious [this would be like] praying and communication’. She 
then acknowledged and struggled with the difficulties Digital Presence poses for her 
convictions. 
 
Lucy meanwhile described how her atheism necessitated that ‘if she’s going to be 
anywhere, she’s going to be there [on Facebook]’. That the intention of reading 
messages is still attributed to the deceased is unsurprising: the habitual association of 
the Profile with the user; the LPC which indicate persistent vitality; and the effects of 
the emergent ‘contact comfort’ which invokes the deceased’s ‘Person-File’399 
cumulatively ensure that the PD continues to ‘feel’ like the deceased. 
 
However, Lucy’s comment that ‘if she’s going to be anywhere, she’s going to be there 
[on Facebook]’ demonstrates how Catherine and Lucy can continue to attribute 
intention to the deceased, whilst avoiding the paradox of attributing an intention to an 
agent whom no longer exists. For Catherine, Facebook is a place where she can go to 
‘see something of him’, because a ‘presence of who he was remains there’; it is a 
‘part’ of her father, allowing her to ‘visit him’. Thus, despite her rejection of 
supernatural transcendence, ‘it feels like messages get through’. 
 
As such, whilst there is no ‘Heaven’ for the deceased to persist in, by attributing 
intention to the ‘living’ Profile of the deceased, recourse is made to the deceased 
persistent in their Profile; this was illustrated by Lucy when she explained how her 
experience of Digital Presence had led her to consider that the deceased may be 
‘sticking around somewhere’, and that ‘if she’s going to be anywhere, she’s going to 
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be there’. 
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                                           The Extended Mind 
 
Beyond Skin and Skull – Extended Mind 
 
In their seminal paper, ‘The Extended Mind’, Clark and Chalmers considered the 
possibility that cognitive processes, and indeed, mental states, might extend beyond 
the boundaries of the brain and into our external environments. They were by no 
means the progenitors of the concept of cognitive processes or the ‘mind’ extending 
beyond ‘skin and skull’:400 in 1916 Dewey had claimed that ‘hands and feet, apparatus 
and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of thinking as changes within the 
brain’.401 Earlier still, Merleau-Ponty presented an image of the human animal as ‘la 
texture commune’,402 while Husserl described how appropriating external media such 
as napkins could aid cognitive processes.403 
 
Clark and Chalmers did however develop the concept, and illustrated cases in which 
‘the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, 
creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right’.404 
They claimed that if ‘part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in 
the head, we would have no hesitation in recognising as part of the cognitive process, 
then that part of the world is part of the cognitive process’,405 and thus ‘if we remove 
the external component of the system behavioural competence will drop, just as it 
would if we removed part of its brain’.406 
 
For example, they alluded to the use of a computer program to manipulate geometric 
shapes as opposed to mentally rotating them as an example of a cognitive process 
(mental rotation) extending from the brain and occurring in an external component; 
                                                 
400 A. Clark and D. Chalmers, ‘The Extended Mind’, Analysis, 58 (1), 1998, p7. 
401 J. Dewey, ‘Essays in Experimental Logic’, (Chicago: UCP, 1916), cited in S. Gallagher, ‘The 
Socially Extended Mind’, Cognitive Systems Research, 25, 2013, p4. 
402 D. Moran, ‘The Phenomenology of Embodiment: Intertwining and Reflexivity’, in R. Jensen and D. 
Moran (Eds), ‘The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity’, (London: Springer, 2013),  p301. 
403 T. Nenon, ‘Intersubjectivity, Interculturality, and Realities in Husserl’s Research Manuscripts on 
the Life-World’, in ibid, p151. 
404 Clark and Chalmers, op. cit., p8. 
405 Ibid. 
406 Ibid. 
 86
they also claimed that mental states can be ‘constituted partly by features of the 
environment’,407 using the example of belief.  
 
They claimed that if the information which informs a dispositional belief is externally 
coded in a readily available and accessible manner, e.g. in the well guarded and oft-
employed notebook of an Alzheimer’s patient, then that information functions 
equitably as ‘the information constituting an ordinary non-occurent belief; it just 
happens that this information lies beyond the skin’.408 The patient and her notebook 
constitute a ‘coupled system’ which extends the mental state of believing from the 
agent to the external component. 
  
I propose that such a coupled system can be founded between a user and their Profile, 
and the appreciation that this coupling has occurred, however latent and cumbersome 
to articulate, forms the neurological basis of Catherine and Lucy’s sense that the 
Profile was a ‘part’ of their decedents. However, in order to maintain this proposal, 
we must first consider the objections made to the concept of ‘extended cognition’ 
itself. 
 
No Man is an Island – Cognition Extended or Embedded 
 
Clark and Chalmers pre-empted the objections of those who might equate cognition 
with consciousness when they described how memory retrieval, linguistic processes 
and skill acquisition are all ‘beyond the borders of consciousness, yet play a crucial 
role in cognitive processing’.409 Despite allaying this concern, their extended 
cognition/extended mind hypothesis has been met with opposition on the grounds of 
qualitative distinction and false inference. 
 
The ‘Difference argument’ posed by Rupert contends that internal cognitive processes 
and those supposedly ‘external’ are qualitatively distinct;410 Adams and Aizawa’s 
related ‘Mark of the cognitive’ objection posits that any external processes are 
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‘incompatible with any plausible criterion that specifies the conditions under which a 
process qualifies as cognitive’;411 and Adams and Aizawa’s ‘Coupling-Constitution 
fallacy’ claims that Clark and Chalmers confuse causal and constitutive 
functioning.412 
 
While these objections are valid, they are not fatal to the concept of the coupled 
system. Providing we concede that while ‘cognitive processes do not extend outside 
the skin, they do depend very heavily on the external environment’,413 then for all 
intents and purposes, we can claim that removing an external component of a coupled 
system will reduce the behavioural competences of that system in a comparable 
manner to removing part of the brain. 
 
Bernecker has acknowledged that adopting an ‘embedded cognition’ hypothesis, 
makes no ‘substantive difference’414 to Clark and Chalmer’s model of the coupled 
system; it may well be that ‘future cognitive research will allow us to select one of the 
two rival hypothesis’, however the current limits of neurological inquiry are such that 
extended and embedded cognition hypotheses are ‘empirically and evidentially 
indistinguishable’.415 In any case, ‘both theories stress the dependence of cognition on 
the environment’,416 differing only in the location of cognitive processes; thus, both 
support the notion of cognition being dependent on external components. 
 
That coupled systems are not only possible, but that the brain has a proclivity to form 
them is suggested by data which demonstrate that neuro-physiology develops in a 
manner ‘that complements external structures’.417 Umilta et. al’s neuro-imaging study 
of monkeys discovered that newly introduced tools ‘came to be incorporated into the 
brain maps of the animals’ hands’.418 Similarly, Bassolino et. al found that the 
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manipulation of tools remaps the somatosensory cortex in the human brain in a 
manner that incorporates the tools themselves.419 
 
There is of course a type distinction between rakes and pliers and Facebook Profiles, 
although Clark and Chalmer’s claim that ‘extended cognition is a core cognitive 
process’420 appears well founded when we consider the history of technological 
development. Our early ancestors may have reduced memory load through cave 
paintings, and humans have employed everything from the abacus to the iPad to 
perform arithmetic and other mental processes. But what of our contemporary zenith, 
the internet? 
 
To Have and to Hold – The Internet as External Component 
 
To conclude their ‘Extended Mind’ paper, Clark and Chalmers rejected the notion that 
the internet can function as a reliable component of a coupled system. Smart 
concurred on the same grounds: the internet does not satisfy the external component 
criteria, established by Clark and Chalmers in response to Rupert’s ‘Cognitive Bloat’ 
objection.421 Rupert claimed that no external component could be sufficiently 
integrated with the subject, and Clark and Chalmers acknowledged the danger that 
‘decoupling’ could occur frequently enough to disqualify certain components from 
forming a true cognitive system.422 
 
Therefore, Clark and Chalmers claimed that ‘the resource must be reliably available; 
any information retrieved from the external resource must be more or less 
automatically endorsed; information contained in the resource should be easily 
accessible as and when required’.423 They rejected the internet on the basis of the 
availability criteria; Smart similarly claimed that as our ‘HTML based… document-
centric, ‘Web of documents’ is a very inefficient means of information access’,424 the 
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internet fails to satisfy the accessibility criteria. 
 
However, Clark and Chalmers’ objection is based on the technological capacities of 
1997, when web-enabled devices were not portable, and required a good few minutes 
of noisy fanfare to connect to the internet. They recognised that ‘if people always 
carried a calculator, or had one implanted’, then these would be ‘part of the basic 
package of cognitive resources that I bring to bear on the everyday world’,425 i.e. 
external components. As Clayton et. al’s study of smartphone use amongst University 
students discovered, in 2015 it can be hard to distinguish whether web-enabled 
iPhones are always carried, or implanted. Given the prevalence and dependence on 
smartphones amongst this demographic, there is no danger of casual ‘decoupling’.426 
 
As for Smart’s claim that the ‘HTML based Web of Documents’ fails the accessibility 
criteria, he is correct: scanning pages of text, either manually or through a digital 
search function, does not afford the accessibility of internal memory. Profiles 
however do not present information in a ‘document-centric’ fashion, but through rich 
multimedia, and more intuitively through the Newsfeed and Timeline features.  
 
Gray et. al’s study of ‘cognitive impartiality’ found that ‘our tendency to consult our 
internal memory as opposed to information stored externally is only informed by the 
time/cost of access, not location per se’,427 and our respondents do appear to be 
delegating memories of the deceased to their PDs: Catherine claimed that her PD is 
the ‘easiest way to… have memories’, and Lucy stated that she used her PD to ‘go 
back’, and recollect. 
 
Admittedly, the extent to which memory is truly delegated to PDs is questionable, as 
stimuli such as photos may simply act as prompts to respondents’ biological memory. 
However, Clark and Chalmers and Smart’s examples pertain specifically to the 
extension of memory retrieval. If we recognise that external components can be 
constitutive of cognition in the manner a shovel is to the act of digging, or pen and 
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paper are to Feynman’s thinking, then the Profile and its users can form a coupled 
system. 
 
Thinking with Things – External Components as Constitutive of Cognition 
 
Gallagher has analogised the constitutive role of external cognitive components with 
the act of digging: ‘take away the musculature, or the shovel, or the ground, and 
nothing like digging would be going on’.428 Similarly, the Nobel prize winning 
physicist Feynman claimed that the process of creating notes and sketches with pen 
and paper was part of the cognitive work itself; Clark has suggested that Feynman 
‘was actually thinking on the paper’,429 and Smart elaborated that in Feynman’s case, 
‘writing is constitutive of thinking’430 as the machinery of cognition extends beyond 
the brain to pen and paper. 
 
In this case, Feynman and his pen and paper constitute a coupled system: ‘if we 
remove the external component of the system behavioural competence will drop, just 
as it would if we removed part of its brain’. The organisational potential of pen and 
paper ‘shapes the flow of thoughts and ideas’,431 to the effect that Feynman’s 
particular manner of thinking may not have been possible through alternative modes 
of expression. 
 
Similarly, it may not be possible for others to articulate an idea through the distillation 
of pen and paper which could be realised through the Profile, i.e. through its possible 
modes of expression such as text, video, audio, hyperlinks to user created digital 
content, and the pictographic medium of ‘emoji’.432 The Profile is also an inherently 
intersubjective and enactive medium of expression, as Catherine observed in her 
father ‘not holding back from having an argument’ and thus collaboratively 
constructing ideas and opinions; it necessitates a manner of thinking particular to this 
form of digital intersubjectivity. 
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Therefore, we can understand why Catherine and Lucy believe the Profile is like a 
‘part’ of their decedents: for Lucy ‘it had to be a part of her… she was on Facebook 
so much’, and Catherine’s father used his Profile to express ‘jokes, opinions, views, 
wit’ through ‘photos and videos and things’ The degree of use of this constitutive 
component of cognition is such that the Profile and its user formed a coupled system. 
 
What we cannot understand on this basis alone however is why ‘if she’s going to be 
anywhere, she’s going to be there’, and why there is a ‘feeling that messages get 
through’. Even if we subconsciously recognise the cognitive connection between a 
decedent and an external component, that does not entail that writing in an deceased 
Alzheimer’s patient’s notebook guarantees that a message will be communicated 
beyond the grave. We still cannot explain how the intention of viewing messages 
posted on a PD can be attributed to the deceased when the notion of supernatural 
transcendence is rejected. 
 
Instead, we need to consider the manner in which our idiosyncratic interpretation’,433 
(the manner in which the tacit knowledge of coupled systems is interpreted through 
our worldview and culture) is informed by the digital doxa our respondents live in. In 
this context, the external component, the Profile, is an avatar: a form of alternative 
embodiment, necessary to interact with (and interact in) the ontologically distinct 
vista of the ‘Digital’.  
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                                              ‘Being’ Online 
 
Logging on, Going in – A Dialectic of Worlds 
 
Accessing the internet doesn’t just involve booting up and logging on. It involves 
going in: passing through the ‘gateway of a computer screen’434 into a ‘digital 
world’.435 This dialectic of ‘worlds’ dominates public discourse, as the Prime Minister 
regularly refers to the ‘digital world’,436 and the head of GCHQ, an agency commonly 
associated with cutting edge technology describes the internet as the ‘online world’.437 
 
Researchers have reported that this ‘digital world’ is variably described as ‘E-
space’;438 the ‘virtual world’;439 the ‘virtual plane’;440 the ‘electronic realm’,441 and 
most frequently as ‘cyberspace’.442 These scholars also employ these terms in their 
own references to digital technology and the internet, although the Digital is not 
simply described as a ‘world’ due to the scope of its creative potential. 
 
This ‘realm’ is explicitly distinguished from the ‘real world’,443 which is further 
defined as the ‘material realm’,444 or the world of ‘physical matter’.445 As such, 
‘cyberspace’ is distinguished from ‘real, geographic space’,446 and ‘being’ online 
means navigating ‘the virtual terrain of cyberspace’.447 
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This dialectic of the ‘real/physical world’ and ‘digital/online world’ is evident in the 
work of SNS researchers: Brubaker et. al make a distinction between the ‘physical 
world’, and the ‘digital world’,448 Walter et. al discuss the conventions of the ‘online 
world’,449 and Massimi and Baecker distinguish between the ‘real and digital 
worlds’450 amongst other examples. 
 
This trope is also evident in representations of the Digital in popular culture as not 
just qualitatively, but ontologically distinct. The ‘online world’ as ontologically 
distinct is a recurring theme in Channel 4’s popular ‘Black Mirror’ series, the BBC’s 
‘Dr Who’, and several high grossing films such as ‘Tron’, ‘The Matrix’, and 
‘Transcendence’; these promulgate and reinforce the concept of the Digital as an 
‘otherworldly space’451 that can sustain human consciousness, independent from the 
physical body. 
 
Campbell has claimed that the etiology of this dialectic, and the accompanying notion 
that the digital is ontologically distinct from the ‘physical’, or ‘real’ world is the 
etiology of the term ‘cyberspace’, introduced in a science fiction novel published 
1984. The portmanteau ‘cyberspace’ (‘Cyber’ from cybernetics, and ‘space’) was 
coined by Gibson in his novel ‘Neuromancer’, in which the inhabitants of a ravaged 
Earth connect the planet’s computers to a global network, accessed through a ‘virtual-
reality grid space’;452 once in this virtual world, anything is possible. 
 
Campbell believes that Gibson’s construct of ‘cyberspace’ became conflated with the 
‘internet’ as the former became employed as a metaphor for the latter. She has noted 
that Rushkoff and Benedikt were amongst the first scholars to employ the concept of 
‘cyberspace’ as a metaphor for the internet, as they described it is as ‘a parallel 
universe created and sustained by the world’s computers’.453 In the process of 
adopting cyberspace as a metaphoric construct, ‘cyberspace moved from a construct 
confined to science fiction to being used as a descriptive noun’.454 
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This metaphor was then adopted and perpetuated by a group described by Campbell 
as the ‘Digirati’: ‘the digital elite of the 1990s, such as Esther Dyson, Bill Gates, and 
Michael Dertouzous’,455 which ensured the transition of cyberspace from myth to 
metaphor. Given the popularisation of the term as a descriptor of the internet, by the 
mid 1990s ‘the rhetoric of cyberspace began to blur what was real about how the 
internet really functioned’, a thesis shared by Bukatman.456  
 
Sherlock is unsurprised that a metaphoric construct has become popular 
understanding, as the incomprehensibility of the mechanics of digital technology to all 
but a minority ‘leaves the door wide open for mythical interpretation’.457 Numes has 
related this process of cyberspace ‘becoming an actual place’ to the process discussed 
by Baudrillard in relation to hyperreality, wherein ‘the map of the territory itself 
becomes the territory’.458 
 
Campbell has proposed that it is this process of the evolution of myth to metaphor, 
and the subsequent conflation of cyberspace and the internet that informs the 
dialectical rhetoric of ontologically distinct ‘worlds’. However, whilst the ‘Digirati’ 
may have adopted cyberspace as a metaphor to express the creative potential of the 
medium, Campbell does not account for why the concept found such currency 
amongst scholars, or why it has been so pervasive, readily received and resonant. 
Furthermore, she fails to explicate the intellectual heritage of Gibson’s construct, or 
describe the cultural influences evident in Gibson’s work. 
 
Sconce’s account of the emergence of this dialectic maintains that Gibson’s 
cyberspace does have cultural antecedents, and that the concept is a particular 
historio-cultural manifestation of what he refers to as ‘the consistent representational 
strategy of electronic transmutation’.459 Sconce has posited that since the 18th century, 
electricity, information, and consciousness have all been understood in relation to the 
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metaphor of ‘flow’. 
 
He has cited: how electricity has been conceived of as a ‘current’ for over two 
hundred years; Williams James’ description of the ‘stream of consciousness’ in the 
age of Victorian electrification; and Raymond Williams concept of ‘information flow’ 
in the field of media studies as examples of how the metaphor of ‘flow’ is consistently 
employed to understand these three concepts.460 
 
Sconce has claimed that this shared metaphor allows ‘the possibility of analogous 
exchanges, electricity mediating the transfer and substitution of consciousness and 
information between the body and a host of electronic media technologies’.461 Thus, 
with the advent of ‘electronic telecommunications’ with the invention of the telegram 
in the 19th century, the ‘spark’ of consciousness could be transmuted and 
communicated via electricity. 
 
The invention of wireless radio allowed this ‘spark’ to be transmuted to electrons in 
the ‘ether’, and the manifestation of this ‘enduring logic of transmutable flow’ in 
television resulted in the emergence of the notion of the ‘self-contained electronic 
world’. For the ‘visual flow’ of this medium ‘depicted the apparent transmutability of 
human consciousness and electrical transmission in a more palpable form’.462  
 
We can appreciate why this world, referred to as ‘television land’ by Sconce, is more 
palpable then the ‘ether’ of the radio airways: it is a visual representation of reality, of 
the ‘physical’ world. As such, it is readily inhabitable, as this ‘world’ is negotiated via 
the physical body, albeit atomised and reassembled in ‘television land’.463 
 
Thus, Sconce has claimed that the concept of ‘cyberspace’ is another expression of 
the logic of electronic transmutability. It is perceived as ontologically distinct due to 
its evolutionary heritage in television, which engendered the popular notion of the 
‘electronic world’ through visually manifesting the electronic transmutation of 
consciousness in a ‘palpable’ manner. 
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I posit that at best, Sconce has committed the genetic fallacy. The Digital was 
described as a ‘world’ long before the sort of photo realistic representations that 
digital technology can manufacture today. Sconce claimed that the construct of the 
‘electronic world’ emerged as ‘television land’ was hospitable, i.e. it can be 
negotiated via the body. But at least initially, the ‘digital world’ was not readily 
inhabitable: the ‘virtual terrain of cyberspace’ could not be explored with the body, or 
an atomised representation of the body.  
 
In contrast to Sconce’s thesis that an alternative mode of being facilitated the notion 
of a digital world, I contend that the notion of a digital world necessitated an 
alternative mode of being. That the Digital is referred to as a ‘world’ is not due to an 
evolutionary ancestry in television, but due to the resources available to describe a 
liminal space. 
 
The No Place – The Digital as Liminal Space 
 
Zaleski has noted that although the word ‘space’ features in synonyms of the internet 
such as cyberspace, ‘this is not everyday, three-dimensional space’,464 an observation 
reiterated by the head of GCHQ who has distinguished between the internet and 
‘normal, three-dimensional space’.465 Instead Zaleski has claimed that on the internet, 
the ‘laws of space grow hinky’.466 Hyperlinks allow us to traverse the vast expanse of 
the web instantaneously, and the internet allows us to experience co-presence via SNS, 
regardless of geographic distance. 
 
As McLuhan famously observed when he described how the internet had transformed 
the planet into a global village, ‘the internet has abolished space’.467 Space as 
experienced in the ‘physical’ world is collapsed, rendering the internet a ‘no place’. 
This term does not refer to Augé’s concept of the ‘super-modern non-place’;468 it is 
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intended to denote a place ‘that transcends geography in the conventional sense’.469  
 
The Digital also distorts time, creating a sense of what Qiu refers to as ‘timeless-time’, 
wherein a ‘seemingly perpetual movement of digital exchanges eliminate the linear 
sequencing of events and practices, as best exemplified by hyperlinked 
communication’.470 
 
Brasher has noted how the medium ‘forcefully expands time, freezes time, causing 
everything to exist in a perpetual present, and compresses time’, and has elaborated 
that these ‘alternative time experiences’ are comparable to the ‘sacred time’ 
experienced in the great cathedrals and temples of Catholicism, Hinduism and 
Buddhism471 (an idea we will return to in chapter three). 
 
Our capacity to describe this sense of timeless time and spaceless space is limited, and 
I believe our experiences of the internet best accord with those of liminal places, 
which are in the words of Leach, ‘both in this world, and not in this world472’: they do 
not appear to be governed by the same temporal laws of physics. Instead, ‘cyberspace 
embodies the sense of betwixt and between’.473 
 
As it is immaterial and distinct from geographic space, engaging with this vista 
necessitates an alternative mode of being474 as unlike ‘television land’, this is not a 
‘flesh and blood world’.475 That is, this world cannot be readily inhabited by the same 
means of extension as the ‘physical world’, i.e. the physical body. Instead, engaging 
with the Digital necessitates an ‘ontological shift’,476 as the medium ‘unties the mind 
from the body’.477 
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Gray and Escalante have claimed that this sense of an alternate mode of being results 
in notions of disembodied immateriality, as ‘minds roam free in cyberspace’478 as we 
browse and surf the web. Similarly, Hillis has levelled the charge that this conception 
‘repeats a form of Cartesian dualism’.479 However, this critique is not pertinent due to 
the validity of a popular criticism of Cartesian dualism: disembodied existence is 
incomprehensible.  
 
While we may browse and surf the web freely enough, early adopters and proponents 
of digital technology grappled with the question, ‘what kind of persistence do users 
need in order to recognise each other?’,480 i.e. how do users become intelligible and 
thus allow intersubjectivity in an ‘immaterial realm’? Ultimately, what does it mean 
to ‘be’ online? As Stiegler has acknowledged, ‘the who is nothing without the 
what’.481 That what, the means by which we our embodied and may interact with 
others in the ‘digital world’, is the avatar. 
 
Flesh Made Profile – Forms of Digital Embodiment 
 
In the beginning was the word. And the word was (the) avatar. When digital 
interactions were limited to text based exchanges, an individual’s username 
functioned as their avatar, their means of extension, from which the words they wrote 
in chatrooms and forums emanated. Dawson’s early study of digital text based 
exchanges found that if enough time was spent in the Digital by means of this avatar, 
users reported that ‘I associate myself with the words that I’m typing’.482  
 
Numes has described how through this form of digital embodiment via the avatar of 
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the username, ‘our words are our bodies’,483 and Campbell has elaborated that this 
avatar provides the intelligibility that facilitates intersubjectivity, as ‘people become 
known by their words or their taglines [which are] a defining factor of who one is in 
cyberspace’.484 
 
In the words of one user in Dawson’s study, the adoption of textual avatars is ‘like 
flesh made word’,485 and Zaleski encountered some users so immersed in the Digital 
via their avatars that they claimed ‘you sort of forget you have a body’.486 
 
As graphic processing became more sophisticated, graphic avatars representing 
human or animal forms became available. In Taylor’s study of a graphical 
intersubjective environment, he also concluded that users do not ‘simply exist just as a 
‘mind’, but instead ‘construct their identities through avatars’.487 Taylor is 
unequivocal in his description of these avatars as ‘digital bodies [which] root us and 
make us present, to ourselves and to others’,488 equated by users with their corporeal 
bodies in the ‘physical’ world. 
 
In 2015, the avatar of choice is the Facebook Profile, as this SNS is the dominant 
mode of digital intersubjectivity. The PD, as the external component of a coupled 
system which Catherine and Lucy believe has a connection to the deceased, also 
functions as an alternative means of embodiment.  
 
Before discussing what I believe to be the mechanics by which Catherine and Lucy’s 
decedents persist through their Profiles, I will address the observations made by 
Graham, Gibbs and Aceti: that the ‘digital/material’ dialectic is ‘creating a false 
dichotomy with regard to the body and technologies such as the internet’, which 
suggests a ‘particular ontology that may in fact be faulty, because it artificially 
segregates the physical body and an internet presence’.489 
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That the Digital is not actually ontologically distinct from the physical has also been 
affirmed by Gray and Escalante, whose ‘New Materialist’ approach defines the 
Digital as ‘stuff which is incorporated in materiality rather than floating as a 
metaphysical substance in virtual space’.490 
 
While these scholars may be seeking to redress the prevalence of a discourse which 
reinforces a structural division between ‘physical’ and ‘digital’, to describe the act of 
identifying an avatar as a ‘distinct bodily entity, as a kind of metaphor for the physical 
body’ as a ‘fallacy’491 is of no explanatory utility. 
 
This etic, realist proscription is akin to criticising the Catholic who maintains the 
Eucharist is the body of Christ. It offers no insight into the emic understanding of 
avatars, and fails to engage with the context of an inculcated digital doxa in which 
these interactions occur and are meaningful. These statements are comparable to those 
of colonial anthropological traditions which would relegate tribal rite to ‘magic’, and 
do nothing more than describe the savagery of the digital native. 
 
Instead, if we acknowledge the influence of a digital doxa and the effects of this 
dialectic, then understanding the necessity of an alternative mode of being in the 
liminal space of the ‘digital world’ allows us to understand why ‘if she’s going to be 
anywhere, she’s going to be there’,492 and why there is a ‘feeling that messages get 
through’.493 
 
Making Sense of the Worlds – Emic interpretations of Neurological Processes 
 
The Profile has already demonstrated that it can sustain consciousness in the ‘digital 
world’, and Vealey has also described the Profile as a ‘digitalised body’.494 He has 
claimed that the ‘body is further extended into cyberspace’,495 although he does not 
elaborate on the nature of this extension or the ontological implications of his 
                                                 
490 Gray and Escalante, op. cit., p4. 
491 Graham, Gibbs and Aceti, op. cit., p134. 
492 Lucy. 
493 Catherine. 
494 K. Vealey, ‘Making Dead Bodies Legible: Facebook’s Ghosts, Public Bodies, and Networked Grief’, 
http://www.gnovisjournal.org/2011/04/03/making-dead-bodies-legible./, accessed 23/05/15. 
495 Ibid. 
 101
reference to ‘cyberspace’; as such, this statement appears to exhibit the influence of a 
digital doxa without critically reflecting on it. 
 
Vealey has also claimed that whilst Profiles can function as ‘digitalised bodies’, PDs 
are ‘unresponsive’, ‘electronic tombs’, and any address to them ‘undoubtedly fails’:496 
they are mummified cyber corpses. However, as our respondents have reported, their 
attempts to communicate with the deceased through PDs have not ‘failed’, in that it 
feels like messages are received. These PDs are also responsive, in that they react and 
respond to continued systemic integration and interaction, which generates activity. 
 
With the identification of ‘biological’ motion at the site of the PD a corresponding 
intention attribution must be made, and due to the PDs ‘contact comfort’, attributed to 
the deceased. As our respondents acknowledge that their loved ones are dead, and as 
they reject the possibility of supernatural transcendence, intention cannot be attributed 
to the deceased in ‘Heaven’.  
 
Instead, the sole means of recourse is the PD, as an alternative form of embodiment 
connected or ‘part’ of the deceased as an element of a coupled system. Unlike 
Vealey’s cyber corpses, these avatars are still deemed viable conduits, as healthy 
digital bodies. As such, there is a sense in which as the physical body has perished, 
the ‘ontic substance’497 of the deceased has migrated to their avatar, to that viable 
‘part’ of themselves. 
 
This confluence of neurological processes (which produce examples of what Boyer 
has described as ‘specific intuitions that are not delivered by conscious, deliberate 
processes’)498 are ‘idiosyncratically interpreted’499 through a digital doxa and secular 
worldview as indicators of the transmutation of the deceased to their alternative form 
of embodiment, i.e. the Profile. 
 
Indeed, Lucy claimed that the only form of life after death she had ever entertained 
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was reincarnation, i.e. a tangible form of re-embodiment. This was short lived, 
although her beliefs were ‘starting to change’ in response to her experiences of 
Digital Presence. That Lucy rejected the notion of ‘Heaven’ at around the age of 8, 
yet is willing to accept that the deceased might persist on Facebook demonstrates how 
the Profile can offer a plausible form of post-mortem existence when a tangible, 
viable form of re-embodiment is necessary for belief. 
 
As noted, Sconce has attempted to delineate the logic of transmutation with reference 
to the imaginative potential of electricity; Bollmer identified information as the 
process’ sine qua non;500 and Hayles501 and Thacker502 have both claimed that 
bioinformatics has discursively ‘transformed ‘life’ into little more than disembodied 
code, able to exist in any formally compatible material substrate’.503  
 
I maintain that it is sufficient that there is simply some form of connection which 
allows this transmutation to occur. As an element of a coupled system, the Profile is 
emically recognised as being a ‘part’ of the deceased; thus there is a connection, 
however ineffable, which facilitates the transmutation of ‘ontic substance’ from the 
corporeal, to the digital body. 
 
As a feature of what Leach described as ‘magical logic’,504 i.e. the unknown and 
mysterious causal processes of the incomprehensible, the existence of this connection 
is sufficient to sustain the logical possibility of transmutation. To contest the means 
by which this logic operates to akin to Martin Luther’s criticism of the Catholic 
Church’s recourse to Aristotelian logic to validate the act of transubstantiation: the 
actual process is ill-considered and largely irrelevant to the lay.505 What matters is that 
it works, even if the means by which it does so are not fully understood. That a lack of 
understanding does not nullify the efficacy of the process is demonstrated by the lack 
of comprehension Catherine and Lucy have expressed in their accounts of Digital 
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Presence. 
 
Nonetheless, we may well ask why Julia also identifies the LPC on a PD in her 
network and yet finds the experience ‘disturbing’ as opposed to welcome. Julia had 
witnessed continued interaction as ‘better friends still post on a regular basis’ and 
sustained activity two years after the individual’s death. She also noted evidence of 
systemic integration as the PD was included in ‘the reminders you get of their 
birthdays’, i.e. automatically generated birthday reminders for members of one’s 
social network.  
 
Like Catherine and Lucy, Julia did not define herself as religious, although unlike 
Catherine and Lucy, Julia did not describe her relationship with the deceased as close. 
She had ‘not spoken to [the deceased] in years’, and had only visited the PD as she 
‘felt like I maybe ought to write something, because other people had written 
something’. The crucial differentiating factor in these cases is the desire to maintain a 
bond. 
 
Julia had no desire to maintain a bond with an old school friend whom she had not 
spoken to in years, and so experienced her presence as ‘disturbing’. Catherine 
however, ‘really misses’ her father, regularly ‘visits him’ on his Profile, and ‘wanted 
to do something [to] keep his presence there’, by continuing to engage with the PD. 
Similarly, Lucy continues to direct messages to the deceased as the PD allows the 
same means of social engagement practiced in life. 
 
Therefore, it does not appear that the phenomenon of Digital Presence is contingent 
upon a desire to maintain a bond with the deceased; it does, however, appear to 
influence the emotional response to the phenomenon. The presence of the deceased, 
absent the desire to maintain a bond when no alternative means of transcendence are 
available, may be akin to seeing a digital ghost. 
 
But what are the implications of Digital Presence when survivors indulge the 
phenomenon to maintain a bond with the deceased? Does the emic interpretation of 
contact comfort and ‘biological’ motion in the context of a digital doxa and a secular 
worldview realise the techno-soteriology of the post-humanist? Does it enable the 
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secularisation of transcendence through the digital body that does not decay? Can it 
really be Online as it is in Heaven? 
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                                 Online as it is in Heaven 
          Techno-Soteriology, Sacred Spaces, Rituals, and Worldviews 
 
                                   Techno-Soteriology 
 
God, Google, and the Last Great Gap – Digital Epistemology 
 
Whilst most people use the internet to check their emails, keep in touch with friends 
and family and watch videos on YouTube, the digital pioneers of the 90s and early 
00s shared somewhat grander expectations for the potential of mass networked 
communication. Negroponte believed that we would witness the establishment of 
‘things like world peace’,506 and McLuhan and Zingrone foresaw a ‘technologically 
engendered state of universal understanding and unity… creating a perpetuity of 
collective harmony and peace’.507 
 
Dyson shared this optimism, and predicted that in the immediate future, ‘cyberspace’ 
would create a ‘wonderful pluralistic… free and diverse world’,508 while Bill Gates 
explained ‘the network will draw us together, if that’s what we choose’.509 Brasher 
believed that the cumulative effect of our digital endeavours would ‘make the politics 
of oppression and resentment obsolete’,510 and some technological theorists even 
envisioned an emergent ‘kind of group consciousness’.511 Indeed, the similarities of 
the Digital to Chardin’s concept of the ‘Noosphere’, as a ‘level of unified 
consciousness’512 did not go unnoticed by the ‘Digirati’. 
 
However, as is only too evident, we need only read the comments below any given 
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YouTube video or venture into an online forum on any given topic to conclude that 
this vision of universal harmony is far from realised, as digital anonymity continues to 
breed animosity. Such early hopes for the medium are now described as the ‘first 
wave’ of research, characterised by the belief that ‘computers and the internet could 
(and probably would), do almost anything’.513 
 
The ‘second wave’ of commentary, a product of the mid-to-late noughties, tended to 
urge toward caution and an appreciation of a broader historical and social context; 
some first wave proponents of the Digital later recanted, and conceded that their 
earlier work was ‘naïve, and even utopian’.514 The failure of the dawn of the Digital to 
herald a utopian revolution is comparable in scale to the unfulfilled promise of those 
psychoanalysts, sociologists and philosophers who prophesised that the popularisation 
of the scientific method would ultimately spell the demise of religious belief and 
ideation. 
 
In his The Future of an Illusion, Freud projected that increased proliferation and 
sophistication of ‘proper education’ would nullify the need for the human wish project 
that is religion;515 through Zarathustra’s madman declaring ‘God is dead’, Nietzsche 
suggested that the concept of God would soon no longer prove viable,516 and Comte 
believed that the rationalisation of thought fostered by the scientific method would 
render the ‘old myths’ of religion517 obsolete. 
 
The belief that greater popular scientific knowledge would provoke the decline and 
death of religion has been maintained by Stark and Iannaccone, who have claimed 
that ‘it is science that has the most deadly implications for religion’518 for Western 
Europe; they have claimed that religious beliefs are less credible as individuals have 
become ‘better educated and less credulous’.519  
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Chadwick has claimed that the proliferation of ‘doubt’ in Victorian England between 
1855 and 1885 was attributed to this process of scientific rationalisation, as ‘some 
blamed science, or fastened upon the name of Darwin as a symbol of an entire 
development of the sciences as they came to bear upon the truth of religion’.520 The 
sum of these assertions has inspired Messerly to announce, as Freud, Nietzsche and 
Comte amongst others before him, that ‘our belief in the gods will not endure. Our 
descendents will be too advanced to share such primitive beliefs’.521 
 
However, as with the utopia the dawn of the Digital was supposed to realise, the 
secular revolution has failed to materialise. As Brasher has noted, ‘public education 
has spread tremendously, yet religion has not vanished’.522 For as Wilson observed, 
‘religion and science can co-exist as alternative orientations to the world’:523 contrary 
to the Enlightenment view, Bruce contends that there is no ‘zero-sum knowledge 
competition’,524 as people continue to maintain religious beliefs despite advances in 
scientific insight. 
 
That is not, however, to say that scientific advancement has not been identified as 
having what Martin and Catto have described as an ‘indirect impact’525 on the process 
of Western European secularisation. Along with the fragmentation of societies and 
social life, the disappearance of the community and the growth of centralised 
bureaucracy, Martin and Catto have claimed that the ‘advance of technical 
rationality’526 has been partly responsible for increased secularisation (I am aware that 
the term ‘secularisation’ is by no means unequivocal, but I refer to it to describe a 
decline in explicit religious conviction, as expressed in censuses, etc.). 
 
Wilson described ‘technical rationality’ as the effect of technology to ‘reduce the 
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occasions on which people have recourse to religion’,527 due to, as Bruce phrased it, 
‘the success of technology in delivering the goods’.528 Technological efficiency 
reduces uncertainty, and thus the need to petition the supernatural: ‘there is simply no 
need to turn to the gods for help with ringworm in cattle when you can buy a drench 
which was proved over and over again to be an excellent cure for the condition’.529 
 
Martin has elaborated that ‘the overwhelming sense of divine limits which afflicted 
previous generations is much diminished’530 as we have extended the scope of our 
technological mastery over nature. Thus, it is not that religion lacks plausibility in a 
world of medicine and microchips; it is that it increasingly lacks utility, as ‘the 
frequency and seriousness with which people attend to religion decreases’531 as our 
‘notion of the scope of the divine’532 declines. Indeed, Winner claims that the extent 
of this process is such that the 20th century was in part defined by this technical 
rationality, as it was ‘taken for granted that the only reliable sources for improving the 
human condition stem from new machines’.533 
 
Brasher even characterises ours as a ‘digital epistemology’,534 wherein ‘new 
computers or new software materialise as the most plausible response to whatever 
problems arise’,535 and in which ‘cyberspace’ ‘is continuously available and can 
answer our every desire: want a new car? Go online. Want companionship? Go online. 
Want to know what the weather is like in Antarctica? Go online’.536 
 
The Digital is now utilised for everything from finding a lover, to providing the 
answer to any given question as people across the planet petition the search engine 
Google as the first reference for any enquiry; it processes more than 3 billion searches 
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a day.537 If we are sceptical that for many Google functions as the source of all 
wisdom, simply enter the words ‘How do I’ into the search bar and view the range of 
popular search suggestions. 
 
Thus, whilst Benedikt’s claim that the Digital would establish a utopia of peace and 
harmony has yet to be realised, his claim that ‘everything important to the life of 
individuals… will be found for sale or for the taking in cyberspace’538 appears more 
substantiated. Also, Buick and Jevtic’s claim that the ultimate manifestation of this 
digital epistemology is our desire to create ‘a human made machine with all the 
answers’539 has also been substantiated. 
 
IBM’s ‘Deep Blue’ supercomputer that beat the chess Grandmaster Kasparov in 1997 
is a pocket calculator in comparison to IBM’s ‘Watson’. A networked artificial 
intelligence, showcased on the US game show ‘Jeopardy’ in which it defeated every 
human opponent, ‘Watson’ is now ‘training’ to be a cancer consultant. Watson is 
‘finding personalised treatments for every cancer patient by comparing disease and 
treatment histories, genetic data, scans and symptoms against the vast universe of 
medical knowledge’, i.e. every journal article, textbook and research paper that has 
been digitalised.540 
 
Thus, as technology continues to ‘reduce the domain over which religion offers the 
most compelling explanations and most predictable outcomes’,541 Postman’s ‘god of 
technology’ (a term which describes ‘the sense that people believe technology works, 
that they rely on it, that it makes promises’)542 will continue to supplant the ‘god-of-
the-gaps’, (the practice of ‘looking for god when our human skills fall short of what 
we wish we could achieve’).543 To rephrase Groothuis, who asks ‘apart from God, 
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where better to search than in cyberspace?’:544 why search for God when we can 
search in cyberspace? 
 
We may answer that whilst the god of technology has sealed some of these gaps, 
strongholds of hopelessness remain. As Bruce has noted, ‘religion is most used for the 
dark recessive areas of human life over which control has not been established by 
technology’,545 with the great gap, death, remaining the preserve of religion. However, 
new Posthuman prophets, serving as the outriders of the secularisation of 
transcendence are presenting technological possibilities once consigned to science 
fiction as imminent reality, as technology attempts to span the chasm of the last great 
gap, the abyss of death. 
 
Staring into the Abyss – The Secularisation of Transcendent Being 
 
Death has been described as the ‘mainspring of human activity’546 and has been 
explored as the central preoccupation of the homo-sapien by countless scholars. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that Kerr may observe ‘the longings that human beings 
naturally seem to have for some sort of transcendence of finitude’,547 and Groothuis 
may claim that ‘much of human endeavour has been concerned with how to throw off 
the limitations of our mortal bodies’.548 
 
For transcending the corporeal is a recurring trope in Semitic religions, and ‘a staple 
of Greek philosophies such as Platonism and Neo-Platonism, and non-Semitic 
religions such as Gnosticism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and many of the New Age 
expressions of today’. Groothuis believes this is because the ‘vicissitudes of the body’ 
are such that ‘many have banned it from the realm of final redemption’.549  
 
Whilst humans have attempted to technologically ameliorate these vicissitudes of the 
corporeal condition through medicine, and, Groothuis claims ‘labour-saving devices 
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such as the washing machine’,550 the universal transcendence project has only been 
realisable through religion. Nonetheless, the salvific potential of technology, a form of 
techno-soteriology, has long fascinated authors. Sconce has noted how writers and 
film producers have indulged in the ‘fantasy [of] an autonomous being at last 
purged… of the material world’.551 
 
Arthur Clark’s 1956 novel ‘The City and the Stars’ presented a future in which 
immortality has been achieved through ‘people being stored in a computer and 
downloaded over and over again into new bodies’,552 and Aldous Huxley’s classic 
dystopian novel ‘Brave New World’ also explored the possibility of alternative forms 
of existence.553 Moravec too has written about the uploading of consciousness to 
mainframes, and its downloading to new, robotic bodies. 
 
He describes a future in which the brain can be ‘simulated and excavated’, and 
consciousness ‘downloaded’ to ‘a shiny new body’.554 The only difference is that 
Moravec was the Director of the Mobile Robotics Laboratory in Carnegie-Mellon’s 
Field Robotics Centre, and his book is shelved under ‘non-fiction’. 
 
A number of scholars have claimed that we have been on the verge of actually 
achieving forms of secular transcendence. Munnik believed that we were advancing 
beyond symbolic immortality, and claimed that ‘now, what you can do with words, 
sounds and images, you might be able to do with life forms’;555 he asked ‘how 
fictional is ‘Jurassic Park’? Dolly the Sheep exists, and so does CopyCat’.556 Moravec 
has maintained that robotic embodiment is inevitable, and Steinhart believes that 
within the next 100 years, via advanced neurological scanning technology ‘you can 
have a virtual afterlife with a virtual body in a virtual world’.557 
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Nonetheless, whilst self-styled ‘futurist’ Ross has claimed that humanity should aspire 
to ‘discard the body and upload the mind into the world-wide cyberspace web’,558 this 
remains the preserve of science fiction. Bell, a Co-Founder of Microsoft, has claimed 
that it is more likely that ‘you will have virtual immortality through your digital 
memories being invested in an avatar’559 (simply a more sophisticated form of 
symbolic immortality). Kurzweil believes that this form of symbolic immortality will 
evolve into the actual immortality of consciousness, as our data will achieve self-
consciousness in a moment he refer to as the ‘singularity’;560 again, these projections 
pertain to the world of science fiction. 
 
They do, however, portend to the Posthuman prophets to whom I initially referred. As 
early as 2001, Brasher observed that like the knights who pursued the medieval Holy 
Grail, ‘electronic knights’ pursue ‘the Techno Grail, whose marvellous properties are 
associated with the next new product, muddying the divide between humanity and 
death’.561 These Posthuman prophets should not be mistaken for some of the new 
generation of millennial philanthropists such as Low, who invested millions of dollars 
to harness technology to ‘upgrade and heal the human body’,562 i.e. simply to 
ameliorate the vicissitudes of the corporeal condition, as humanity as done for 
millennia.  
 
Instead, I refer to a new generation of Silicon Valley billionaires who, characteristic 
of their ilk, haven’t just identified the problem, as Ellison has: ‘How can a person be 
there and then just vanish, and not be there?’.563 They are also seeking to ‘solve’ the 
problem; to, in the words of Thiel, ‘turn the fact of life [death] into a problem to be 
solved – a problem towards whose solution I hope to contribute in whatever way I 
can’,564 through investing billions of dollars to ‘explore ways to digitise the brain 
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based on the theory that your mind could live long after your body dies’.565 Thiel and 
Ellison are two amongst a number of the Silicon Valley elite who believe that the 
secularisation of transcendence is less than a lifetime away. 
 
Nonetheless, despite the presentation of these Posthuman possibilities as imminent 
reality, they are beyond contemporary technological capacities, and thus it appears 
transcendence is still rooted solely in the domain of religion. However, as Bollmer has 
noted, ‘it is important to remember that many claims about technology, especially in 
the form of utopian or anti-utopian arguments about the future, are not about the 
actuality of technology’.566 
 
Instead, as Kling observed, such speculative projections ‘articulate a social vision that 
constructs the limits and possibilities of technology in contemporary society, in spite 
of any actual material limitations and potentialities of technology’.567 Midgley 
concurs, as she has described how such technological speculation ‘plays a part in 
shaping the world-pictures that determine our standards of thought, the standards by 
which we judge what is possible and plausible’.568 
 
Thus, whilst the technologies to realise their dreams of secularising transcendence do 
not exist, in foretelling the imminent realisation of digital transcendence, these 
Posthuman prophets have indirectly and inadvertently allowed it occur. By validating 
science fiction fantasy, they have reinforced the dialectic informing the digital doxa 
our respondents live in, and assured it a newfound plausibility. 
 
As demonstrated by our respondents, the interpretation of ‘biological’ motion 
detection, contact comfort and cognitive coupling through a secular worldview and 
digital doxa then becomes sufficient to sustain the possibility of a form of secular 
post-mortem persistence: a life after death not contingent on the supernatural. Has the 
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god of technology inadvertently flushed the god-of-the-gaps out of his final foxhole, 
death? 
 
Before we proceed, it is important to define what achieving the secularisation of 
transcendence, and overcoming death means to our respondents. Neither Catherine 
nor Lucy feared nor acknowledged their own mortality (unsurprising for two 
individuals in their early 20s living in Western Europe). Furthermore, neither of them 
mentioned that the phenomenon of Digital Presence subdued any personal existential 
anxieties. 
 
However, Hodge has proposed that afterlife beliefs are not primarily ‘personal 
attempts to attain immortality, but rather a way to imagine deceased loved ones 
continuing to exist’.569 Hodge has cited a series of experiments conducted by 
Bering570 in which all of the participants’ references to afterlife beliefs were made in 
relation to ensuring the continued existence of deceased loved ones. 
 
Thus, there is a sense in which to conquer death is not necessarily to be assured of our 
own immortality, but to be able to continue a bond with the deceased in spite of death. 
Indeed, Catherine and Lucy only seek to maintain a bond with their decedents, and the 
notion of abolishing death as continuing a bond is evident in the early twentieth 
century Spiritualist tradition: as one medium claimed, to effectively communicate 
with the deceased is to ‘abolish the conception of death which now prevails in the 
world’.571 
 
Is it then accurate to claim that in discovering what Perry-Barlow classified as a ‘non-
spiritual technique’572 to transcend the corporeal body, ‘the dreams of a complete 
absenting of the body… have shifted from the metaphysics of the Church to those of 
the computer chip’?573 Might we witness an increasing number self-defining as ‘not 
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religious’, as the transcendence project is no longer dependent upon the supernatural? 
When the sacred canopy above us is replaced with the Net, to catch us when we fall, 
has technology killed God? 
 
The short answer is probably not. I am cautious not to believe that the context and 
circumstances in which I conduct my research are entirely unique, and that I stand on 
the edge of history. Instead, as Bollmer notes, technology has always ‘transformed 
concepts of the self’.574 
 
From Cave Paintings to Profiles – Techno-Salvation  
 
Görman, Drees and Meisinger have provided examples of how technology can 
influence self-understanding, as we claim to feel ‘under stress, and feeling huge 
pressure’, which requires us to ‘let off steam’; ‘these are images from the steam age… 
early radio receivers also left their own traces in our language – we need to tune 
in’.575 I would add that we can also be like an ‘open book’, and occasionally need to 
‘unplug’. 
 
As well as our concepts of the self, technology has also affected our religious beliefs. 
I am not referring to technological innovations that facilitate conventional acts of 
worship or ritual; such attempts to ‘spiritualise the novel habitus’576 of the Digital, 
through utilising the internet to facilitate performances of religious rituals at physical 
sites of worship,577 or ‘replicating charismatic meetings in cyberspace using an online 
multi-user virtual world’.578 
 
Although there is evidence that millions of people in the US alone use the internet for 
such religious purposes on a daily basis,579 I am referring to how technology has 
actually fostered new religious beliefs. For humanity has employed each new 
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innovation in communications technology to attempt to transcend the structural 
division between the mundane and the supernatural, between ‘this’, and ‘other’. To 
traverse worlds to commune with the ‘other’, be that the ‘divine’ or the deceased 
transcendent (or both) since before the Tower of Babel. 
 
In doing so, these attempts have fostered new beliefs; sometimes adopted as orthodox, 
sometimes hetero-orthodox, from the prehistoric era, to the modern day.  
 
Between 10 and 30 thousand years ago, one band of humans spent ‘hours crawling 
through deep, narrow, labyrinthine, utterly dark passageways which led to special 
chambers’,580 in order to create seemingly three-dimensional art in the caves of 
Lascaux, Southern France. These ochre paintings portrayed images of bison, birds, 
symbols and human figures, and the archaeologist Pfeiffer believes that these ochre 
paintings ‘suggest such things as intense rituals, ordeals, journeys underground for 
mystic reasons’,581 as these chambers were lit with torches, arduous to reach, and 
filled with ‘pictorial symbols of technological and spiritual principles’.582 
 
He has claimed that the process of travelling underground and viewing images which 
were only visible if torchlight struck them at particular angles, and were painted over 
natural features to give the illusion of three-dimensions was the culmination of a 
process intended to alter consciousness. The technological innovation of symbolic 
ochre painting was employed in ‘mystical rituals’ to express ‘spiritual principles’ and 
to interact with the ‘other’. 
 
Rheingold has noted that ‘we will never know with absolute certainty what went on 
there’,583 although we can be more certain that another ancient people employed the 
technological innovations of their day to interact with the ‘other world’. Another 
archaeologist, Blundell, has claimed that the San people of Southern Africa ‘believed 
that there were passageways linking our world to the spirit world’,584 as some of their 
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painted images appeared to enter and exit ‘cracks and crevices in rock surfaces, as if 
through a veil between the two worlds’585 (specifically via a thin red line weaving in 
and out of the cracks in rock faces). 
 
Blundell has thus maintained that ‘the rock surface acted as a veil between the real 
and spirit worlds, and the images entering or exiting natural features in the rock 
surface were actually entering or exiting the spirit world’.586 His claims have been 
supported by the testimony of Manqindi Dyantyi, an early 20th century member of the 
San in the former Transkei territory of South Africa whose father was the last of the 
San painters, who has corroborated this position. 
 
Blundell believes that the San culture of Manqindi Dyantyi at the beginning of the 
20th century is representative of a San culture spanning the centuries, possibly 
extending to the pre-historic. Whilst this is contentious for a great number of reasons, 
this testimony nonetheless demonstrates that the San have utilised the technology of 
their day to interact with the ‘spirit’ world. 
 
Technology has also, at least in the Western Christian tradition, been augmented with 
the supernatural to conquer death, in one form or another. Whether technology has 
been incorporated into similar acts of eschatological ideation in other religious 
traditions warrants further investigation, although such an inquiry is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
 
Munnik has classified Christianity as a ‘technologically mediated religion, because its 
perspective on the divine, was, (and is), the perspective of an alphabetic, literate 
mind’.587 For this was the God who ‘created the world with a spoken word’,588 and 
wrote the law with His own hand. I would add that it is also through the written word 
that the reader can conquer death through immortality, as John wrote ‘I have written 
this to you who believe in the name of the Son of God, so that you may know you 
have eternal life’;589 the means of disseminating the ‘word’ of God, and thus 
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conquering death, is through reading the written word, to become one of the ‘people 
of the book’. 
 
In the Byzantine Empire, the technological artistry of their iconographic tradition, of 
creating representations of the divine adorned with ethereal gold leaf functioned as a 
means of communing with the divine; the sum of the material elements, skilfully 
arranged through preparing the board, engraving, colouring, and adorning to represent 
the divine functioned ‘like a window to the spirit world’.590 Again, with the divine as 
the source of eternal life, to interact with those Saints depicted was to secure 
intercession to ensure that the worshipper too would conquer death and achieve 
immortality. 
 
In the 19th and early 20th century, not long after the advent of electronic 
telecommunications technology, these new innovations were also utilised to mediate 
between the mundane and the supernatural, through the birth of Spiritualism. Durham 
Peters has documented how the modern Spiritualist movement, founded by the Fox 
sisters in 1844, ‘explicitly modelled itself on the telegraph’s ability to receive remote 
messages’.591 
 
The Fox sisters claimed to understand the rapping sounds heard in their séances as ‘a 
telegraphic cipher attempting to bridge the chasm between the living and the dead’,592 
and the term ‘spiritual telegraph’ was applied ‘almost from the first’.593 Indeed, a 
British newspaper published in 1852 termed the Fox sisters activities a ‘systematic 
mode of telegraphy’,594 and Sconce has claimed that the Foxs’ contemporaries 
understood the ‘spiritual telegraph’ as ‘more than a metaphor, as an actual technology 
of the afterlife, invented by scientific geniuses in the world of the dead’.595 
 
With the invention of the telephone, contemporary commentators re-conceptualised 
                                                 
590 V. Urubshurow, ‘Introducing World Religions’, (London: Routledge, 2008), p122. 
591 J. Durham Peters, ‘Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication’, (London: 
Chicago, 1999), p95. 
592 Ibid. 
593 Ibid. 
594 Ibid, p95. 
595 Sconce, op. cit., p12. 
 119
the spiritualist medium, post-1876, as like ‘the receiver of a telephone’,596 with the 
earthly medium and otherworldly spirit functioning like ‘a pair of operators, 
connected by a telephone of rather delicate and uncertain quality’.597 Durham Peters 
has posited that these media ‘helped re-populate the spirit world’.598 I would contend 
that these technologies did not help to ‘re-populate’ an ethereal beyond, but provided 
another means to attempt to bridge the divide between worlds, perhaps re-exciting the 
popular imagination through spiritualism’s promise of ready universal access to the 
deceased. 
 
Through these methods of supernatural augmentation, telecommunications 
technologies were appropriated to conquer death through, in the words of one 
spiritualist medium ‘abolishing the conception of death which now prevails in the 
world’,599 i.e. through allowing us to continue a bond, in spite of death.  
 
Whilst Catherine and Lucy both maintain a secular worldview, the Digital has also 
been adopted as a means of conquering death (through maintaining a bond) by those 
who profess a Christian faith. During my undergraduate dissertation research, I 
encountered survivors who interacted with their decedent’s Profiles to petition them 
to ‘say hi’ to other deceased friends in ‘Heaven’, and Hieftje’s research discovered 
that some Christian respondents believed that there was a sense that the deceased 
could ‘get on Facebook up in Heaven’.600 
 
Furthermore, whilst Joan’s communication with her decedent appears to operate via a 
general notion of deceased omniscience, she claimed that ‘in my mind she was with 
me on the other end of the computer’, and thus ‘posting a private message was like 
sending it to heaven’. Whilst Joan claims that the efficacy of communicating via PDs 
is equitable to speaking to photos, or ‘talking to her in my mind’, she nevertheless 
explicitly reconfigures her belief in relation to this digital medium. 
 
Instead of the deceased simply knowing, the deceased is envisioned as ‘on the other 
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end of the computer… in Heaven’, as they are in Hieftje’s examples, and those from 
my previous study. Again, the technological zenith of a period, in this instance digital 
technology, is utilised to breach the impasse between realms, and in doing so fosters 
new beliefs: in these examples, that the Digital is a liminal space which can be 
engaged with from Earth, and from computers in ‘Heaven’. 
 
Another example of the Digital being used to mediate between worlds is found in the 
Neo-Pagan community. Davis’ studies found that Neo-Pagans who performed rituals 
online believed that the Digital was ‘a way to be between worlds’;601 that it functioned 
as a ‘portal into another world’,602 and McSherry discovered that Neo-Pagans 
idealised the Digital as ‘a technological doorway to the astral plane… once we enter 
cyberspace, we are no longer in the physical plane; we literally stand in a place 
between the worlds’.603 
 
Darling, a commentator interviewed in a survey on the initial uses of new 
technologies claimed that the first response to such innovations is ‘how can I have sex 
with it’.604 I would add that accompanying this response is the equally primitive desire 
to discover ‘how do I conquer death with it’. As technology is appropriated in this aim 
it is also incorporated into larger schemas of religious ideation, although whether 
these new beliefs and practices are adopted as orthodox is variable, and perhaps 
dependent on the degree of unmediated, democratic accessibility they allow.605  
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I initially claimed that the Digital was not unique in the respect that it has been 
augmented with the supernatural to mediate between the mundane and the 
supernatural and thus conquer death. This is true. It is, however, the first form of 
technology that can also sustain the ‘other’, i.e. the deceased transcendent, without 
reference to or dependence on the supernatural. 
 
Nonetheless, whilst the Digital may be the first form of technology to allow the 
secularisation of transcendence, that is not to say, like Brooks, that ours is a ‘post-
sacred age’.606 Instead, the complexity and liminal nature of the Digital is re-
enchanting our world through the sensus numinis it invokes. 
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                                             The Sacred Profile 
 
Heaven.com – Equating the Digital with Heaven 
 
Some scholars have felt confident enough to claim without hesitation that ‘the sacred 
is present in computers’;607 that we can refer to ‘cyberspace… as a sacred place’608 
and engage with ‘the sacred mechanisms of cyberspace’,609 which ‘definitely qualifies 
for Eliade’s vision of sacred space’.610 Others, such as Talbott, have claimed that the 
Digital cannot possibly function as a sacred space, as ‘cyberspace gives us a world of 
indirect interaction… an abstracted world’,611 i.e. a lack of materiality which 
precludes the ‘profound penetration of reality’612 necessary to qualify a space as 
‘sacred’. 
 
I nevertheless contend that PDs can be considered sacred spaces, and believe that 
Talbott has falsely approximated the concept of ‘sacred space’ with superficial 
aspects of particular, conventional sacred places. I would also challenge the basis on 
which Mosco, Cobb, Chama and Stenger deem the Digital to function as a ‘sacred 
space’, for I believe that they have inappropriately equated the Digital with an 
experiential character derived from Judeo-Christian notions of the transcendent. 
 
Jacob’s study on the use of the internet by conventional religious groups demonstrates 
Talbott’s fallacy. Jacob examined a ‘Virtual Hindu Temple’ created by the Student 
Hindu Council of the University of Illinois, and the Christian Virtual Church, 
designed by the Pastor of Cheltenham’s Harvest Church.613 Users of the Virtual 
Temple claimed that ‘a Virtual Temple cannot recreate the same experience’614 of a 
Temple in the ‘real world’, and that whilst it could not ‘recreate the same experience 
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fully, it is better than nothing,615 i.e. ersatz at best. 
 
Jacobs claimed that these comments were representative of users’ experiences at both 
sites, and noted that ‘there is a general consensus that suggests that virtual sacred 
spaces… lack something in relation to their ‘real world’ counterparts’.616 Indeed, the 
designer of the Virtual Church acknowledged that ‘online interaction could neither 
replace nor fully replicate the physical co-presence of fellow worshippers’,617 and the 
creator of the Virtual Temple ‘emphatically indicated that the Virtual Temple is not 
equivalent to a consecrated Temple located in the physical world’.618 
 
Instead, as Jacobs noted, ‘the designer and the users of the virtual sites tend to see 
them in terms of simulation, a false approximation of the real’,619 for these sites were 
graphic representations of physical sites: by clicking on a door, users would enter the 
space, and then navigate digital simulations of sites modelled on actual architectural 
structures. Dawson’s study of Neo-Pagan uses of the internet similarly concluded that 
‘we witness an attempt to recreate or simulate real space in virtual space’.620 
 
Campbell’s survey of online religion found that faith groups ‘incorporate the internet 
into their traditional religious practices’,621 and Jacobs similarly concluded his study 
by stating ‘there is an attempt to recreate online, as far as possible, the experience of 
being in a ‘real world church/temple’, located in geographical space… this suggests 
that the internet is utilised as a tool in the maintenance of traditional practices’,622 i.e. 
to simulate and attempt to facilitate conventional acts of worship.  
 
As the efficacy of these sites are judged by their ability to simulate physical places of 
worship, and physical acts, they will inevitably be found lacking. The inability of 
digital simulacrum to recreate the sensory affectivity of their physical counterparts 
disqualifies them from functioning as sacred spaces, when the simulation criterion is 
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strictly imposed. 
 
Chama however, has claimed that simply ‘signing onto the internet is a transformative 
act’,623 as the ability of the Digital to invoke a sense of liminality, via its apparent 
immateriality, designates all of ‘cyberspace’ as ‘sacred’ space. Brasher has claimed 
that through the sense of what Qiu described as the ‘timeless-time’624 experienced in 
the Digital, ‘cyberspace breathes new life into the sacred idea of eternity’.625 
 
For as ‘people customarily relate to emergent technologies by means of practices and 
ideas with which they are already familiar’,626 for Western consumers, ‘cyberspace 
imaginatively accorded… with the religious idea of eternity as perpetual 
persistence… bequeathed through ancient Jewish and Christian beliefs’.627  
 
As well as this interpretation of ‘timeless-time’, Wertheim has claimed that the sense 
of immateriality ascribed to the Digital, as distinct from ‘geographical space’, accords 
with our ‘Western Judeo-Christian heritage, which has within it a deep current of 
dualism that has always associated immateriality with spirituality’.628 Thus, it is not 
‘particularly surprising that essentially religious dreams are projected onto 
cyberspace’.629 Lanier has also claimed that popular notions of ‘cyberspace’ express 
‘Christian ideas’630 of the transcendent as immaterial and eternal. 
 
In this vein, Benedikt has likened the Digital to ‘the image of the New Jerusalem of 
the Book of Revelation’;631 Stenger has similarly maintained that the Digital is sacred 
due to its apparent likeness to the Christian notion of ‘Paradise’.632 Wertheim has 
claimed that the sense of the Digital as sacred ‘begins with the vision of the Heavenly 
city’,633 as the sense that the Digital can afford the transcendence of the physical body 
through its liminal character relates to ‘the Christian vision of the Heavenly City as a 
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dream about transcendence’.634 
 
These proponents of the ‘sacred digital’ contest Otto’s claim that monumental 
architecture is the most effective means of representing the numinous,635 and Van der 
Leeuw’s comments on the ‘singular potential of expressing the holy through massive 
monumental architecture’.636 
 
Conventional places of worship may attempt to mediate between the mundane and the 
supernatural through architecturally invoking a sense of place as ‘imago mundi’,637 an 
axis between the mundane and the supernatural, but the quality of digital space allows 
us to experience something of the experiential quality of the supernatural, e.g. 
‘Heaven’, more directly. 
 
That experiences of temporal and spatial distortion are inherent to encounters with 
Otto’s ‘numinous’ is also suggested by the cognitive neuro-scientific inquiries of 
Newberg and d’Aquili. The pair used SPECT imaging to scan the brains of Franciscan 
Nuns and Buddhist meditators while they reported ‘religious experiences’. In both 
cases, the Posterior Superior Parietal lobe, associated with orientation, was inhibited, 
as respondents reported a sense of ‘timelessness’, ‘infinity’, or ‘closeness to God’.638  
 
Newberg and d’Aquili (albeit tentatively) concluded that experiences of being in the 
presence of that deemed ‘sacred’ can be associated with decreased levels of temporal 
and spatial orientation. This data could be cited to substantiate the claim that the 
Digital is ‘sacred’ as it has the capacity to invoke a similar sense of temporal/spatial 
distortion, which accords with the reticent resources of a Judeo-Christian milieu, i.e. 
Heaven.  
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However, I do not believe that this account, that the Digital is popularly deemed 
‘sacred’ due to its experiential accordance with the concept of ‘Heaven’ is in any way 
relevant to our respondents’ experiences. Catherine and Lucy reject the Judeo-
Christian concept of ‘Heaven’, with Lucy explicitly stating ’No, Heaven doesn’t exist’.  
 
Whilst Brasher may claim that experiences of ‘timeless-time’ are best interpreted with 
the resources of a reticent Judeo-Christian milieu, there is no need to reference 
religious concepts to interpret digital liminality; as described, the effects of an 
inculcated digital doxa allows for the interpretation of ‘the sacred idea of eternity’639 
as a qualitative feature of the onto-distinct ‘digital world’. 
 
Thus, any account of the Digital functioning as a sacred space because of its apparent 
accordance with ‘the vision of the Heavenly City’640 is not pertinent to our 
respondents. Instead, any allusion to Christian notions of ‘Heaven’ are made post-
facto, and function as comparisons made for descriptive utility, demonstrating the 
prevalence and dependence of the Western transcendence project on such religious 
ideation. 
 
Furthermore, this account suggests that the Digital is considered sacred in its entirety, 
but before the death of their decedents our respondents did not experience or treat 
these Profiles as distinct from any others. It is only post-mortem that PDs are 
experienced as distinct, as Lucy reported that her deceased friend’s Profile ‘definitely 
feels different’; as for Catherine, whilst other members of her network can be 
contacted via other mediums, the PD constitutes her sole means of contacting her 
decedent. 
 
For Wertheim, Stenger and Benedikt, the Digital can be deemed sacred as it accords 
with the experiential quality of their source of sanctity, the transcendent ‘Heaven’. For 
our respondents however, the source of sanctity is the deceased, transcendent via their 
transmutation to their Profiles. 
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Murti, Menhirs and the Deceased Transcendent – Sanctity and Transubstantiation 
 
Hubert has noted how ‘burial sites often become sacred places in themselves’,641 and 
Davies has documented how secular sites that have become associated with the 
deceased, like British crematoria, come to be deemed sacred as ‘the sense of 
sacredness seems to be associated with the dead and the rites preformed for them’.642 
As noted however, PDs are not merely associated with the deceased: due to the 
confluence of neurological processes invoked by PDs, idiosyncratically intuited in 
relation to a secular worldview and digital doxa, the PD is the deceased, transcendent 
via transmutation. 
 
Expressed in semiotic terms, PDs function as icons, i.e. ‘signs in which the signifier 
imitates and resembles, as closely as possible, the signified’;643 they are thus akin to a 
variety of symbols wherein the transcendent is transubstantially manifest in the 
mundane.  
 
For example, Kunin has noted that in certain tracts of the Torah, the God of Israel is 
‘viewed as actually dwelling in the Tabernacle and the Ark’;644 in the Hindu tradition, 
the ‘Murti’ or temple is ‘considered to be a form of the sacred, and not simply a 
symbolic representation’;645 and at the Japanese site of Okitama-No-Kami ‘the deity 
resides in a rock, or in the stones, conceived as the abode of the deity as opposed to its 
actual body’.646 
 
A number of scholars have also claimed that as well as deities, deceased ancestors 
have been understood to be manifest in an iconic sense via transubstantiation. Burls 
has claimed that ‘there is, in some contexts, an important sense in which built forms 
                                                 
641 J. Hubert, ‘Sacred Beliefs and Beliefs of  Sacredness’, in ‘Sacred Sites, Sacred Places’, (Eds) D. 
Carmichael, J. Hubert, B. Reeves and A. Schanche, (London: Routledge, 1994), p15. 
642 D. Davies, ‘Christianity’, in ‘Sacred Place’, (Eds) J. Holm, with J. Bowker, (London: Continuum, 
2003), p43. 
643 D. Chandler, ‘Semiotics: The Basics’, (London: Routledge, 2002), p36, cited in Jacobs, op. cit., 
p1110. 
644 S. Kunin, ‘Judaism’, in Holm, with Bowker, op. cit., p128. 
645 Jacobs, op. cit., p1112. 
646K. Tange and N. Kawazoe, ‘Ise: Prototype of Japanese Architecture’, (MA: MIT Press, 1965), p39, 
cited in Jones, Vol. 2, p98. 
 128
actually are the dead’.647 Jones concurs that dead ancestors have been ‘actually 
identified with, or ‘transmutated’ into architectural, specifically stone, structures’.648 
 
He has cited Hayden’s claims that there was a ‘confidence among ancient Mexicans 
that their ancestors were embodied, and apparently living on, in rocks and stones’,649 
and Mabbett’s that ‘often, a Hindu shrine is an embodiment of the soul of a real 
human being, for whom his new home is regarded as a lodging in exactly the same 
way as his body during his life’.650 
 
Jones has also claimed that Northern and Western European Neolithic menhirs and 
dolmens were not simply ‘giant tombstones… or some sort of posthumous housing 
for the (un)dead… the dead would have been more directly identified with, or 
transubstantiated in the stones’.651 He noted that such structures were ‘of course, of 
stone’, due to stone’s ability to ‘cultivate a sensation of atemporality, and thus of 
deathless life’.652 
 
Lefebvre has also commented on the ability of stone to ‘transcend death’,653 and 
Eliade has noted that it is through stone (a material reserved for such funerary 
constructions in the European Neolithic period in contrast to the ephemeral dwellings 
of the living) that these dwellings of the dead could ‘last forever’, and thus constitute 
an ‘inexhaustible reservoir of vitality and power’.654 Geldern has similarly claimed 
that in ‘a pervasive Neolithic cult of ancestors’, stone represented ‘the human hope 
that one’s person would be remembered, perhaps immortalised, through the agency of 
stone’.655 
 
Indeed, we can also identify a confidence in the durability of stone to preserve the 
                                                 
647 A. Burl, ‘Rites of Gods’, (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1981), p47, cited in Jones, Vol. 2, p160. 
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653 H. Lefebvre, ‘The Production of Space’, (Trans. D. Nicholson-Smith), (MA: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 
p221, cited in ibid. 
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deceased in contemporary public memorials, as the Commonwealth War Graves 
Commission describes Lutyens’ ‘Stone of Remembrance’ as ‘as durable as any work 
of man can be’.656  
 
Whilst stone may have been appropriated by the transcendence project to provide a 
sense of atemporality and ensure that the transubstantiated deceased could constitute 
an ‘inexhaustible reservoir of vitality and power’, Jones concludes his observations by 
noting that ‘in stone’s stead, photography, (and now maybe some sort of computer-
generated imaging) may currently provide the most expeditious medium for the 
transubstantiation of the dead’.657 
 
In this prediction, he foreshadowed the utilisation of PDs as a means of transmuting 
the deceased, and, as stone has done, ‘keeping alive one’s forebears to assume 
continued relations with them’.658 However, PDs are far more precarious than many 
would like to believe. They are forever contingent upon SNS policies which may be 
expedient to ensuring the accuracy of marketing data at the expense of being sensitive 
to the needs of survivors. Nonetheless our respondents’ confidence in the durability of 
the Digital is demonstrated by their responses to the suggestion that these PDs may 
not last forever. 
 
The notion of a PD being deleted was almost unintelligible to Catherine who visibly 
struggled to comprehend the idea, replying ‘erm, yeah, it’s yeah… that’s a strange 
thought’, and claimed that she would be ‘pretty devastated’ if her PD was deleted. 
Lucy was also taken aback by this suggestion, and believed that there would be ‘a 
massive outrage against that’, and that it would be ‘like losing her again’.  
 
Given its liminal, ‘eternal’ quality, there is a sense in which the Digital, and 
particularly PDs, will endure. Confidence in a PDs durability may have encouraged 
our respondents to engage with them: they are always present to them, even ‘if I’m 
just lying in bed and thinking about her, then I’ll scroll through it myself’, and there is 
                                                 
656 www.cwgc.co.uk, accessed 24/03/03, cited in F. Speed, ‘The Sacred Environment:  An Investigation 
of the Sacred and its Implications for Place-Making’, in (Ed) S. Menin, ‘Constructing Place: Mind and 
Matter’, (London: Routledge, 2003), p59. 
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no perceived risk of ‘losing them again’. As such, PDs satisfy two of Eliade’s criteria 
of the ‘sacred’, i.e. ‘enduringness’,659 not of rock, but of the Digital, and ‘efficacity660’, 
through the interpretation of the neurological processes they can invoke. 
 
Thus, I posit that for our respondents, their PDs constitute a sacred space: from an etic 
perspective, the PD is an iconic symbol of the deceased; emically, the PD, akin to the 
Catholic Eucharist, Hindu Murti, and Neolithic menhir is the actual source of sanctity, 
i.e. the transcendent, in this instance understood as the deceased transcendent via 
transmutation. 
 
Although, whilst such iconic symbols conventionally function as mediums, e.g. 
Davies has noted that the Catholic relics of the 8th and 9th century acted as mediums 
between the mundane and the supernatural,661 for our respondents 
immanence/transcendence is a redundant dichotomy. Given their unique worldviews, 
the transcendent deceased is inherently immanent via their PD, which functions as 
Eliade’s ‘hierophany’, i.e. as something ‘sacred’ manifest in the mundane yet 
‘continuing to participate in its surrounding cosmic milieu’662 (if we define the SNS 
as the cosmic milieu of the Profile). 
 
A Threshold, a Limit, a Boundary – Demarcating Sacred Space  
 
However, I believe that PDs can not only be deemed sacred spaces as they constitute a 
source of sanctity; they can also satisfies Eliade’s requirement that a sacred space 
have a ‘threshold, a limit, a boundary’;663 Jones’ requirement that it has 
‘configurations [which] work to enclose perimeters’;664 Hubert’s condition that ‘the 
sacred be placed apart from everyday things or places’;665 and Chidester and 
Linenthal’s that a sacred space is ‘maintained and reinforced by boundaries that keep 
certain persons outside the sacred space’.666 
                                                 
659 M. Eliade, 1957, op. cit., p12. 
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661 Davies, in Holm with Bower, op. cit., p43. 
662 Eliade, op. cit., p11. 
663 Ibid, p25. 
664 Jones, Vol. 2, p291. 
665 Hubert, op. cit., p11. 
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Brasher has legitimately questioned what the notion of sacred ‘cyberspace’ ‘implies 
for the boundaries between the sacred and profane’.667 Jacobs has claimed that his 
case studies of the Virtual Temple and Virtual Church ‘suggest that it is possible to 
set apart virtual sacred spaces’.668 He asserts this however on the basis that ‘the design 
of the sites derives from conventional and traditional conceptions of sacred space’,669 
i.e. with simulations of anti-chambers and thresholds designed into these simulacra of 
physical sacred spaces. 
 
Facebook, however, as noted in Chapter 1, delineates between the ‘profane’ Newsfeed 
and the ‘sacred’ PD through the possibilities afforded by the code of the SNS, i.e. it 
symbolically demarcates one space from another. To access a PD, members must 
transgress the boundaries between the Newsfeed and the Profile by actively selecting 
it, or running a search for it, and choosing to enter it. Thus, it is possible, in a 
Durkheimian fashion, to discern two classes, two opposite kinds, on Facebook: the 
profane Newsfeed, and the sacred PD, with their boundaries clearly delineated. 
 
PDs also satisfy Eliade’s requirement that sacred spaces operate via ‘sacred time’. 
Elaide has explained how in a Christian context, ‘liturgical time… unfolds in a 
historical time sanctified by the incarnation of the Son of God’.670 As Bowker and 
Holm elaborated, ‘the faithful engage in a kind of participation with the past as part of 
worship itself’;671 by ritually re-enacting the historical actions of Christ, worshippers 
depart from conventional ‘profane time’. 
 
In a similar fashion, our respondents do not experience the ‘profane time’ of the 
present on PDs. Instead, they ‘scroll back’ to the time of the source of sanctity, the 
deceased. Lucy described how she would ‘scroll through it, go back all the way’ until 
it ‘felt like it was still back there’. Catherine also scrolled back to the point at which 
she could ‘read messages that he once sent’, an act which regressed the PD to a point 
at which she could re-enact that time occupied by the source of sanctity. 
 
                                                 
667 Brasher, op. cit., p42. 
668 Jacobs, op. cit., p1104. 
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670 Eliade, op. cit., p72. 
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The PDs break with profane time is accentuated by its juxtaposition with the 
perpetually dynamic, quintessentially ‘present’ Newsfeed; as well as updating all 
information in real time, it is also ephemeral: updates disappear as frequently as they 
appeared. While the profane time of the Newsfeed is present and ephemeral, the 
‘sacred’ time of the PD is the ‘historical time sanctified’672 by the deceased, 
permanent and durable. 
 
Discovering Through Labour – Maintaining Digital Presence  
 
Also, like a number of sacred places where the source of sanctity is transubstantiated 
into the very architecture, this presence must be maintained. Freedberg has catalogued 
a variety of consecration rites, wherein ‘inanimate constructed objects are imbued 
with life’, e.g. the ‘washing and opening of the mouth’673 rites performed on 
Babylonian statues of gods, and the Hindu ‘eye-painting ceremonies’ wherein images 
are ‘animated’ in the act of painting eyes onto them.674 
 
Consecration alone however is insufficient to maintain this presence. Such Hindu 
images are daily ‘awakened by a priest… then bathed and adorned. With ritual puja, 
food is offered to the deity’. If such rituals are not performed ‘the deities are not 
present, and the temple lies dormant as the deities are not ‘in residence’’.675 I propose 
that the Digital Presence found on PDs is also ritually maintained, and that this 
particular form of ritual mediates between two broad accounts of sacred space: the 
substantive and the situational. 
 
The substantive, or phenomenological approach, evident in ‘Otto’s ‘Holy’, Van der 
Leeuw’s ‘Power’, and Eliade’s ‘Real’’676 posits, as Harries has described, that 
‘meaning cannot finally be made or invented, only discovered’,677 or as Kristensen 
                                                 
672 Eliade, op. cit., p72. 
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claims, that sacred spaces cannot be made through ‘the utterance of a prayer, the 
swearing of an oath, or performance of a ritual’.678 Humans do not ‘create, fabricate, 
or sanctify particular places’.679 The substantive school maintains, as Eliade has 
described, that sacred spaces are ‘never, properly speaking, ‘chosen’ by people… 
instead, it falls to homo religiosus to search for, and to discover’680 such places. 
 
The situational approach, propounded by ‘Durkheim, van Gennep and Levi-Strauss 
[maintains] that nothing is inherently sacred’.681 In the words of Levi-Strauss, the 
sacred is ‘a value of indeterminate signification, in itself empty of meaning and 
therefore susceptible to the reception of any meaning whatsoever’,682 wherein sanctity 
‘can be assigned to virtually anything through the human labour of consecration’.683  
 
I propose that the ritual means of sustaining Digital Presence mediates between these 
approaches of considering signs and symbols as of arbitrary or inherent value:  the 
Profile is not arbitrary, its meaning ‘cannot finally be made or invented, only 
discovered’. However, contrary to Eliade, the Profile’s sanctity does depend upon 
‘social human choices, even of an unconscious sort’,684 as Digital Presence is 
sustained through what Smith described as the ‘result of the cultural labour of 
ritual’.685 
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                                          Ritual Interaction 
 
From Fiddler Crabs to Facebook Profiles – Digital Ritual 
 
As with the Digital and sacred spaces, it is necessary to determine whether ‘digital 
ritual’ is a valid category, or a contradiction in terms; and as with digital sacred spaces, 
the fallacy of approximating the concept with superficial aspects of conventional 
praxis has been made in relation to ritual.  
 
O’ Leary believes that ‘digital ritual’ is an invalid term, as ‘even with the best 
graphics, sound, and three-dimensional simulations, the participant in such rituals 
remains too much of a spectator, separated from the virtual space by the box on the 
desk’.686 This comment however is in reference to the simulation of conventional 
rituals in digital space, and as O’ Leary later concedes following a discussion with a 
designer of virtual environments, ‘the physicality of the sacred ritual is only the sign, 
not the thing signified’.687 
 
Therefore he suggests that the materiality associated with conventional rituals may 
not be a prerequisite of ritual per se. Indeed, Dawson has claimed that ‘the 
opportunity exists to participate in virtual rituals… and some people have tried to do 
so’.688 However, as Rappaport has observed, the term ‘ritual’ is broad enough to be 
applied to actions ranging from ‘the courtship of fiddler crabs [to] the Roman 
Mass’,689 and like the term ‘sacred’ it is by no means unequivocal.  
 
Therefore, before we consider how interacting with a PD sustains Digital Presence, 
we must consider whether interacting with a PD could be described as a ‘ritual’. We 
will determine whether PD interactions adhere to a variety of proposed definitions of 
‘ritual’ to ensure that we can employ the term ‘digital ritual’ and apply it to PD 
interactions with confidence. 
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We could begin by considering Rappaport’s definition of ritual, as denoting ‘the 
performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not 
entirely encoded by the performers’,690 a definition from which he derives five criteria: 
that performers have not encoded these invariant sequences themselves; adherence to 
form, including specified context; invariance; a performative character; and formality 
vs. physical efficacy (a criterion we shall examine separately below).691 
 
We can observe that interacting with a PD includes ‘acts and utterances’. Survivors 
must actively choose to navigate away from the Newsfeed to the PD, and then choose 
to ‘enter’ it. Once accessed, survivors communicate via comments on the deceased’s 
Profile, or through private messages (both examples of utterances). Thus, the fourth 
criteria, performance, is satisfied. 
 
Criteria one through three are also satisfied by the architectural dictates of the SNS. In 
relation to the first criterion, i.e. ‘the relationship of performers to their own 
performances of invariant orders that they themselves have not encoded’,692 whilst 
Rappaport qualifies that this condition ‘does not hold for occasional innovators’,693 
PD interactions nonetheless adhere to this rule.  
 
Survivors ‘themselves have not encoded’694 this ‘more or less invariant sequences of 
formal acts and utterances’. The architecture of the SNS is such that our expressive 
capacities are confined by the dictates of code; the act of ‘entering’ a PD, in order to 
communicate utterances via public comments or private messages are the only options 
available. As such, this sequence is the product of the SNS, rather than performers, i.e. 
our respondents. 
 
The second and third criteria, those of ‘formality, i.e. adherence to form including 
‘specified contexts’695 and ‘invariance’696 are also products of the confines of code: 
these forms, i.e. acts of entering and the means of utterance, are necessarily performed 
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in the specified context of the SNS, and are invariant to the extent that these are the 
only options available to survivors. Therefore, I maintain that PD interactions satisfy 
Rappaport’s broad definition. 
 
We may also consider Lévi-Strauss’ description of ritual as ‘the exact inverse to a 
‘game’: it brings about a union, or in any case an organic relation between two 
initially separated groups… there is asymmetry which is postulated in advance 
between profane and sacred, dead and living, etc, and the ‘game’ consists in making 
all the participants pass to the winning side’.697 
 
Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist definition can also be applied to PD interactions: these 
interactions facilitate mediation between the otherwise mutually exclusive, negative 
structural relation between ‘living’ and ‘deceased’, otherwise intractable for our 
respondents. Also, as our respondents do not acknowledge a supernatural realm, the 
‘winning side’, or positive valence is ‘alive’, a side the deceased are brought to (via 
transmutation to a ‘living’ Profile). 
 
Rue’s definition of ritual as ‘any repeatable unit of behaviour, the performance of 
which… is conducive to a religious experience’698 initially appears problematic. Such 
exchanges are evidently ‘repeatable units of behaviour’. But is their performance 
‘conducive to a religious experience’? We will consider whether such interactions can 
be deemed ‘religious’ in our next section, ‘‘Religiosity’, Worldviews, and 
Enchantment’, but for now we can note that Rue elaborates ‘ritual includes prayer’.699  
 
Catherine reported that her interactions would be ‘like, praying and 
communication…if I was religious’. Nonetheless, if we understand ‘prayer’ as 
communication with the transcendent, however that may be conceived, then it may 
not be too outlandish to suggest that PD interactions, as ‘repeatable units of 
behaviour’, may be ‘conducive to a religious experience’ when that religious 
experience is specified as ‘prayer’ (as noted, we will give greater consideration to 
whether such interactions can be deemed ‘religious’ in ‘‘Religiosity’, Worldviews, and 
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Enchantment’). 
 
In relation to Tambiah’s broad definition of ritual as ‘a culturally constructed system 
of symbolic communication constituted of patterned and ordered sequences of words 
and acts’,700 again, words and acts are patterned and ordered according to the dictates 
of SNS architecture, and we will discuss PD interactions as symbolic communication 
shortly. 
 
To review, it would appear, as Kinney predicted, that ‘the technical innovations on the 
Net are likely to encourage the development of new forms of ritual’.701 But to 
understand how these rituals sustain Digital Presence, we must understand how bread 
can become body. 
 
Wish you Were Here – The Illocutionary Force of Communal Performative Utterances 
 
In Catholic theology, the Eucharist succeeds ‘ex opera operato’, i.e. ‘the words are 
themselves efficacious’.702 An ordained Priest, saying the right words, in the right 
place, at the right time, can turn bread into the body of Christ through the power of 
those words alone. Such speech-acts are not confined to Catholicism. Austin has 
described such acts as ‘performative utterances’;703 Searle as ‘speech acts’;704 O’ 
Doherty as ‘factitive utterances’,705 and Skorupski as ‘operative acts’.706 
 
A performative utterance is ‘a speech-act that effects what it describes… the words of 
institution… do not merely describe an existing state of things’.707 Through being 
spoken, they realise a new state. As Danet has noted, ‘these are instances when saying 
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is doing’,708 and for our respondents, their interactions function as performative 
utterances. In uttering ‘wish you were here’, the deceased are present.  The very act of 
communicating creates the conditions in which such communication is effective. 
 
For interacting with the deceased generates activity on their Profile and subsequently 
in the Newsfeed, which in turn contributes to the classification of the PD as a ‘living’ 
Profile via the ‘activity’ criterion. The interactions themselves transform the current 
state of affairs into the desired state of affairs. In proclaiming ‘this is the body of 
Christ’ the Priest makes it so; in writing ‘it feels like you’re here’ our respondents 
realise that effect. Such interactions possess an ‘illocutionary force’,709 in that the 
efficacy of PDs to communicate a message is instituted, reified and sustained through 
such utterances. 
 
However, the deceased are not transmuted to their Profiles by a lone voice crying out 
across a vast social network. Contrary to Lingel’s claim that ‘rituals of death have 
become increasingly individualised in contemporary society’,710 and Walter’s 
projection that ‘Western individualism’711 will produce increasingly ‘individualised’ 
rituals, this is a collective ritual. This form of speech-act is a communal performative 
utterance. 
 
Church is correct in noting that PDs cannot be defined as places of communal 
grieving, as survivors tend not to interact with each other, opting instead to ‘deflect 
their attention from each other, to the deceased’.712 But, to the extent that certain 
survivors can experience PDs ‘as’ the deceased, they are products of communal ritual. 
For as noted in Chapter 2, activity alone is insufficient to categorise a Profile as 
‘living’. ‘Activity’ and ‘interaction’ form a dyadic, as the two are inextricably linked: 
activity is generated by the interaction of other members of the deceased’s network.  
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As such, the ‘illocutionary force’ of theses performative utterances is cumulative; if 
other members of the deceased’s network are not also interacting with the PD, then it 
will not satisfy the interaction/activity dyadic, and thus it will not be identified as a 
‘living’ Profile. These other members may not experience the PD as the actual 
deceased transcendent via transmutation, but survivors in a comparable position to our 
respondents may well do so. 
 
We may consider on reflection however, that if we view PD interactions as the 
mechanism by which Digital Presence is sustained, are PD interactions best defined as 
‘ritual’, or technical acts? Rappaport’s fifth criterion stipulated by his definition of 
ritual states that a ritual must ‘lack material or physical efficacy’,713 i.e. in the words 
of Homan, rituals do not ‘produce a practical result on the external world’.714 Leach 
similarly distinguished between ‘technical and ritual acts… [as] technical acts 
produce observable results in a strictly mechanical way’.715 
 
As these communal performative utterances produce effects which in turn activate the 
animacy system, which contributes to a sense of Digital Presence, might a reductionist 
claim that these speech acts ‘produce observable results in a strictly mechanical way’? 
Yes, a reductionist might, but as Goody has noted, in ritual ‘the relationship between 
means and ends is not intrinsic’.716 
 
For our respondents, the means by which communication is effective is ineffable, and 
‘if ritual does anything at all it doesn’t do it by operating with matter and energy on 
matter and energy in accordance with physical laws’.717 Instead, PD interactions can 
be described as rituals as the sense in which they can communicate a message is 
ineffable, and our respondents are not aware that such interactions also function as 
components of communal performative utterances. 
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Consequently, Walter’s claim that ‘in a modern society thin on ritual but rich in 
information and communications technologies, it is perhaps not so much through 
ritual, as Durkheim argued, but through media-enhanced possibilities of collective 
remembering that ancestors are called forth’, is undermined. In relation to Digital 
Presence, it is these rituals of PD interactions that ‘call forth’ the deceased, and make 
them present on their Profiles. 
 
We can now note how through communal utterance, the Profile becomes what Eliade 
described as a ‘hierophany’ for our respondents, i.e. how ‘a particular object might 
appear to be simply a mundane object, but for the believer, it is transformed into 
something sacred, something set apart’.718 For through interpreting the resultant 
interaction/activity through their particular worldview, this dyadic is interpreted as an 
indicator of persistent vitality.  
 
We can also claim that these interactions reflect Jones’ comments on the role of 
buildings in creating a sense of ‘sacred place’. He claimed that ‘it is not buildings, 
which mean nothing in and of themselves, but the dynamic interactions between 
people and buildings, particularly in the context of ritual’719 that creates meaning. As 
between people and buildings through ritual, so too between people and Profiles. 
Meaning is made through ritual, as communal performative utterances create the 
conditions in which meaning can be made, i.e. in which indicators of persistent 
vitality can be interpreted as evidence of the transmutation of the deceased. 
 
Through understanding how Digital Presence is maintained, PDs can be likened to 
those ‘Australian Aboriginal sites… the maintenance of which requires… the 
performance of items aimed at caring for the spirit housed at it’.720 For like these sites, 
‘without these maintenance processes the site remains, but it is said to lose the spirit 
held within it’.721 Without the maintenance of Digital Presence through such 
communal performative utterances, the sense of Digital Presence may well deteriorate, 
i.e. the PD may lose ‘the spirit held within it’. 
                                                 
718 Jacobs, op. cit., p1105. 
719 Jones (Vol. 1), op. cit., p29. 
720  H. Payne, ‘Singing a Sister’s Sites: Women’s Rites in the Musgrave Ranges’, (Ph.D Thesis, 
University of Queensland, 1988), p72, cited in Hubert, op. cit., p15. 
721 Ibid. 
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Conversely, it could suffice that a PD was once the site of a sense of Digital Presence 
for it to continue to function as an efficacious form of communicating messages to the 
deceased. Whether this is the case warrants further investigation, possibly through 
assessing whether our respondents still feel that ‘messages get through’ to their 
decedents if interaction, and subsequently activity, were to decline over time. 
 
A Feeling of Relief – Profile Interactions as Words Against Death 
 
If PDs can be likened to those Australian Aboriginal sites, then this form of ritual 
maintenance mediates between the substantive and situational approaches to sacred 
spaces. In agreement with the substantive school, the PD is not an arbitrary symbol: 
its meaning ‘cannot finally be made or invented, only discovered’,722 as it is the 
particular features of the SNS which allow a sense of Digital Presence to emerge. 
 
However, contrary to Eliade, and in agreement with the situational school, a PDs 
sense of ‘sacredness’ does depend on ‘social human choices, even of an unconscious 
sort’,723 as the deceased transcendent may vacate the PD without the ‘cultural labour 
of ritual’,724 i.e. in the absence of communal performative utterances.  
 
Finally, we may consider how this ritual coheres with Rappaport, Tambiah and 
Leach’s definitions of ritual as ‘communication’; not simply in the sense that 
‘performers presumably feel themselves to be communicating with spiritual beings’725 
(or in our respondents’ cases, the deceased transcendent). But also as ‘the participants 
transmit information concerning their own physical, psychic or social states to 
themselves and other participants’.726 Or, in the words of Leach, rituals express ‘the 
individual’s status in the structural system in which he finds himself for the time 
being’.727 
 
                                                 
722 Harries, op. cit., p47, cited in Speed, op. cit., p62. 
723  Eliade, 1958, op. cit., p383, cited in Jones, Vol. 2, op. cit., p35. 
724 Smith, op. cit., p107, cited in Chidester and Linenthal, p6. 
725 Rappaport, op. cit., p51. 
726 Ibid, p52. 
727 E. Leach, ‘Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure’, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1954), p11, cited in ibid. 
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The ‘self-referential’728 message these rituals communicate is that the self is an 
intersubjective construction. Confirming Silverman and Klass’ claims that 
‘individuals are interdependent and living in a web of relationships’,729 Catherine 
reported how on communicating with the PD, ‘Erm, I would say, there’s this, sort of 
feeling of relief ’. Lucy similarly stated how she ‘felt better’ having interacted with 
her PD. These feelings of relief could be interpreted as the satisfaction of what Parkes 
described as the ‘searching or pining’ element of grief.730 
 
Parkes’ ethological approach to grief posited that such ‘pining’ behaviour was due to 
an innate desire to reunite with those decedents whom we experience a close bond 
with, as such bonding behaviour is evolutionarily advantageous. Seale also described 
how ‘secure narratives of self-identity’731 are products of an ongoing intersubjective 
reflexive process, and as such, continuing a dialogue with the deceased serves ‘as a 
micro-ritual for the sustenance and renewal’732 of our ‘selves’. 
 
PD interactions then are ‘auto-communicative as well as allo-communicative’.733 
They communicate that the ‘self’ is an intersubjective project, and characteristic of 
self-referential messages, they do ‘not merely ‘say something’ about the state of the 
performer. They ‘do something’ about it’’.734 For as Rue has noted, ‘a rite is for 
setting things aright’,735 and Smith has recognised that ‘ritual is a means of 
performing the way things ought to be in conscious tension with the way things 
are’.736  
 
Through such rituals, our respondents not only communicate the self-referential 
message that the ‘self’ is the product of an ongoing process of intersubjective 
reflexivity including significant others. These utterances also act as ‘micro-rituals for 
                                                 
728 Rappaport, op. cit., p52. 
729 Silverman and Klass, op. cit., p8. 
730 See C. Parkes, ‘Bereavement: Studies in Grief in Adult Life’, (3rd Edition), (London: Routledge, 
2001). 
731 C. Seale, ‘Construction Death: The Sociology of Dying and Bereavement’, (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 
p193. 
732 Ibid. 
733 A. Wallace, ‘Revitalisation Movements’, American Anthropologist, 58, 1956, p237, cited in 
Rappaport, op. cit., p51. 
734 Rappaport, op. cit., p107. 
735 Rue, op. cit., p135. 
736 J. Smith, op. cit., p109, cited in O’ Leary, 2004, op. cit., p51. 
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the sustenance and renewal’ of the ‘self’. They are thus, to borrow a phrase, ‘words 
against death’,737 in that through these utterances, survivors can respond to an 
existential crisis posed by death. Not the threat posed by the incomprehensibility, or 
‘terror of death’.738 But the threat posed to the intersubjective reflexive process, as 
these utterances allow survivors to ‘overcome death’ by continuing those bonds which 
sustain the ‘self’. 
 
I propose that PD interactions constitute rituals. But are they also evidence of 
Dawson’s claim that ‘cyberspace may be inducing a new way of being religious’?739 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
737 D. Davies, ‘Death, Ritual and Belief: The Rhetoric of Funerary Rites’, (2nd Edition), (London: 
Continuum, 2002), p1. 
738 Becker, op. cit., p11. 
739 Dawson, op. cit., p17. 
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                       ‘Religiosity’, Worldviews, and Enchantment 
 
Our Father, Who Art on Facebook – The Digital as ‘Religion’ 
 
Attempts to conceptualise how the Digital may induce new manners of ‘being 
religious’ have drawn comparison to a number of traditional religious ‘types’, e.g. as 
tending toward ‘a kind of functional pantheism’,740 and of being understood as a 
‘creative cybernetic godhead’;741 Graham, Gibbs and Aceti have also referred to ‘an 
emerging online religion’ as a ‘return to animism’.742 
 
To address Brooke and Thomas’ suggestions that the Digital may be perceived as a 
form of pantheistic ‘godhead’, or as somehow omnipotent and divine in its entirety: 
while we may make reference to Postman’s ‘god of technology’ this is a metaphoric 
extension of the ‘god-of-the-gaps’ theory. It refers to the manner in which the Digital 
is accommodating an increasing range of needs and desires, as opposed to denoting a 
belief in an actual digital sentience. 
 
As mentioned, not all quarters of the Digital are treated with equal reverence, and 
there is nothing to suggest that anything of a ‘numinous’ nature has been detected on 
mundane shopping websites, or even in the profane areas of SNS, such as the 
Newsfeed. Instead, only some PDs, by virtue of ‘being’ the deceased transcendent, are 
regarded as ‘sacred’. 
 
As for the suggestion that the Digital induces a ‘return to animism’, Graham, Gibbs 
and Aceti’s use of the term is ambiguous and un-nuanced to the extent that it is of 
limited, if any descriptive utility. If referring to Tylor’s basic description, of a belief 
in ‘living, personal powers behind all things’,743 or a ‘system of belief which allegedly 
attributes spirits or souls to things, living or non-living’744 (in the sense that via 
Tylor’s speculative inference, ‘all living things’ were believed to possess anima), then 
                                                 
740 T. Brooke, ‘Cyberspace: Storming Digital Heaven’, SCP Journal, 19 (4), 1995, p16, cited in 
Groothuis, op. cit., p118. 
741 D. Thomas, ‘Old Rituals for New Space’, p41, in Benedikt, op. cit, cited in Wertheim, op. cit., p254. 
742 Graham, Gibbs and Aceti, op. cit., p137. 
743 E.B. Tylor, ‘Primitive Culture’, (4th Edition., rev. 2 vols), (London: John Murray, [1871], 1903), 
p429, cited in D. Pals, ‘Eight Theories of Religion’, (2nd Edition), (Oxford: OUP, 2006), p26. 
744 Ingold, op. cit., p106. 
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this is hardly an apt description of the dynamics of Digital Presence. 
 
There is no suggestion from our respondents that Profiles possess any form of 
ontologically independent anima, or ‘soul’, or that individual programs or pieces of 
software possess anything which conceptually resembles a ‘thin, unsubstantial human 
image… the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates’.745 However, if we 
consider Davies suggestion that ‘we might update [Tylor’s] enduring concept of 
animism to remind us of the psychological processes that seem attuned to perceive 
potentially active forces in the world around us’,746 then there may be grounds for 
such a label to be applied to PD interactions. 
 
To the extent, as described by Gendler and demonstrated by participants in Heider and 
Simmel experiments and our respondents, that ‘when subjects encounter patterns of 
motion that resemble genuine intentional actions, they have the habitual propensity to 
respond as if they were in the presence of an agent with beliefs and desires’,747 then 
we could classify our respondents’ proclivity to perceive ‘potentially active forces’ in 
PDs as a form of ‘animism’. 
 
Nonetheless, I would suggest that we reject this description, as it fails to recognise 
variations in the manner in which intention is attributed to PDs, i.e. relative to one’s 
worldview. As discussed, if the deceased are believed to persist in ‘Heaven’, then 
there is a sense in which the PD is accessed by the deceased ‘in Heaven’. 
 
If ‘biological’ motion is detected by a survivor with a secular worldview, inculcated 
in a digital doxa and wishing to continue a bond, then intention is attributed to the 
deceased, transmuted to their Profile. As the singular term ‘animism’ fails to account 
for these varying dynamics, and possibly denotes that the Digital possess an 
independent ‘anima’, it is of no real descriptive utility. 
 
While PD interactions may not correspond to notions of animism and pantheism, we 
may question whether this ritual could nonetheless be classified as a form of what 
                                                 
745 Pals, op. cit., p27. 
746 Davies, (2011), op. cit., p228. 
747 T. Gendler, ‘Alief in Action (and Reaction)’, Mind and Language, 23 (5), 2008, p552. 
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Graham et. al would describe as an ‘emerging online religion’, with reference to 
understandings of the multivalent term ‘religion’. In relation to a classical substantive 
definition, such as Tylor’s ‘belief in spiritual beings’, the issue is not, predominantly, 
the reference to ‘spiritual beings’; accommodation could be made to include notions 
of the deceased transcendent in this category, which would thus qualify PD 
interactions as ‘religious’. 
 
Instead, our primary concern is the condition of ‘belief’. Even examples of 
‘functional’ definitions of religion, i.e. those not referring to ‘spiritual beings’, often 
still contain reference to the condition of ‘belief’, e.g. Rue’s definition of religion as 
‘belief in the most explicit and systematically coherent interpretation of ideas about 
reality and value’.748 Or Durkheim’s definition of religion as a ‘unified system of 
beliefs and practices’.749 For it is questionable whether our respondents could be said 
to ‘believe’ that messages can be communicated via PDs.  
 
As outlined in our methodology, the difficulty with investigating instances of Digital 
Presence is that respondents are not cognisant of cause or influence; theirs is what 
James described as an ‘acquaintance-knowledge’,750 as a ‘feeling’ derived from 
experience encompassing ‘sensations, emotions, and vague feelings of relations’751 
similar to Sperber’s distinction between ‘encyclopaedic and symbolic knowledge’ 
(the latter ‘acquired’ through experience).752 
 
Whilst Sperber later described this distinction as one between ‘reflective beliefs and 
intuitive beliefs’,753 such ‘intuitive beliefs’ are derived from ‘innate, spontaneous, and 
unconscious perceptual and inferential processes’.754 This description then violates 
Bailey’s requirements that a ‘religious’ belief be ‘voluntarily adopted [and] not 
                                                 
748 Rue, op. cit., p144. 
749 See E. Durkheim, ‘The Elementary Forms of Religious Life’, (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 2008). 
750 W. James, ‘The Principles of Psychology’, (Vols. 1 and2), (NY: Henry Holt and Co, 1890), p221, 
cited in Rappaport, op. cit., p375. 
751 Ibid. 
752 D. Sperber, ‘Rethinking Symbolism’, (Cambridge: CUP, 1975), cited in Davies, (2002), op. cit., p11. 
753 D. Sperber, ‘Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs’, Mind and Language, 12, (1997), cited in T. Tremlin, 
‘Divergent Religion: A Dual-Process Model of Religious Thought, Behaviour, and Morphology’, p78, 
in H. Whitehead and R. McCavley (Eds) ‘Mind and Religion: Psychological and Cognitive 
Foundations of Religiosity’, (Oxford: AltaMira Press, 2005). 
754 Tremlin, op. cit., p78. 
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biologically determined’,755 which prompts us to question whether such ‘unconscious 
inferences’ can be described as ‘beliefs’ in accordance with the common usage and 
understanding of ‘belief’, i.e. as denoting a degree of autonomy and agency, if not 
necessarily ‘rationality’. 
 
The Ultimate Question – Profile Interactions as Lifestyle and Deathstyle 
 
Instead, could PD interactions and an attendant ‘feeling’ of Digital Presence be 
defined as examples of what Eliade referred to as ‘crypto-religion’,756 ‘implicit 
religion’, or ‘religiosity’? Bailey described ‘implicit religion’ as ‘anything present in 
lives that was comparable to religion, in any of its various dimensions and 
manifestations’,757 which would ‘probably not be perceived by its actors as 
religious’.758 This concept has been developed by a number of cognitive 
anthropologists, with Tremlin defining ‘implicit forms of religiosity’759 as ‘popular 
forms of religion practiced by regular people in everyday life’,760 which deviate from 
‘official beliefs and behaviours maintained by institutions’.761  
 
Ultimately, both ‘types of religiosity’, i.e. ‘official’ and ‘implicit’ are ‘simply one 
outcome of faculties of thought common to all normal brains’,762 and Day has 
similarly described all forms of ‘religiosity’ as ‘a predictable side effect of the human 
cognitive engine’s performance’.763 But what Bailey refers to as ‘religion, in any of its 
various dimensions and manifestations’ is by no means definitive or even certain, and 
it is unclear what Tremlin and Day are referring to. If they are referring to ritual, then 
we can ask why we need reference ‘religion’ at all. 
 
As Davies has noted, ‘implicit religion has, essentially, nothing to do with religion, 
                                                 
755 E. Bailey, ‘Implicit Religion’, Religion, 40 (4), 2010, p273. 
756 Eliade, 1957, op. cit., p24. 
757 Bailey, op. cit., p271. 
758 Ibid, p272. 
759 Tremlin, op. cit., p80. 
760 Ibid, p70. 
761 Ibid. 
762 Ibid, p69. 
763 M. Day, ‘Rethinking Naturalness: Modes of Religiosity and Religion in the Round’, p86, in 
Whitehead and McCavley, op. cit. 
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but everything to do with being human as a member of a particular society’.764 Herein 
lies the problem: even if we accept that ‘religion is simply one outcome of faculties of 
thought common to all normal brains’, it is not the only possible outcome. Simply 
‘being human’ entails attempting to make sense of the world as meaning-making 
animals, and ‘religion’ is but one type of meaning-making. 
 
Therefore, instead of drawing comparison between our respondents’ attitudes and 
behaviour and ‘religion’, it is more appropriate to view our respondents’ responses as 
the products of a worldview grappling with some of the fundamental questions 
humans ask about themselves and their place in the world. I use the term ‘worldview’ 
in accordance with Droogers and Harskamp’s usage of the term, as ‘analogous to 
culture, understood as both a human capacity and the result of exercising that 
competence’.765 
 
That is, both our intrinsic capacity to ‘link persons, social relations, objects, events, 
time and space’,766 and the collection of values and emotional repertoires different 
individuals employ to make meaning, as expressed in ‘the variety of answers given in 
religions, secular worldviews, ideologies and spiritualities’.767 
 
As noted, our respondents’ responses are the product of a very particular, secular 
worldview, and these responses are best understood as products of their worldview 
grappling with what Hijman and Smaling claim is one of the five ‘basic and ultimate 
questions that humans universally ask about themselves and their world’.768 Namely, 
one concerning ontology and eschatology: how is meaning to be made of death? 
 
This question is addressed by our respondents’ worldview in the form of 
transmutation to the Profile. In Smart’s typology of a worldview’s expression of an 
                                                 
764 D. Davies, ‘Implicit Religion and Inter-faith Dialogue in Human Perspective’, Implicit Religion, 2 
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766 Ibid, p20. 
767 Ibid, p23. 
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Een Inleiding’, in A. Smaling and E. Hijmans (Eds), ‘Kwalitatief Onderzoek en Levensbeschouwing’, 
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answer/solution to an ‘ultimate question’, which includes ritual, ethical, and 
institutional responses, I would posit that as well as this worldview’s response 
expressing itself through ritual, there is also a moral obligation inherent in these 
rituals. 
 
In my undergraduate dissertation study, I discovered that survivors were attempting to 
communicate messages such as ‘sorry I haven’t wrote on here in a couple of days, 
and their claims that ‘I try to talk to you everyday’ exhibited a sense of obligation to 
interact with PDs. Similarly, Catherine stressed that she wanted to ‘keep his presence 
there’ through interacting with the PD, and Lucy reported how members of the 
deceased’s network felt compelled to ‘post things… to try to keep her alive’. Again, 
this relates to the recognition that ‘selves are no more single existences than are atoms 
and molecules’,769 i.e. that reflexivity is intersubjective by nature, which consequently 
affirms the value of community. 
 
In agreement with Durkheim, this worldview acknowledges as an ‘eternal truth that 
outside of us there exists something greater than us, with which we enter into 
communion’,770 and that this is society. This worldview does not, however, attempt to 
dress society in the guise of god. Therefore, there is a sense of obligation in 
maintaining that community of significant others, a community that is palpable on 
SNS. Indeed, if we omit the ‘belief’ condition of Durkheim’s definition of ‘religion’ 
as given in his ‘Elementary Forms’, then these rituals of PD interactions and their 
corresponding sense of moral obligation to maintain community, till death shall not 
part, adhere to it. 
 
Although, reference to the term ‘religion’ is not necessary if we recognise that the 
term ‘worldview’ encompasses the meaning-making process, be it religious or secular. 
Thus, it is more useful to think of this aspect of worldview (the 
ontological/eschatology), and these expressions of it (both ritual and moral), as the 
‘death-style’ (or rather, deathstyle) of this particular worldview. By ‘deathstyle’ I 
refer to Davies, admittedly artificial distinction between the ‘degree of distance 
                                                 
769 M. Jackson, ‘Minima Ethnographica’, (London: UCP, 1998), p6, cited in Droogers and Harskamp, 
op. cit., p28. 
770 See Durkheim, op. cit. 
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between issues that pre-occupy our everyday life activities and those that concern us 
as far as death is concern’.771  
 
We can observe then that this worldview’s deathstyle is not what Bauman and Lévi-
Strauss would describe as ‘anthropoemic’, wherein the deceased are ‘segregated, and 
separated’.772 Contrary to claim’s that Western societies can be characterised by ‘the 
development of a physical, and symbolic, separation between the living, and the 
dead’,773 the deceased are not ‘secluded from society’.774  
 
Instead, the lifestyle of maintaining a community of significant others who contribute 
to the intersubjective reflexive process is not just reflected by the deathstyle. The 
deathstyle is the lifestyle, as the place of the deceased within a community of 
significant others is actively maintained, (integrated and un-sequestered) in the same 
manner in death as it was in life. 
 
Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain – Preserving Enchantment 
 
However described, these interactions discredit Weber’s prediction that the world ‘is 
en-route to a disenchanted future’.775 Our respondents experience a sense of 
enchantment, i.e. they are faced with something ‘uncanny, weird, mysterious or 
awesome’,776 where ‘neither science nor practical knowledge seem of much utility’.777 
They are ‘confronted by circumstances or occurrences so perculiar and so beyond our 
present understanding as to leave [them] convinced that, were they to be understood, 
[their] image of how the world operates would be radically transformed’.778 
 
There are indications that such a transformation is occurring in Lucy, who did not 
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‘believe in anything’ but as a consequence of her experiences of Digital Presence, is 
more inclined to entertain the possibility of some form of post-mortem persistence; 
she is ‘starting to change… I definitely believe more now in her, sticking around 
somewhere, than I used to’. Indeed, Lucy stated that ‘I was interested in what you 
emailed [because] I’m an atheist… which again is why I was interested’, as she 
wanted to attempt to understand something so peculiar, that it could radically 
transform her image of how the world operates.  
 
There is also the accompanying ‘tincture of unease’779 induced by the phenomenon’s 
‘uncanny flavour’,780 an unease that ‘derives from the assault upon our prior sense of 
how the world works – and thus upon our practical competence in dealing with it’.781 
As noted, this sense of unease is evident as both respondents visibly struggled to 
comprehend their experiences. However, if Schneider is correct in claiming that 
‘successful explanation domesticates the uncanny by revealing the engines behind it, 
like Toto in the Wizard of Oz, demystifying events by drawing back the veil that 
obscured their causes’,782 then far be it from us to draw back the veil. 
 
If attempts to reveal the mechanics of Digital Presence could be deleterious to a PDs 
ability to function as the sole means of continued contact and communication with 
their beloved decedents, then I should prefer that Catherine and Lucy remain 
enchanted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
779 Ibid. 
780 Ibid. 
781 Ibid. 
782 Schneider, p4. 
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                                                 Conclusion 
 
We are now in a position to return to our initial concerns, as detailed at the outset of 
this study. 
 
I propose that some survivors experience Digital Presence because of the manner in 
which they interpret a confluence of neurological processes, i.e. contact comfort, 
‘biological’ motion detection, and coupled system recognition. The cumulative effect 
of these processes stipulates that an intention (reading Facebook messages) must be 
attributed to the deceased. However, a secular worldview in a digital doxa does not 
allow for the deceased to read messages ‘on Facebook up in Heaven’783 as some 
religious worldviews do. Instead, it allows (and requires) the deceased to be present 
on their Profiles via the transmutation of their consciousness/‘ontic substance’. 
 
Subsequently, the prospect of Profile memorialisation is met with such hostility 
because a memorialised Profile is ‘deceased’, as opposed to ‘living’. Therefore, a 
memorialised Profile can no longer function as a viable conduit for the transmuted 
‘ontic substance’ of the deceased, which would negate any sense of Digital Presence 
and the potential to communicate with the deceased. The phenomenon is not best 
described as a form of ‘religiosity’. Instead, it is best understood as the lifestyle, and 
the deathstyle, of a secular worldview in a digital doxa.  
 
Of course, more research must be conducted to verify this hypothesis. Future studies 
must determine whether other survivors who have experienced Digital Presence have 
also interacted with ‘living’ Profiles of deceased users; indeed, such studies must 
establish whether the binary ‘normal/living’, ‘abnormal/deceased’ classification is 
evident in other survivors’ accounts. They must also note whether respondents share 
Catherine and Lucy’s secular worldview and have also been inculcated in a digital 
doxa; they could test for the latter by establishing the frequency and overall duration 
of a respondent’s engagement with the Digital. 
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A future study could then conduct a series of fMRI scans on respondents whilst they 
engage with ‘living’ Profiles of deceased users, e.g. by accessing Facebook on fMRI 
compatible devices whilst they are scanned. Then, degrees of STS/mPFC stimulation 
could be noted and compared with baseline levels to test our hypothesis. 
 
It would also be interesting to examine the prevalence and character of Digital 
Presence in other cultural contexts. For example, is Digital Presence more prevalent in 
Hindu societies, where the concept of the ‘Avatar’ has far deeper historio-cultural 
roots than our current British context? This is one of a number of questions which 
could be explored in future research. 
 
Although, we may well question whether Facebook will still be relevant for future 
studies of DPMC. I fully concur with Brasher’s claim that ‘forecasting the future… is 
a pastime equivalent to bungee-jumping off a bridge using a badly frayed cord. 
Bodies lie broken on the rocks below’.784 Nonetheless, convention dictates that we 
consider possible future developments and their impact on our topic, and there are a 
plethora of innovations which could contribute to technology’s ‘abolishing the 
conception of death which now prevails in the world’.785 
 
Services such as ‘Liveson’ already promise that we can ‘keep tweeting even after 
we’ve passed away’.786 With their company motto, ‘when your heart stops beating, 
you’ll keep tweeting’, Liveson’s AI software can analyse a Twitter account to 
discover a user’s ‘likes, tastes and syntax’.787 Once initiated, the service accesses the 
deceased’s Twitter account, and tweets as though the deceased were commenting on 
events from beyond the grave. 
 
AI software is also being developed to allow us to ‘become virtually immortal’788 in 
more interactive forms. The ‘Eternime’ platform, currently in its beta testing phase, 
‘collects your thoughts, stories and memories, curates them, and creates an intelligent 
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avatar that looks like you’.789 This avatar ‘will live forever… and people could 
interact with it as if they were talking to you’.790  
 
By answering questions about themselves and allowing the platform to access their 
social media accounts, individuals can create avatars; upon their demise, their 
survivors can converse with these avatars as though conversing with the dead on 
Skype. Different neurological processes may be operant from those that generate the 
sense of Digital Presence found on Facebook. But we might imagine that the prospect 
of not only being able to ‘get hold of’791 our decedents, but to have them get hold of 
us might invoke a powerful sense that the deceased are present in these new digital 
avatars.  
 
New immersive forms of virtual reality and advances in digital scanning technology 
also present opportunities for those seeking to conquer death. The Oculus Rift, a 
virtual reality company bought by Facebook in July 2014 for $2bn allows users to 
enter fully immersive virtual worlds via a VR headset. In the words of Scharf, the 
founder of the world’s largest virtual reality conference: ‘you will be able to go inside 
the internet; the internet will become a place’.792 
 
Digital scanning and graphic processing capabilities have now reached a degree of 
sophistication whereby an avatar in these virtual worlds is a near-perfect 
representation of its user’s physical body. Two users on opposite sides of our planet 
can meet face-to-face in vast virtual worlds, and given the recent development of 
teledildonic technology, they can remotely have sex too. 
 
Teledildonic devices allow two remote parties to have a form of digital intercourse. 
Companies like Kiiroo have created wearable devices which transmit motions and 
actions performed on one device, through the internet to the corresponding device. 
Such haptic peripherals allow us to not only see and hear people in virtual worlds, but 
                                                 
789 Ibid. 
790 Ibid. 
791 Sam, respondent in my undergraduate dissertation study, Durham, 2013. 
792 Vice, op. cit. 
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to touch them as well.793 
 
The potential applications of these technologies are already apparent. In the course of 
a life, a person could be scanned, and they could upload their avatar into an Oculus 
Rift virtual environment. They could use haptic peripherals like Kiiroo, which could 
record data about their bodies. And they could create an Eternime account, 
programmed to synchronise with their Oculus Rift avatar upon their demise. 
 
An avatar that looks like them, talks like them and feels like them would live online 
for any and all to interact with in perpetuity. We have accounts of 20th century 
spiritualists who claimed to have had ‘sex with the spirits’794 of their deceased 
spouses. With the technologies either currently available to us or in their final testing 
stages, we need only replace ‘spirits’ with ‘avatars’ and the same might be true of 
some survivors in the not so distant future. 
 
Again, forecasting the future is a fool’s errand. Facebook has continuously altered its 
policy on PDs. From automatically deleting them, to leaving them, to memorialising 
them. It changed its policy during the course of this study when it introduced the 
‘Legacy Contact’ feature in February 2015. Ultimately, we cannot know what might 
become of PDs. Or whether Facebook, as central as it may be to the lives of 1.49 
billion people at present, may be a dormant repository of forgotten memories in 10 
years time. 
 
What we do know is that the human animal’s capacity to pursue the transcendence 
project is limitless, and the possibilities afforded by digital technologies portend to a 
future in which for some survivors it will continue to be Online as it is in Heaven. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
793 Timmermans, cited in Ibid. 
794 C. Kernahan, ‘‘Black Objects’: Plain Speaking and Painful Facts about Spiritualism’, (London: 
R.T.S, 1920), cited in Waters, op. cit., p426. 
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